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Abstract
Title of Dissertation: Virtual Aids to Navigation
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy
There are many examples of master, bridge crew and pilot errors in navigation causing
grounding under adverse circumstances that were known and published in official
notices and records. Also dangerous are hazards to navigation resulting from dynamic
changes within the marine environment, inadequate surveys and charts. This research
attempts to reduce grounding and allision incidents and increase safety of navigation by
expanding mariner situational awareness at and below the waterline using new
technology and developing methods for the creation, implementation and display of
Virtual Aids to Navigation (AtoN) and related navigation information. This approach
has widespread significance beyond commonly encountered navigation situations.
Increased vessel navigation activity in the Arctic and sub-Arctic regions engenders risk
due, in part, to the inability to place navigational aids and buoys in constantly changing
ice conditions. Similar conditions exist in tropical regions where sinker placement to
moor buoys in sensitive environmental areas with coral reefs is problematic.
Underdeveloped regions also lack assets and infrastructure needed to provide adequate
navigation services, and infrastructure can also rapidly perish in developed regions
during times of war and natural disaster.
This research exploits rapidly developing advances in environmental sensing
technology, evolving capabilities and improved methods for reporting real time
environmental data that can substantially expand electronic navigation aid availability
and improve knowledge of undersea terrain and imminent hazards to navigation that
may adversely affect ship operations. This is most needed in areas where physical aids
to navigation are scarce or non-existent as well as in areas where vessel traffic is
congested. Research to expand related vessel capabilities is accomplished to overcome
limitations in existing and planned electronic aids, expanding global capabilities and
resources at relatively low-cost. New methods for sensor fusion are also explored to
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reduce overall complexity and improve integration with other navigation systems with
the goal of simplifying navigation tasks. An additional goal is to supplement training
program content by expanding technical resources and capabilities within the confines
of existing International Convention on Standards for Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) requirements, while improving safety by providing
new techniques to enhance situational awareness.
Key Words: Aid to Navigation, AtoN, 3-dimensional Forward-looking Sonar, 3D-FLS,
Hydrographic Survey, Virtual AtoN
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Chapter 1

Introduction

This chapter describes Virtual Aids to Navigation (AtoN) that comprise the domain of
the research embodied within this dissertation. The subjects of hydrographic survey and
the Arctic are also discussed as they form elements essential to the placement of AtoN
and their operating environment.
1.1

Background

There exist various landmarks, markers, devices and other natural features, manmade
signs and apparatuses to aid travelers in determining their location and direction of
travel and to identify routes between destinations, warn of dangers and obstructions to
travel, and to assess the rate of progress being made in their transit. In the maritime and
aviation communities such features, signs and apparatuses are referred to as aids to
navigation that are found both within the physical environment as well as on navigation
charts that depict their geographic positions and characteristics by which their purpose
and function may be recognized. Long range AtoN include Global Navigation Satellite
Systems (GNSS) such as the United States Global Positioning System (GPS), Russia’s
Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS), the European Union’s Galileo,
China’s BeiDou Navigation Satellite System, and the low frequency Long Range
Navigation (eLORAN) radio systems. Short range maritime AtoN include various
lighted and unlighted beacons and buoys, ranges, lighthouses, leading lights and
associated sound signals.
The Virtual AtoN concept of a charted aid to navigation having no physical presence at
the charted location is relatively new to maritime use. However, this concept is now
becoming more widespread and accepted with the adoption of Automated Identification
System (AIS) radio-based technology that can project a virtual AtoN to a specific
position for display on AIS monitors and AIS-capable Radar and Electronic Chart
Display and Information System (ECDIS) monitors. This is accomplished using a Very
High Frequency (VHF) radio transmitter augmented with AIS capabilities located
within the line of sight of the specific position at which an AIS virtual AtoN is
deployed. A similar approach has been implemented in the aviation community for
many decades beginning in the middle of 20th century in the form of VHF Omni-
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directional Radio Ranges (VOR). Virtual navigation fixes are defined by the
intersection of radials from two different VOR stations, and bearings to and from these
stations are also provided facilitating navigation along traffic routes and corridors.
VOR technology in aviation is gradually being replaced with GNSS enabling direct
routing between origins and destinations. Universal adoption of GNSS provides equally
useful utility to mariners for navigation.
1.2

Virtual aids to navigation

The results of this research embody a new and unique approach for Virtual AtoN
implementation through a modern realization of piloting as a commonly recognized
method of marine navigation defined in Bowditch (2002) as, “navigating in restricted
waters with frequent determination of position relative to geographic and hydrographic
features”. The approach recognizes the limitations of modern satellite and radio-based
navigation systems due to atmospheric phenomena, spoofing, aliasing and denial of
service resulting from natural events and manmade actions and activities. This results
in a “ship-centric” orientation providing the watchstander with the tools necessary to
perform successful navigation using ship’s own resources without overreliance upon
external sources and systems such as GNSS and AIS. The described Virtual AtoN may
be static in terms of their characteristics not changing over long periods of time, or
dynamic as their characteristics may change in both the time and space domains in
accordance with the specifications of the vessel itself by providing a capability to
discern hazards to navigation based upon operating requirements in terms of draft,
speed and other factors rather than using a static AtoN model. Virtual AtoN may also
be permanent, temporary or momentary in duration reflecting the indication of a hazard
to navigation detected using 3-dimenstional forward looking navigation sonar (3DFLS) and displayed on ECDIS in real time having significant relevance to the vessel
while making way.
The Virtual AtoN concept resulting from this research is enhanced beyond existing AIS
virtual AtoN technology from several perspectives. First, the results reflect a truly
Virtual AtoN described by International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and
Lighthouse Authorities - IALA (1081) as,
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“A virtual aid to navigation (Virtual AtoN) does not physically exist but is a
digital information object promulgated by an authorised service provider
that can be presented on navigational systems”,
where the described Virtual AtoN is computer-generated and exists entirely as a digital
data object with no corresponding presence in the physical environment such as a VHF
transmitter, sinkers or piles required for implementation. Virtual AtoN also include
expanded functional elements beyond AIS virtual AtoN to support static and dynamic
characteristics with permanent, temporary and momentary durations that are only
possible using a ship-centric approach on a vessel equipped with modern environmental
sensors. The result is a highly versatile Virtual AtoN capable of providing
comprehensive and timely information to mariners about hazards to navigation, safe
waterways, caution and avoidance areas.
Second, the Virtual AtoN digital information object contains the complete set of
functional and operational characteristics in addition to a high resolution 3-dimensional
topological model of the physical environment at and adjacent to the position at which
the Virtual AtoN is deployed. Such enhancement to the traditional characteristics of an
AtoN provides an inherent capability for self-verification that the AtoN is on station
and watching properly defined as, “an aid to navigation on its assigned position
exhibiting the advertised characteristics in all respects” and “the state of an aid to
navigation on charted position and exhibiting its proper characteristics” (USCG,
M16500.7A; Bowditch, 2002a). The act of watching properly is closely related to AtoN
availability described by IALA (1035) as, “the probability that an aid to navigation or a
system of aids to navigation, as designed by the Competent Authority, is performing its
specified function at any randomly chosen time”. This concept may also be applied to
verification of both traditional, physical and AIS AtoN, and represents advancement in
technology that can significantly expand and enhance the capabilities of scarce national
resources presently dedicated to perform this task.
The concepts of ship-centricity, dynamic and momentary AtoN and the new capabilities
they provide as advanced by this research are contrary to the present static
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functionalities, methods and procedures used by competent national authorities and
authorized service providers in provisioning charting and AtoN services. For example,
rather than having to rely on navigation charts that are blank and contain no soundings,
a ship-centric approach places the tools necessary to complete a safe passage directly
into the hands of the mariner. This is accomplished by using 3D-FLS data to provide
soundings information and create Virtual AtoN of momentary duration representing
detected hazards to navigation existing within the water column but not attached to the
bottom for immediate display using existing symbology on ECDIS. Indeed, the time
frames currently required to properly establish such Virtual AtoN using existing
practices would nullify many of their benefits.
The approach followed for Virtual AtoN introduction includes examination and
approval by responsible authorities of the methods and processes for their creation and
to take best advantage of their static and dynamic characteristics. Their initial
deployment should only be to areas where existing AtoN services are deficient or nonexistent due to environmental and logistical challenges, such as in the Arctic where ice
movement can destroy physical AtoN, and in tropical locations where the potential to
damage sensitive coral reefs prevents the placement of sinkers for physical AtoN.
1.3

Hydrographic survey

The impetus for initiating research into Virtual AtoN lies in a perceived need for such
services in the Arctic and other remote places where existing AtoN services are
inadequate or do not exist at all. A key factor is the availability of hydrographic survey
results adequate to determine where AtoN are most needed. Existing limitations in the
present AtoN system and inadequate resources to perform hydrographic surveys
impede expansion to geographic regions experiencing significant growth in marine
traffic yet are highly remote and ecologically fragile. This is a problem worldwide, with
large gaps along major international shipping routes in the Indian Ocean, South China
Sea, Western Pacific and adjacent waters. This problem also exists in the Caribbean,
some coastal waters of Africa, Australasia, Oceania and the Antarctic where modern
surveys, metrication and datum shift to World Geodetic System 1984 (WGS84) are all
urgent requirements in locations which are now frequented by cruise liners (IHO C-55).
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In the United States this includes thousands of square miles in the Arctic and sub-Arctic
encompassing the northern slope of Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, and tropical regions
spanning the Hawaiian Islands to Midway Atoll and other US territories. Many of these
areas are poorly charted, if they are charted at all. The US National Oceanographic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) states that the Arctic is severely deficient in
many capabilities extended to the rest of the Nation and large gaps exist in the
information they do have as illustrated by empty white space on navigation charts of
the region (NOAA, 2011; 2013).
In areas where surveys have not been conducted to modern standards and charts are
blank or contain sparse information, a ship-centric approach involves acquiring live
soundings information ahead of the vessel using 3D-FLS and displaying this in real
time as soundings on ECDIS and for the creation of Virtual AtoN of momentary
duration. This depth information can also be stored for subsequent use by national
hydrographic and AtoN authorities for chartmaking and the placement of static and
dynamic Virtual AtoN in these areas in the future. Although 3D-FLS is not intended to
replace multibeam sonar in performing hydrographic surveys, its use by vessels of
opportunity can enhance safety of navigation and supplement national hydrographic
authority survey vessel assets by providing an independent source of high-resolution
3D bottom topography data and expanding geographic coverage to new areas.
1.4

Aid to Navigation establishment

The International Maritime Organization (IMO) requires Governments to provide AtoN
as the volume of traffic dictates and the degree of risk requires (SOLAS 74/78).
According to the U.S. Coast Guard, a situation to be avoided unless specifically
warranted by unusual circumstances is the establishment of AtoN in areas not properly
charted or where they would invite the inexperienced to attempt a passage which would
still be dangerous in spite of the AtoN (USCG, M16500.7A(a)). The increasing traffic
in the Arctic region would in itself qualify as unusual circumstances in terms of the
establishment of AtoN. Given the inadequacy of Arctic surveys and navigation charting
and the increasing level of traffic in the region, the requirements of this research
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identified a need to accomplish adequate hydrographic surveys and the establishment of
AtoN through extraordinary means. Fulfillment of this need was investigated through
the examination of potential technological solutions.
1.5

Enabling technologies

An analysis of environmental sensing technologies was performed to determine which,
if any, sensors were sufficiently capable, suitable and able to supplement existing
sensor suites to aid mariners in safely navigating poorly surveyed and unsurveyed
waters. Due to the remoteness of the Arctic the scope of this analysis was limited to
vessels that are most likely to be involved in transits of the region and for which the
consequences of grounding and other incidents would be most significant. This
includes vessels subject to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea
(SOLAS) convention and the International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters
(the Polar Code) but excludes many small vessels whose transits tend to be local using
local knowledge, have minimal instrumentation and sensor suites, and generally
provide low environmental risk (SOLAS 74/78a; MSC.385(94)). The basic sensor suite
presently mandated by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) as carriage
requirements on SOLAS vessels includes radar, AIS, ECDIS and echosounder in
addition to various communication devices and GNSS. With the exception of the
echosounder, all other sensors and equipment are designed for use with respect to the
physical environment above the waterline. The single-beam echosounder is the sole
sensor capable of providing visibility into the underwater environment, and this is only
to the extent of determining water depth directly below the hull and nowhere else. The
availability of a more advanced multi-beam echosounder on the bridge would not
provide significant advantage over the single-beam echosounder as this would yield
depth information along a swath of the bottom athwartships, and nowhere else.
The analysis concluded that the only sensor capable of assisting vessels in safely
navigating poorly surveyed and unsurveyed waters by providing insight into the
underwater topography ahead of the bow of a vessel making way is an echosounder
with 3-dimensional forward-looking capabilities that encompasses 3D-FLS. This
dissertation reports results and findings obtained from different experiments performed
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at diverse geographical locations using various 3D-FLS types and manufacturers’
models examined during the course of this research. Its use, along with a single beam
echo sounder, in verifying AtoN as watching properly and as a means to perform
hydrographic survey in accordance with International Hydrographic Organization
(IHO) standards and requirements is also discussed.
1.6

Frames of reference

A comprehensive treatise of Virtual AtoN research must cover a broad range of subject
matter spanning multiple areas of responsibility. Five frames of reference have been
considered in conducting this research and in the performance of investigations that
include:
• Applications – Where the results of this research may be applied,
• Sensors – Environmental sensors needed to accomplish the research objectives,
• Engineering – Resources needed to build the systems resulting from the research,
• Regulatory – Authorities accountable for research adoption and implementation, and
• Training – Instruction on the use of the research results.
A graphic that attempts to depict the scope and nature of these subjects and the frames
of reference these represent is illustrated in Figure 1.1.
Efforts have been made to interact with several different maritime communities to
explore the implications of Virtual AtoN research. This includes diverse areas of
application, technical authorities both in sensor development and in the engineering of
AtoN systems, educators involved in the training of mariners, and regulatory authorities
at the national and international levels.
Application – Geographic areas where the use of Virtual AtoN is most appropriate
include those where existing AtoN systems and their infrastructure are not in place
and/or cannot rapidly be put in place to support essential operations. Such areas include
the Arctic where ice movement can move or destroy physical AtoN rendering them
ineffective and logistical and maintenance support is hampered by the large distances
involved, harsh weather conditions and lack of personnel. Virtual AtoN can also benefit
tropical regions in which the placement of sinkers to moor physical AtoN or to place
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HF transmitters to support AIS AtoN can harm coral reefs or other sensitive
environmental features, and to provide guidance to mariners where such services would
not otherwise be available. Additional locations include those ravaged by the effects of
war or natural disaster where existing infrastructure has been destroyed. The ability to
rapidly deploy Virtual AtoN in such locations may assist in providing logistical support
for reinforcement of manpower and materiel and the provisioning of food and building
materials for relief efforts.

Figure 1.1: Frames of reference for Virtual AtoN research
Sensors – The transit of poorly charted waters where Virtual AtoN have been deployed
requires the use of the complete sensor suite on the bridge of a vessel subject to SOLAS
requirements. Additional sensor requirements in the form of 3D-FLS are needed in such
areas when prior surveys are inadequate resulting in poor charting and Virtual AtoN are
not present.
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Engineering – Engineering efforts are accomplished in the analysis of 3D-FLS
capabilities to assist in detecting hazards to navigation and to acquire information for
hydrographic survey and chart making. Multi-sensor integration involving the use of
Virtual AtoN combined with 3D-FLS, ECDIS, single beam echo sounder, AIS, radar,
GNSS and other sensors is also considered as the basis for automating much of the data
acquisition aspects of this research whereby crowd sourcing of hydrographic data and
Virtual AtoN system design may be accomplished. However, this scope of this research
has presently been limited to the use of 3D-FLS in combination with the single beam
echo sounder for the purposes of assisting in the verification of Virtual AtoN as being
in the correct position and watching properly.
Human factors and training – Human factors are examined related to the use of 3DFLS as a means for navigating without having to impose any additional training
requirements on watchstanders and other crewmembers. Further consideration of
human factors is also accomplished pertaining to the use of 3D-FLS and the technical
means for its display on ECDIS as well as the setting of alarms and training issues. The
focus of these efforts was to integrate 3D-FLS with ECDIS rather than require the use
of another display on the bridge, to adopt standard protocols for the display of
electronic symbols, and in determining reaction times for watchstander intervention
upon detection of hazards to navigation.
Regulatory environment – The fifth frame of reference has to do with the regulatory
environment and the many governmental, inter-governmental and non-governmental
organizations in charge of the various areas of responsibility identified in this research.
Governmental organizations such as the Coast Guard and NOAA are responsible for
implementing IMO, IHO and national guidance in the United States; each of which are
represented at the IMO and IHO. At the international level the IMO is cognizant of
maritime affairs and the IHO is cognizant for issues pertaining to hydrographic survey
and chart making. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) include many professional
and technical organizations such as International Association of Marine Aids to
Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA), the Nautical Institute (NI), the Cruise
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Line Industry Association (CLIA), and many others that provide industry, causespecific and other representation at the IMO and IHO.
1.7

Objectives and research questions

The hypothesis investigated by this research is that environmental sensor data can be
acquired, managed, adopted and applied to provide real time guidance for vessels to
safely transit uncharted waters and/or waters lacking physical aids to navigation. The
overall goal is to determine the potential for and to design and evaluate ship-centric
Virtual AtoN capable of rapid deployment and adapting to dynamic environmental and
situational conditions enabling safe ship’s navigation without benefit of physical AtoN
in remote and underdeveloped locations, war zones and disaster areas.
The specific objectives of the research are as follows:
1. Facilitating safe vessel transits of uncharted and poorly surveyed waters, as well as
waters lacking physical aids to navigation;
2. Creating infrastructure to support navigation system dynamic sensor fusion and
integration with vector chart data to enhance watchstander situational awareness;
3. Compatibility with existing and evolving standards and practices for AtoN, AIS,
ECDIS, other eNavigation methods and technologies; and satellite services for
GNSS positioning and data communications;
To achieve these objectives, the following questions have guided this research:
1. What sources of environmental sensor data can be used to maintain a lookout below
the waterline, and are these data of sufficient resolution to safely use in vessel
navigation? Additional aspects of this same question include:
• How may these environmental sensor data be acquired, and with what area of
coverage? Also, are the measurements repeatable and able to provide the same
data at different times and conditions?
• Are bottom, submerged and/or floating hazards to navigation (HtoN) detectable,
to what degree and accuracy, and under what conditions?
• How may hazards to navigation be represented to watchstanders as Virtual AtoN
in a manner that is intuitive, understandable and correct?
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2. Can data necessary to create static and dynamic Virtual AtoN be communicated to
responsible AtoN authorities with sufficient resolution to meet evolving AtoN
implementation goals and practices?
3. Can 3D-FLS survey data be communicated to national hydrographic authorities
with sufficient resolution to meet charting standards?
1.8

Appended papers

In addition to the main body of text, this dissertation is based upon the research results
reported and described within the following papers:
Paper 1 – Wright, R.G. and Baldauf, M. (2016) ‘Virtual Electronic Aids to
Navigation for Remote and Ecologically Sensitive Regions’, Journal of Navigation,
1–17. DOI: 10.1017/S0373463316000527.
This paper describes the results of research that determines whether Virtual AtoN
existing entirely as digital information objects can overcome the practical limitations of
physical AtoN and AIS virtual AtoN. Also described are possible methods of
deployment based upon similar concepts already in use.
Paper 2 – Wright R.G. and Baldauf M. (2016) Correlation of Virtual Aids to
Navigation to the Physical Environment. TransNav, the International Journal on
Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation, Vol. 10, No. 2, 287-299. DOI:
10.12716/1001.10.02.11
This paper describes the results of research in the ability of Virtual AtoN to fulfill
traditional navigation aid functions by considering attributes of the physical
environment to help ensure their proper location and to verify the display of correct
characteristics.
Paper 3 – Wright R.G. and Baldauf M. (2016). Hydrographic Survey in Remote
Regions: Using Vessels of Opportunity Equipped with 3-dimensional ForwardLooking Sonar. Journal of Marine Geodesy. Vol. 39, No. 6, 439-357. DOI
10.1080/01490419.2016.1245266
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This paper describes research efforts to exploit the capabilities of commercial-off-theshelf 3D-FLS installed on expeditionary and other vessels of opportunity for
hydrographic survey and detecting bottom features to navigate by georeferencing. Also
cited are capabilities to provide high-resolution full bottom survey data to supplement
the assets of responsible hydrographic survey authorities in exploring and charting
these regions.
Paper 4 – Wright R.G. and Baldauf, M. (2016) Arctic Environmental Preservation
through Grounding Avoidance, L.P. Hildebrand & L.W. Brigham, editors.
Springer International Publishing, AG, Cham. London. Submitted, undergoing
peer review.
This paper describes the Arctic in terms of transit routes, the challenges of Arctic
navigation and increases in vessel groundings that have occurred and may potentially
occur as traffic in the region increases. The use of Virtual AtoN and 3D-FLS as means
for developing strategies to avoid groundings and preserving the Arctic environment is
considered.
Paper 5 – Wright R.G. and Baldauf M. (2014) ‘Enhanced Situational Awareness
through Muli-Sensor Integration’, in Proc. 18th International Navigation Simulator
Lecturers' Conference (INSLC 18), Buzzards Bay, Massachusetts USA, 40-59.
ISBN 978-0-692-29012-5.
This paper examines the capabilities of 3D-FLS to detect hazards to navigation at
cruising speed through an in-depth analysis of the Costa Concordia tragedy. Insight into
bridge alerts and alarms that may have been generated had 3D-FLS been installed,
operational and observed just prior to the grounding are also provided.
1.9

Other related papers and publications

Additional presentations, papers and publications resulting from this research useful to
supplement the five primary papers cited in this dissertation are listed as follows:
• Wright R.G., Baldauf M. “Physical Aspects of Virtual Aids to Navigation”,
Activities in Navigation – Marine Navigation and Safety of Sea Transportation; ed.
Adam Weintrit, 61-68, 2015, CRC Press, London.
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• Wright R.G., Zimmerman C. “Vector Data Extraction from Forward-Looking Sonar
Imagery for Hydrographic Survey and Hazard to Navigation Detection”, Proc. of
IEEE/MTS Oceans Conference, Washington D.C., 19-22 October 2015.
• Wright R.G., Baldauf, M. “A Georeferencing Approach to Real-Time Virtual Aid to
Navigation Verification”, in Proc. ION GNSS+ Conference 2015, Institute of
Navigation, Tampa, FL, 14-18 Sep. 2015.
• Wright R.G., Baldauf M. “Improving the Safety of Polar Navigation – Contribution
of New Technology and Training”, presented at 6th Arctic Shipping Summit,
Montreal, Canada, 18-19 March 2015.
• Wright R.G.; Baldauf M.: “Collaborative Navigation through the Establishment and
Distribution of Electronic Aids to Navigation in Real Time”, in Proc. Joint
Navigation Conference, Institute of Navigation, 16-19 June 2014, Orlando, FL.
• Mehdi, 2016: Mehdi Raza Ali, Wright R. Glenn and Baldauf Michael. “3-dimensional
Forward-looking Sonar: Offshore Wind Farm Applications”, 2016 European
Navigation Conference, Helsinki, Finland.
• Patent Application: Number 62218306, “Method of Virtual Aid to Navigation
Verification using Georeferencing”, US Patent and Trademark Office. Filing Date:
14 September 2015. Named Inventor: R. Glenn Wright.
• Patent Application: Number 62378691, “Virtual Dynamic Aids to Navigation”, US
Patent and Trademark Office. Filing Date: 24 August 2016. Named Inventor: R.
Glenn Wright.
1.10

Limitations

This dissertation presents a new approach towards the design, development and
implementation of Virtual AtoN systems that can complement and work in conjunction
with existing AtoN. The theories and concepts described do not presently conform to
nor are in accordance with existing practices of national and international AtoN or
hydrographic authorities. Analysis of the integration of the processes and products
involved in Virtual AtoN creation with responsible authorities is beyond the scope of
this research and must be investigated further with their cooperation.
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Discussion is provided on the use of 3D-FLS to perform hydrographic survey of the sea
bed ahead of the vessel’s path of transit as well as to analyze the features and
characteristics of the water column itself to detect potential hazards to navigation. It
should be noted that 3D-FLS is presently not mandated for use by the IMO or any
national authority under equipment carriage requirements for vessels, nor is its use
presently sanctioned for hydrographic survey by the IHO or any national authority.
1.11

Structure of the dissertation

Chapter 1 provides an introduction to the domain of this research. The aims and
objectives of the research are described in Chapter 2, followed by a discussion of the
theoretical underpinnings of the approach in Chapter 3. Five areas of study examined as
part of this research effort are discussed in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5 the materials and
methods used in this research are described. Chapter 6 presents the results of this
research, followed by a discussion of these results in Chapter 7. In Chapter 8 findings
and conclusions are provided.
1.12

Discussion of aid to navigation terminology

During the course of this research it came to light that there are several different terms
with similar meanings, and different meanings for similar terms pertaining to aids to
navigation. The use of proper terminology in a new discipline requires a learning curve
as these concepts mature. The papers appended to this dissertation provide such an
example as the terminology has changed in these writings over the several year course
of this research. In an attempt to clarify the present use and meaning of terminology
within the context of new capabilities identified herein, a summary of the following
words, terms and working definitions are offered here for the basis of discussion:
• Aid to Navigation (AtoN) – Any device or system, external to a vessel, which is
provided to help a mariner determine position and course, to warn of dangers or of
obstructions, or to give advice about the location of a best or preferred route (IALA
NAVGUIDE, 2014).
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• Physical Aid to Navigation (Physical AtoN) – Reference to visual and other
physical (real) aids to navigation in contrast to electronic AIS AtoN (IALA
NAVGUIDE, 2014a).
• AIS Aid to Navigation (AIS AtoN) – AIS AtoN that emanate VHF radio
transmissions and can vary from the presence of an actual transmitter on a physical
AtoN, to the transmission of a ‘synthetic’ or ‘virtual’ AtoN as a Message 21 from
an AIS base station to a location within the radio transmission range of the AIS
base station (IALA 1062).
• Virtual Aid to Navigation (Virtual AtoN) – A Virtual AtoN does not physically
exist but is a digital information object promulgated by an authorized service
provider that can be presented on navigational systems (IALA 1081). In terms of
letter capitalization, the word “Virtual” when associated with “AtoN” is capitalized
in IALA 1081. This convention has been adopted throughout this dissertation.
However, several variations of this practice may be spotted in the appended papers
as usage appears to have changed over time. Two types of Virtual AtoN exist in
terms of behavioral characteristics:
- Static: Characteristics do not change over long periods of time, such as when
emulating a physical AtoN.
- Dynamic: Characteristics may change in both the time and spatial domains in
accordance with the specifications of the vessel itself by providing a capability to
discern hazards to navigation based upon operating requirements in terms of
draft, speed and other factors.
Both Static and Dynamic Virtual AtoN may be implemented with time durations
that are permanent, temporary or momentary in nature.
Other commonly used terms found in discussion on this subject contain variations of
the terms described above. These include:
• Electronic Aid to Navigation (eAtoN or e-AtoN) – Reference to AIS AtoN
emphasizing their electronic nature in contrast to physical AtoN (USCG 11D, 2014;
Lewald, 2015).
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• Real AIS Aid to Navigation (Real AIS AtoN) – A ‘real’ AIS AtoN is transmitted as
a Message 21 from an AIS Base Station that is physically located on the AtoN
(IALA 1062a).
• Synthetic AIS Aid to Navigation (Synthetic AIS AtoN) – A ‘synthetic’ AIS AtoN is
transmitted to the location of a physical AtoN as a Message 21 from an AIS Base
Station situated in the vicinity of the physical AtoN (IALA 1062b).
• Virtual AIS Aid to Navigation (Virtual AIS AtoN) – A ‘virtual’ AIS AtoN is
transmitted as a message 21 for an AtoN that does not physically exist. (IALA
1062c). In terms of punctuation the use of the word “virtual” when associated with
“virtual AIS AtoN” is used as an adjective in IALA 1062 to denote its description
of a type of AIS AtoN and is therefore not capitalized.
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Chapter 2

Aims and Objectives

Aids to Navigation (AtoN) comprise a portion of the set of tools needed to safely plan
and execute a voyage from berth to berth. Another such tool is the navigation chart
used by mariners to identify the depths needed to formulate a route providing sufficient
under keel clearance to allow for safe passage. The navigation chart also shows the
positions of AtoN that include buoys, daymarks, lights and ranges used to identify
channels and routes of safe passage as well as known hazards to navigation in the area
of intended transit. Although they are indispensable to mariners in helping to identify
safe routes of passage, navigation charts merely provide a static representation of the
results of hydrographic surveys that may have occurred years, decades or even
centuries ago. Their depiction of AtoN portrays the locations of where they are
supposed to be if they are on station and watching properly, and have not sunk or
drifted away. Notices to mariners are issued by the appropriate authorities to update
navigation charts with interim changes until the next formal release of an updated chart.
However, there is no guarantee that these notices are sufficiently comprehensive or up
to date to assure safe passage.
The records abound with incidents where navigation charts and notices to mariners
were inadequate or not observed. For example, in 2010 the cruise chip Clipper
Adventurer grounded in the Northwest Passage on a shoal discovered in 2007,
published in Canadian Notices to Shipping but not officially charted until June 2012
(TSB, 2010). The February 2010 grounding on rocks of the sternwheel cruise boat
Willamete Queen in Oregon was, as explained by the Captain, due to missing buoys
that mark the hazard. These buoys were marked as seasonal on NOAA chart 18528 and
were scheduled to be installed and watching the location between May and October
(USCG vs Chesbrough, 2012).
These are just two incidents that spotlight examples of master and bridge crew errors
under circumstances that were well known and published in official notices and
records. Many other current examples also exist: Exxon Valdez, Shen Neng 1, Fedra,
Sea Diamond, Costa Concordia, USS Guardian... In each of these cases the vessel did
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the airplane equivalent of flying into a mountain. Although charting errors may be cited
as a contributing factor in some of these incidents, watchstanders on the bridge of
vessels generally have had no primary or direct means to gain insight into the
underwater environment other than an echo sounder showing the depth immediately
below the keel.
The International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW), International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea (COLREGS), common law and statutory authority of individual
nations require ship owners and mariners to operate in a manner that is diligent by
maintaining a proper lookout to conduct safe transit and avoid collision and grounding.
This has traditionally been interpreted as being what watchkeepers can directly observe
with their own eyes as well as using electronic aids such as RADAR and AIS. Other
than through the use of navigation charts (a secondary measure) and an echo sounder (a
direct measure) showing depth of the water under the keel, there is not and has not ever
been an effective means to maintain a lookout below the waterline other than a
watchstander examining the area ahead of the bow with a pair of binoculars looking for
changes in water color, different wave patterns or other effects to indicate hazards or
obstructions might lie ahead in the immediate path of the vessel. Until now, there has
been no promise of technology that could assist in accomplishing this task.
2.1 Safe transit of waters lacking physical aids to navigation
The frontiers of the world are those areas that border the furthest extent of settled or
inhabited areas beyond which lies wilderness and the unexplored (Oxford, 2016). This
definition applies to the Polar Regions where extreme environmental conditions prevail
and ship transits are relatively few. Although this definition is historically accurate,
world events are fostering ventures into these areas for a variety of reasons that include
exploration for energy and minerals, shortened trade routes, the expansion of national
territorial claims and increasing military presence, and even tourism. The Arctic in
particular is the focus of much of this activity, where figure 2.1 illustrates the primary
routes of transit through this region.
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Figure 2.1: Arctic shipping routes

(Source: AMSA, 2009)

These routes may be considered coastal and archipelago waters that are relatively
shallow and teaming with surface and underwater hazards to navigation. Such routes
require the use of piloting methods and procedures to safely prepare for and complete a
voyage. In doing so it is vital to be able to obtain and evaluate soundings, identify and
use AtoN effectively and to fix a vessel’s position throughout the voyage. However,
such capabilities are extremely limited in the Arctic.
2.1.1

Issues with Arctic navigation

Arctic waters are for the most part unsurveyed, and many of the existing surveys were
completed decades or even centuries ago using antiquated methods. Hydrographic
authorities in Russia, Canada and the United States have recently stepped up their
efforts using modern techniques with state of the art sensors, but the areas that need to
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be surveyed are vast and the resources to accomplish them are relatively few. A recent
initiative, the IHO Crowd-Sourced Bathymetry Working Group (CSBWG) whose
purpose is to acquire useful hydrographic information through unconventional sources,
represents an important step towards filling this gap (CSBWG, 2015). In the meantime
many navigation charts in the Arctic contain unacceptably large areas without
soundings by which mariners are expected to identify routes of safe passage. Many of
these charts were created using different geodetic datums, complicating the situation.
Another problem in the Arctic is the lack of short range AtoN by which vessel traffic is
guided through channels where masters may generally be confident of safe passage,
along preferred routes that minimize distances and transit times as well as avoid
ecologically sensitive and wildlife protection areas, and which mark hazards to
navigation that must be avoided. AtoN take the form of beacons that are permanently
fixed to the earth’s surface using piles and other structures, and buoys that require
mooring to the sea bed by concrete sinkers and other devices. However, ice movement
in the Arctic can destroy beacons and hole and sink buoys or move them to positions
where they are no longer useful. Incorrectly positioned AtoN may lure unwary seafarers
to grounding and lose their ships to casualty with potentially great cost in human life
and loss of cargoes, in addition to detrimental effects to the fragile Arctic environment
through fuel and chemical spillage and pollution. Also, since AtoN are scarce or nonexistent in the Arctic, the information they provide regarding routes and safe areas for
transit are also not available on navigation charts for voyage planning.
Further complicating matters is that precise positioning and timing capabilities
provided by GNSS at high Arctic latitudes are less accurate and reliable as a result of
the satellite constellations that provide the radio signals used by GNSS receivers being
low to the horizon. Additional factors affecting AIS and GNSS performance include the
susceptibility of signals to propagation delays and resulting inaccuracy due to aurora
activity and the atmospheric effects of the ionosphere and troposphere on radio waves.
To sum it up, ship navigation in the Arctic is challenging due to the widespread lack of
knowledge of water depths in the region, charts that are inadequate or blank and with
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inaccurate equipment to ascertain position. This situation has changed little since the
early days of Arctic exploration.
2.1.2 Overcoming Arctic navigation issues
The approach taken in this research acknowledges the limitations of hydrography and
buoyage, and the relationships between these two disciplines. Simply put, the
placement of beacons and buoys cannot be accomplished in areas that are poorly
surveyed or not surveyed at all since the knowledge of where they should be placed is
absent. Thus a twofold approach to this research was undertaken. The first challenge
was to determine how to safely navigate without knowledge of the bottom topography.
The second challenge was to provide a means to place short range AtoN in an area that
is hostile to their existence.
This research attempts to exploit modern sensor technology as a tool to increase
watchstander awareness of the underwater environment in the vicinity of the vessel, and
especially forward of the vessel in the direction of transit. Such increased awareness
must be provided at a distance sufficient to promote the effective avoidance of
grounding and hazards to navigation, or at least to significantly lessen the effects of
allision with such hazards. This is attempted through the use of 3D-FLS that can
provide high-resolution imagery forward of the bow out to 1,000 meters at speeds of up
to 20 knots or more. Using this technology it appears possible to navigate in such an
area in relative safety. The potential of 3D-FLS to perform this function was explored
by examining its accuracy in creating a 3-dimensional bathymetric model of the sea bed
and in using this information as a means to verify vessel positioning. With detailed,
high-resolution knowledge of the sea bed obtained either through conventional
hydrographic survey using multibeam sonar or 3D-FLS, sufficient knowledge of the
area would be available to place AtoN.
The second challenge was to overcome the physical barriers to the placement of AtoN
in the Arctic in a manner that would be useful and intuitive to mariners, supportable
within the existing AtoN design lifecycle, and maintainable by responsible AtoN
authorities. The concept of Virtual AtoN seemed fully amenable to solving this
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problem, excepting that the traditional methods of verifying that AtoN are in their
proper position and watching properly cannot apply as there is no physical device for
which to verify position. Certainly one could match the position of an icon on an
Electronic Navigation Chart (ENC) or ECDIS display with the proper position where a
Virtual AtoN is supposed to be deployed. However, visibility may be limited
precluding the taking of a fix using physical objects or landmarks or GNSS
inaccuracies as a result of high latitude or atmospheric effects or a variety of manmade
interference due to spoofing, aliasing or a denial of service attack may render any
means of electronic positioning subject to significant error, with potentially disastrous
results. Thus, the ability to verify Virtual AtoN as being on station and watching
properly became a significant aspect of this research.
2.2 Infrastructure creation to support general navigation
The problem of harsh weather and environmental factors destroying and disabling
AtoN may be solved with the advent of truly Virtual AtoN that require no physical
presence whatsoever in the area of their deployment and are verifiable. Such an
approach can dramatically enhance the ability to extend AtoN systems into the Arctic.
This may be accomplished in part through an automated approach towards verification
of position and watching properly in best waters that can be performed on a continuous
basis by suitably equipped vessels of opportunity while passing Virtual AtoN as part of
their normal operation without requiring any assistance or action by crewmembers.
The capability to extend nations’ navigational infrastructure in terms of short range
AtoN for shipping to the furthest and most remote and inhospitable regions is the
ultimate goal of these objectives. However, this does not necessarily imply that this
should occur with rapidity. Suitable projects for the development of prototype systems
must first be established to integrate Virtual AtoN production and deployment into
existing methods and procedures used for AtoN systems in general. Further research
must still be performed to explore the potential limits in the verification of Virtual
AtoN, and how this concept may be extended to physical and AIS AtoN in general,
with the potential to produce significant cost savings over present methods.

22

Finally, no thoughts are entertained towards replacing existing physical or AIS AtoN
with Virtual AtoN. Existing AtoN systems are fully capable and excellent at performing
their required functions and these must remain the preferred methods of buoyage in all
areas where their use is not limited by environmental or logistical factors. At present,
Virtual AtoN should only be considered for use in the Arctic and remote areas that
feature sensitive coral reefs where sinker placement for attaching buoys to the bottom is
limited.
2.3 Compatibility with existing and evolving standards and practices
Early discussions with industry representatives at eNavigation and other conferences
and venues produced clear-cut preferences that the use of 3D-FLS and Virtual AtoN
should not create any additional workload upon watchstanders on the bridge. The
maritime industry has and continues to undergo significant change in terms of
crewmember qualifications and training in accordance with STCW, and companies are
struggling with keeping in compliance with existing training mandates and
requirements. Indeed, widespread assurance was given (rightly so) that any thoughts of
imposing additional training requirements based upon the introduction of new
technologies would be met with stiff resistance by the maritime community.
Based upon these observations, every opportunity has been taken to introduce new
equipment, concepts and methods for use on vessels within the confines of existing
requirements and regulations. For example, the display of 3D-FLS information to
watchstanders should be accomplished using ECDIS, without imposing any new
requirements for additional monitors on the bridge. All of the symbols, with few
exceptions, expressed for Virtual AtoN have been prepared in accordance with the
requirements for existing ECDIS symbols, with minor variation to depict their virtual
nature. The only exceptions are where entirely new capabilities are identified for
Virtual AtoN that are not available using physical or AIS AtoN. In terms of
hydrography, the data obtained from 3D-FLS residing on vessels of opportunity should
be readily compatible with the IHO S-100 and S-102 hydrography standards.
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Chapter 3

Theoretical Underpinnings

Virtual AtoN as envisaged in this research are used to enhance the situational
awareness of watchstanders on the bridge as to hazards to navigation that exist at and
below the waterline, including hazards detected in real time and ahead of the vessel.
The availability of such knowledge, especially in poorly surveyed and charted regions
such as the Arctic, can facilitate better decision making in ship operation while making
way. The goal is to ultimately result in enhanced safety of navigation through a
reduction in unintended groundings and allision with hazards to navigation.
The theoretical underpinnings of this research encompass:
•

Virtual AtoN contribution to knowledge of the state of the environment,

•

3D-FLS efficacy for hydrographic survey,

•

Single beam echo sounder efficacy for validation of Virtual AtoN operation, and

•

Assessment of risk based upon the availability of sensors and Virtual AtoN.

This chapter discusses the concepts in the overall approach taken to guide the
methodology and examine the results achieved in this research. The focus is on the use
of Virtual AtoN and how they contribute to determining the state of the environment in
establishing situational awareness to watchstanders on the bridge. Also discussed are
the measurements and contributing factors towards measurement error in analyzing the
experimental results achieved in determining the efficacy of 3D-FLS as a means to
independently source hydrographic survey data, and single beam echo sounders in a
georeferencing approach to Virtual AtoN verification. Advantages gained through the
use of 3D-FLS and Virtual AtoN from the point of view of risk management and
decision theory applied to voyages in areas lacking proper survey and AtoN are also
discussed.
3.1

Ship-centric approach

The application of these theories is accomplished through the establishment of a shipcentric approach to enhancing watchstander situational awareness below the waterline
when the use of traditional methods of voyage planning and following is not possible.
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This is especially appropriate for vessels transiting littoral regions in the Arctic and
elsewhere that are not adequately surveyed and nautical charts are blank or otherwise
inadequate. This lack of situational awareness in modern times has not been an issue of
great significance as shipping routes are generally well surveyed and mariners have the
benefit of centuries of previous experience and observations to aid them. However, the
recent increase of transits of poorly surveyed areas by vastly larger ships where the
consequences of groundings and accidents in terms of loss of life, vessels and cargos
along with catastrophic environmental damage attaches much greater significance to
this issue.
An approach is taken whereby Virtual AtoN are placed along routes to guide vessels in
transit and warn of hazards to navigation where AtoN would not otherwise be available.
In areas that feature recent hydrographic surveys and where hazards to navigation are
known, static and dynamic Virtual AtoN may be incorporated by responsible authority
directly into ENC and displayed to watchstanders on the bridge using ECDIS. Where
hydrographic surveys are lacking or not performed to modern standards ENC may
include inaccurate or missing soundings and hazard to navigation information, or this
information may be entirely absent from the ENC. In such areas 3D-FLS can provide
live soundings information and detect hazards in real time to compensate for ENC
lacking this data so essential to safe navigation. Also, 3D-FLS can assist in detecting
and identifying uncharted hazards that may have occurred since the last survey as well
as hazards present in the water column. The creation of Virtual AtoN with momentary
duration to represent such hazards may then be accomplished for display to
watchstanders using ECDIS.
3.2

Situational awareness

Situational awareness is broadly defined as, “the perception of the elements in the
environment within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning
and the projection of their status in the near future” (Endsley & Rodgers, 1998). In the
context of maritime operations the U.S. Coast Guard defines this as simply “knowing
what’s going on around you” (USCG TCT). The Endsley model of situational
awareness is illustrated in figure 3.1.
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Figure 3.1: Situational awareness in dynamic decision making (from Endsley, 1995)

Ship-centricity, as used in conducting this research, involves enabling mariners to
envision their environment using ship’s own sensors to gain and maintain situational
awareness in conjunction with or in the absence of resources that are normally available
for this purpose. This capability is essential to safe navigation when no other direct or
indirect method is available on which to base command decisions. Using the Endsley
Model, the perception of environmental factors (state of the environment) is made
possible through the use of 3D-FLS to acquire information regarding bottom
topography ahead of the vessel. Comprehension of the current environmental situation
is then achieved through the presentation of 3D-FLS data in the form of soundings and
Virtual AtoN on ECDIS using standard symbology, the meanings of which mariners are
already trained (ECDIS, 2012). Based upon this comprehension of the situation, a
watchstander may then project future events and initiate action appropriate to the level
of threat, such as altering speed and/or course to avoid grounding or allision.
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The three issues considered primary in the Endsley definition of situational awareness
in terms of assessing the state of the environment include:
•

Perception of the elements comprising the current situation (Level 1),

•

Comprehension of the current situation (Level 2), and

•

Projection of future status (Level 3).

The factors pertaining to hydrographic survey and Virtual AtoN at each of these levels
are described in the paragraphs that follow.
3.2.1

Level 1 – Perception

A mariner’s inherent perception of the state of the environment is limited to their own
senses and their capabilities to process the various sensory inputs they receive in a
timely and accurate manner to derive cues as to their meaning, with their visual sense
being of the greatest significance for ship navigation in preventing accidents. The
avoidance of unintentional grounding and allision is accomplished beginning with
voyage planning by visually examining the elements of the domain using applicable
navigation charts to gain an accurate understanding of the minimum depths of the water
along a planned route and to identify and note prominent landmarks, AtoN and any
hazards or obstructions that may be encountered. This process continues by monitoring
the voyage as it progresses using these same charts along with analyzing live sensor
data during the voyage. Also examined are the light lists to ascertain detailed AtoN
descriptions and notices to mariners to identify updates and changes to navigation
charts and/or light lists that may apply to the voyage. The relationships between voyage
planning and monitoring and the use of resources in determining the state of the
environment are illustrated in Table 1.
Resources also used but not listed include tide tables and monitoring station data that
predict and provide real time height of water information, meteorological and
oceanographic forecasts and sensors to determine currents, wind speeds and related
information. Given this reliance on navigational publications and forecast information
used to determine the state of the environment during voyage planning, it is vital to
ensure such routes are adequately surveyed and AtoN systems are in place and
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maintained in accordance with modern standards for soundings and AtoN information
to be included within these publications.
Table 1: Use of resources in determining the state of the environment

Notes: 1. Static and Dynamic Virtual AtoN.
2. Virtual AtoN with momentary duration.

In areas where hydrographic survey has been performed to modern standards,
soundings information is used by responsible authorities to identify the types of AtoN
required and the positions at which they should be situated. Figure 3.2 identifies the
two types of existing AtoN as being physical and AIS, and a third type encompassing
the proposed Virtual AtoN that is the focus of this research. Also identified are their
functions, behavior characteristics, how they are manifest within the maritime domain,
how they are observed by the mariner, and the time of their duration in practical use.
Assuming an Arctic environment or tropical location featuring coral reefs where
physical or AIS AtoN placement and maintenance is difficult, static and dynamic
Virtual AtoN may be used in their stead. The same process currently used for physical
and AIS AtoN is appropriate for establishing Virtual AtoN, resulting in their inclusion
within navigation charts/ENC and light lists with updates between revisions included
in notices to mariners (USCG M16500.7A (a)). This includes the review of criteria
having to do with initial justification, system benefit analysis and system type
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selection. Virtual AtoN may be displayed on ECDIS using symbology appropriate to
function in the same manner as for physical and AIS AtoN.

Figure 3.2: Aids to navigation systems

However, in the Arctic it has already been established that this is indeed not the case;
and that great portions of the Arctic are not surveyed at all or have been surveyed
using obsolete methods and AtoN are few or non-existent. Tide information, accurate
forecasts and live environmental sensors are also deficient. Absent adequate
information to conduct voyage planning, it is therefore necessary to acquire the needed
information regarding bottom topography and hazards to navigation that exist in real
time during the voyage itself.
3.2.1.1

Static Virtual AtoN – Virtual AtoN may be implemented featuring

characteristics that are static in nature and do not change over time instead of physical
AtoN, and may be used in the same manner during voyage planning. This capability
can emulate physical AtoN such as marks providing lateral guidance, notice of hazards
and obstructions, warnings and information. Their characteristics can change, for
example, as a result of responsible authority review determining that repositioning is
appropriate to ensure the AtoN is positioned in best waters, replacement by another
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AtoN with more appropriate characteristics, or is discontinued entirely due to no longer
being needed.
3.2.1.2

Dynamic Virtual AtoN – Virtual AtoN may be implemented featuring

characteristics that are dynamic in nature and may change in either or both the time
and/or spatial domains as a result of environmental features and/or to accommodate
properties unique to a specific vessel such as draft and speed. For example, changes in
the time domain may include seasonal adjustments in Virtual AtoN presence due to the
establishment of marine animal sanctuaries, fishing and no-fishing zones; and daily or
hourly adjustments due to regulatory requirements or special events. Changes in the
spatial domain may include modifications to Virtual AtoN position to accommodate the
needs of specific vessels, potentially eliminating the need for coaxial waterways with
separate markings for deep draft and shallow draft vessels. This may also include the
use of dynamic Virtual AtoN for individual vessels and for private aids to navigation
that fulfill specific government, military, organizational and/or industrial requirements.
Dynamic Virtual AtoN established in an area of planned transit can help to determine
optimal routes or facilitate operations based upon changing voyage dynamics such as
draft requirements considering different loads during the voyage planning stage.
3.2.2

Level 2 – Comprehension

The comprehension of a mariner regarding their current situation begins with their
perception or mental model of the elements of the domain created during voyage
planning and continues with the monitoring of events as the voyage progresses. These
elements represent large amounts of data that must be combined and interpreted to
derive their meaning. The symbols and conventions for presenting the information
contained within the various resources used in gaining their perception of the current
situation are placed into operational context as a result of their use and display within
navigation charts, ECDIS and by sensors providing data in real time. Figure 3.3
illustrates these various sensors available to the watchstander to supplement voyage
planning information on SOLAS vessels, plus communications equipment from which
other navigationally significant information including forecasts and reports from
vessels traveling nearby routes may be available.
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Watchstander comprehension of the meaning of these inputs with respect to the current
situation involves comparing their perception of expected conditions against apparent
conditions through the application of their knowledge within the context of real time
events.

X-Band
Radar/ARPA
GPS

AIS
ENC/ECDIS

3-Dimensional
Foward Looking
Sonar
EchoSounder
SOLAS Vessel Sensors
Additional Sensors

Figure 3.3: SOLAS vessel sensor compliment

3.2.2.1

Permanent Virtual AtoN – Virtual AtoN with permanent duration in terms

of years would be created using the traditional AtoN provisioning process used for
physical AtoN whereby traditional multibeam or 3D-FLS survey data obtained from
national hydrographic authorities is examined along with direct observations from
mariners by national AtoN authorities to identify specific areas where AtoN are needed.
3.2.2.2

Temporary Virtual AtoN – Virtual AtoN with temporary duration in terms

of days or months would be created using the AtoN provisioning process for physical
and/or AIS AtoN whereby traditional multibeam or 3D-FLS survey data obtained from
national hydrographic authorities is examined along with direct observations from
mariners by national AtoN authorities. This is to identify specific areas where AtoN are
needed such as for marking incident locations and/or special events that may include
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boat races and air shows being held over the water to mark restricted areas and special
anchorage boundaries.
3.2.2.3

Momentary Virtual AtoN – Virtual AtoN with momentary duration of

seconds to minutes created in real time from 3D-FLS data further enhances
watchstander situational awareness by alerting them to the presence of transitory and
short-lived hazards to navigation that exist within the water column, and translating
their position and bearing information into ECDIS coordinates and displaying an
appropriate symbol at this location. The detection of such in-water hazards are not
possible through any hydrographic survey whose origin is through traditional
multibeam sonar.
In areas lacking hydrographic survey to modern standards 3D-FLS can provide vessels
with a means to determine an awareness of bottom topography ahead of the vessel
while making way to help bridge crews to assess minimum depths and ensure safe
navigation. This capability is also a necessary precursor to the establishment of Virtual
AtoN where they are most needed. This research focuses on the use of 3D-FLS to fulfill
this need.
Using the FarSounder 500 meter 3D-FLS system as an example, figure 3.4 illustrates
the potential of 3D-FLS to provide real time, high resolution imagery ahead of a vessel
while making way (FS-500, 2015). This image illustrates a swath of soundings ahead to
125 meters showing bottom depths ranging from approximately 25 meters just
below the vessel sloping upwards to less than 5 meters. This image was created as a
result of a series of single pings emitted from the 3D-FLS transmitter, and received by
approximately 200 hydrophones. The imagery is updated at a rate of approximately
once every 1.5 seconds, refreshing the hydrophone data each time resulting in greater
accuracy based upon the repeated measurements of the same area using multiple
hydrophones at different angles. A speed of 6 knots results in a new sampling of data
along a swath of the bottom approximately every 4.6 meters.

32

Source: FarSounder, Inc. Used with permission.

Figure 3.4: Environmental perception using 3D-FLS

Data from individual hydrophones may be recorded for subsequent analysis, from
which the route of transit of a vessel may be recreated on a ping-by-ping basis. Figure
3.5 illustrates the array of approximately 200 hydrophones showing relative signal
strength between hydrophones ranging from blue (no or few echo returns) to red (high
strength echo return). The waveforms depicting the actual returned signals are also
recorded for each hydrophone, allowing for the determination of horizontal and vertical
bearing and target range information. Further examination of target features and
properties based upon ping signal characteristics is also possible. These hydrophone

Figure 3.5: Hydrophone data display

Source: FarSounder, Inc. Used with permission.
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data provide full-bottom bathymetric coverage that may be used by responsible
hydrographic authorities to determine minimum depths over the survey area and to
detect critical items such as wrecks, obstructions and hazards to navigation using
procedures similar to that used with multibeam echo sounders.
3D-FLS capabilities to detect in-water hazards to navigation such as growlers, logs,
shipping containers and other objects that exist within the water column can add
immensely to watchstanders’ comprehension of situational awareness by making them
aware of the presence of these hazards that may otherwise be missed, continuously
updating the state of the environment in real time. The positions of such hazards are
determined in relation to the route of transit of the vessel and displayed on ECDIS
using the appropriate symbology by examining individual hydrophone contact
information with respect to nearby hydrophone signal characteristics. An in-water
hazard is identified when a contact exists in one or more hydrophone(s) that does not
appear to be physically connected to adjoining hydrophone contacts indicating bottom
returns.
3.2.3

Level 3 – Projection

The third level of situational awareness involves thinking ahead or projecting into the
near future possible situations and events based upon comprehension of the current
situation. Within the context of this research this means the ability of the watchstander
to assess the potential for his or her vessel to experience an unintended grounding or
allision considering their knowledge of the present environmental situation as a result
of voyage planning and voyage monitoring using sensor and other data.
The factors associated with projecting risk of grounding and allision have to do with the
operational specifications of the vessel as well as the characteristics of the route being
taken, sea states and weather conditions (Mazaheri, 2009). The primary factors include
the length, breadth and draft of the vessel itself; capabilities in terms of speed, power
and environmental sensors; performance characteristics based upon windage,
maneuverability, stopping distances and turning radius. Significant route characteristics
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include the length, depth and width of the waterway; depth uncertainty, traffic volume
and the slope of the sea bed.
3.2.3.1

3D-FLS use in situation projection – The rate at which environmental

conditions change and the distances in which these changes become apparent during the
course of a voyage help to predict the range of possible events and subsequent
consequences that may result from these events. One example of the use of 3D-FLS to
project a possible future grounding situation is shown using the image provided in
figure 3.4. In this case the rising slope of the sea floor ahead of the vessel to shallow
depths provides decisive clues regarding imminent potential for grounding. Should the
vessel lie adrift without making way, this imagery would not necessarily indicate
imminent grounding unless the rise in the sea bed represents a lee shore upon which the
vessel is being driven by winds and currents. Alternatively, should the vessel be making
way at a speed of 15 knots over a steady bottom when the rise at 125 meters is suddenly
detected an alert watchstander could visually project that a dire situation is imminent
and alarms to that effect could also be generated. Soundings information may also be
displayed directly on ECDIS in areas where charts are blank or incomplete using a
suitably integrated system.
3.2.3.2

Virtual AtoN use in situation projection – The use of Virtual AtoN can

help watchstanders to determine potential future situations and scenarios by enabling
them to determine their actual position and relative positions to any hazards that may
exist and to establish a safe course. One means to accomplish this is through the use of
either static or dynamic Virtual lateral aids to mark channels that provide safe passage.
Dangers and obstructions may be identified using isolated danger marks, while cardinal
marks, safe water marks and special marks may also be used as appropriate. Virtual
AtoN with momentary duration may be generated in real time using 3D-FLS to display
on ECDIS hazards that exist within the water column. In the case of the rising bottom
shown in figure 3.4, these may include isolated danger and other marks.
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3.3

Theory of Errors

The Theory of Errors provides a foundation from which to base the assessment of
experiment results to evaluate the capability of 3D-FLS technology in this role
(Sheynin, 1966). This assessment then provides the basis upon which the viability of
crowdsourcing for navigation chart development using 3D-FLS data obtained from
vessels of opportunity may be judged.
Measurement error is the difference between a measured value and a reference value of
a measurand (JCGM 200:2008). Theory of errors is related to Estimation Theory in
statistics and states that all measurements contain error and the exact measurement is
not known. Tailoring this theory to this research involves evaluating the error
associated with spatial data contained within the 3D-FLS and echo sounder
measurement results (Fan, 2010; Wu, et al., 2010). There are three general types of
errors to be considered when measurements are made: systematic, spurious and random
errors.
3.3.1

Systematic errors

Errors that are systematic in nature relate to the accuracy, precision and trueness of
measurements. Such errors are generally attributed to the instruments used to perform
the measurements, but they can also pertain to the methods and procedures used in the
process of making the measurements as well as human errors made in performing this
process. Systematic errors tend to follow physical and mathematical rules that can be
checked and adjusted through statistical analysis. Increasing the number of
measurements will not result in a reduction of errors.
Measurement accuracy is defined as the closeness of agreement between a measured
quantity value and a true quantity value of a measurand (JCGM 200:2008a). Proper
calibration of equipment against known references and using recognized standards are
two examples of how equipment may be adjusted to improve accuracy. Measurement
precision is the closeness of agreement between measured quantity values obtained by
repeating measurements on the same or similar measurand, and can represent the
repeatability of a measurement (JCGM 200:2008b). The ability of an instrument to
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make precise measurements is generally a function of the quality of the instrument
itself and the methods by which it performs a measurement. Measurement trueness is
the closeness of agreement between the average of many (through an infinite number)
repeated measured values and a reference value, and is inversely related to systematic
measurement error (JCGM 200:2008c). Systematic errors may be reduced by changing
the equipment, altering the measurement performance processes and/or changing
human habits that contribute to systematic errors.
3.3.2. Spurious errors
Spurious errors affect measurements in a non-systematic way and may be caused by
instrument malfunctions, the use of incorrect measurement methods, and human factors
such as gross errors and mistakes caused by errors in reading the measurement results
and errors in transcription made while recording the results. It is not possible to
evaluate or compensate for spurious errors using statistical methods. Such errors are
generally considered as outliers and are discarded.
3.3.3. Random errors
Random errors affect measurements in a non-systematic way which yields results that
are unpredictable. They are caused by human factors, instrument malfunctions,
characteristics of the physical environment that may alter measurement values and
methods of measurement that do not consider all relevant factors which may affect
measurement results. Random errors remain after systematic and spurious errors are
excluded.
3.3.4

Application to this research

In this research errors apply to the uncertainties encountered in making measurements
using 3D-FLS to ascertain bottom depths forward of the bow with accuracy in
accordance with navigation charts to ensure safe navigation by detecting shoal depths
that approach the draft constraints of the vessel (Wright & Zimmerman, 2015). A
second set of different measurements using the data obtained from either multibeam
echosounders or 3D-FLS in conjunction with single beam echosounders are also made
in verifying Virtual AtoN as watching properly (Wright & Baldauf, 2015).
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Uncertainties that pertain to measurement of depth and positioning include (IHO C-13):
•

Total Horizontal Uncertainty (THU): The sum of both random and systematic
measurement uncertainties in the horizontal plane. The maximum allowable THU
for IHO Special Order surveys is 2 meters, and for Order 1a surveys is 5 meters.
Factors used in determining THU include geodetic datum, availability of Wide
Area Augmentation System (WAAS), and equipment specifications in terms of
angular accuracy and roll/pitch error.

•

Total Vertical Uncertainty (TVU): Constant and depth-dependent uncertainties
that affect depth measurements according to the formula:

+

a2+ (b x d)2

Where:
a

represents that portion of the uncertainty that does not vary with depth,

b

is a coefficient which represents that portion of the uncertainty that varies
with depth,

d
bxd

is the depth, and
represents that portion of the uncertainty that varies with depth.

The maximum allowable TVU for IHO Special Order surveys is factor a, 0.25 meters
and factor b, 0.0075; and for Order 1a surveys is factor a, 0.5 meters and factor b,
0.013.
Factors used in determining TVU include:
•

Vertical offset between the transducer mounting location and the water’s surface
determined by measuring the vertical distance between the transducer and the
vessel waterline.

•

Actual height of tide offset from mean lower low water. Height of tide is
determined based upon predicted values using the tide tables for the reporting
station nearest to the measurement location, adjusted for local meteorological and
oceanographic conditions based upon hourly forecasts.
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•

3D-FLS angular accuracy. This value is obtained from the manufacturer
specification for the 3D-FLS used in making measurements, and

•

Roll-pitch error. This value is obtained from the manufacturer specification for the
3D-FLS used in making measurements.

3.4

Georeferencing

The navigation process encompasses careful route planning and closely monitoring
vessel positions while enroute. In areas that lack traditional navigational infrastructure
the means to verify position using visual landmarks and references can be severely
restricted. This is especially true in the remote Arctic where soundings to indicate
depths are often not available on charts, landscapes can be low to the horizon and
nondescript, and AtoN rarely exist except in the immediate vicinity of a handful of
major ports.
Virtual AtoN may be placed in lieu of physical and AIS AtoN in such areas. An
underlying assumption to the correct establishment of AtoN is that they must be
verified as being in their correct position as part of a determination of watching
properly. However, present verification methods established to determine that AtoN are
correctly positioned are deficient under such circumstances. It is therefore necessary to
implement a practical means to verify this condition essential to the establishment of
Virtual AtoN. In addition, such an approach must be resilient to overcome any single
point of failure condition by GNSS as a result of natural events or manmade actions
where failure may render Virtual AtoN ineffective and result in an inability to fix vessel
position. The consequences of lacking navigation capability to verify proper positioning
can be accentuated in the Arctic environment which is often devoid of physical
landmarks by which an accurate fix may be made. The theory of navigation by
georeferencing, defined as aligning physical and geographical features to an internal
coordinate system that can be related to a ground system of geographic coordinates,
forms a vital means through which Virtual AtoN verification may be accomplished
(USGS, 2016).
The state of an aid to navigation on its assigned position may be expressed as follows:
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AtoNpos = TRUE
where:
AtoNpos.

The correct position of the AtoN is the location given in latitude
and longitude conforming with the precision standards of accuracy
classification expressed as the radius of a circle around the
assigned position of an aid to navigation within which the aid is
considered to be on station (USCG, M16500.1C).

As external references are likely to be minimal or nonexistent other than the AtoN
itself, these circumstances presently require reliance upon ship’s own sensors in terms
of GNSS to establish a fix, and the echo sounder to determine the relevant depth
contour and the amount of water below the keel. There are two problems with this
scenario. First, a number of natural and manmade problems are associated with GNSS
availability, reliability and accuracy in the Arctic, increasing risk as a result of
overreliance on this technology. Second, in areas that are unsurveyed and poorly
charted echo sounder readings provide little reference as to vessel location based upon
depth contours since no such information exists within an ENC nor is displayed on
ECDIS.
The approach followed to help verify Virtual AtoN as being in its proper position is
based upon theories associated with the georeferencing of physical objects to
topological features contained within an ENC, and navigation using georeferencing by
virtue of topography following using echo sounder measurements. Virtual AtoN
position verification considers the following:
1. given a geographic position of a Virtual AtoN expressed in latitude and longitude:
Virtual AtoNpos = (XX° YY' ZZ" North/South, XX° YY' ZZ" East/West), and
a. a geographic area (A) encompassing a circular, rectangular or irregularly
shaped area of size (n) wherein Virtual AtoNpos lies at the center, and
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b. the geographic area (A) as represented in the ENC contains a high-resolution
bathymetry model that meets the standards represented by IHO Order 1a
survey, and
c. all viable routes to and from Virtual AtoNpos are contained within this
geographic area (A), then
2. the depths (DES) recorded by the vessel single beam echo sounder when adjusted
for height of tide and vertical offset of transducer to the water’s surface, and
a. the change of depths (dD/dt), and
b. the rate of change of depths (d2D/dt2)
c. for a locus of points (P) within geographic area (A) along the route (R), will
approximate
3. the depths (DENC) as represented by the ENC bathymetric model when adjusted for
height of tide and vertical offset of transducer to the water’s surface 1, and
a. the change of depths (dD/t), and
b. the rate of change of depths (d2D/dt2)
c. for a locus of points (P) within geographic area (A) along the route (R),
4. within a certain tolerance level.
A Virtual AtoN that meets the above criteria in combination with the use of traditional
GNSS and/or navigational fixes to known objects or landmarks may be considered as
having a higher probability of being in the correct position than a Virtual AtoN that
does not meet these criteria. The exact probability varies and cannot be determined in
1

Note: The locus of points (P) approximating depths (DENC) of step 3 is searched based upon

local patterns identified using a contour-tracing algorithm that identifies change of depths
(dD/t) of immediately adjacent soundings along a local minima path within the route (R) in the
specific AtoN geographic area (A) (Wright R.G., 2005; Seo, J., et al., 2016).
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areas that are not well surveyed since the adjacent bottom contours are unknown to any
relative degree of accuracy, and nearby similar seascapes may provide false indications
of being in the correct position. Therefore, a Virtual AtoN should not be considered as
being verified in its proper position using georeferencing criteria alone.
However, the converse of this statement has also true. A Virtual AtoN that does not
meet the above criteria, whether or not it is used in combination with traditional GNSS
and/or navigational fixes to known objects or landmarks, may be considered as having
a higher probability of being incorrectly positioned and not watching in the best waters.
This may be due to two reasons. First, GNSS indications may be in error as a result of
natural or manmade causes that place the vessel in a position other than the indicated
position. Second, even if the correct position is indicated, should bottom contours not
match the surveyed bathymetric model it is likely that bottom conditions have changed
that may invalidate the Virtual AtoN position as being in best waters. This situation
would warrant the sounding of an alarm to alert watchstanders of a possible position
discrepancy or other unforeseen circumstances.
This approach provides a positive baseline against which live single beam echo sounder
measurements may be compared with ENC values. Including areas outside of normal
transit within the soundings bathymetry model may also be useful in positively
identifying that a vessel is outside of its intended route, as opposed to inferring this
condition as a result of bottom topography not matching the features of the intended
route.
3.5

Risk assessment

In assessing risk of Arctic operations it is appropriate to perform an analysis of the
complex systems comprising a model of the interrelations between shipboard
capabilities and external support services, the vulnerabilities that may be encountered
as a result of the loss of these capabilities, and the potential consequences of the loss.
Loosely based upon the so-called Swiss Cheese Model developed by Reason (1990),
this analysis identifies priorities for navigation risk assessment considering the state of
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hydrographic survey, the content and recency of navigation charts, environmental
sensing capabilities and the availability of aids to navigation.
An analysis of the causal relationships between the spatial and geographical
uncertainties existing in the natural environment and technological capabilities for
environmental sensing are explored considering sensor availability, resolution and
accuracy; the means by which sensor data are communicated, the products created
using sensor data, and potential effects of sensor data corruption and interruption due to
natural and human causes.
The potential for accident causation arising from interactions between latent failures
and a variety of local triggering events considered in this research pertain to:
•

Hydrography,

•

Navigation Charts,

•

Environmental Sensing,

•

Aids to Navigation (AtoN), and

•

Human Error;

and involves the unlikely and often unforeseeable conjunction of several contributing
factors arising from different levels of the system. The use of the Swiss Cheese Model
ties in well with the previously described Theory of Errors in terms of the types of
errors that may occur and their potential effects on the processes involved at the
different levels of the productive plane hierarchy.
In the methodology used, potential hazards are identified in accordance with various
scenarios that may result. Cause analysis considers both distal and proximate causes of
error, and various options that may potentially reduce or eliminate these causes.
Consequence analysis addresses the barriers and defenses erected to help reduce or
eliminate the potential outcomes and effects of the errors that may result.
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Chapter 4

Materials and Methods

The hypothesis on which this research is based suggests the present state-of-the-art in
ship sensors is sufficient to provide real-time guidance for vessels to safely transit
uncharted waters and/or waters lacking physical aids to navigation. This premise is
supported in that many modern expeditionary vessels are equipped with advanced
oceanographic sensors such as forward-looking navigation sonar, enhanced radar,
GNSS and satellite communications capabilities complimenting ECDIS to provide
them with every available tool to accomplish their mission as safely as possible. Further
support is provided in that few, if any, similarly equipped vessels with properly
operating sensors and alert watchstanders are known to have been involved in incidents
where uninstalled, missing or improperly watching aids to navigation were considered
to be significant factors in the cause of the incident.
This research examines whether maritime safety and environmental protection may be
enhanced through the automation of sensor data interpretation and display in enhancing
watchstander situational awareness below the waterline. A key element is the timely
and accurate establishment of Virtual AtoN in real-time hazard to navigation detection,
classification and characterization in a form already familiar to watchstanders. Further
investigation explores the archiving of sensor data for use by hydrographic/navigation
chart and AtoN service providers.
Prioritization of ship sensors is given to 3D-FLS which appears to be the most critical
of available modern sensors pertaining to vessel operation in unknown environments.
This is due to the unique ability of such sensors to explore the area below the waterline
ahead of the bow to seek and identify hazards to navigation that may jeopardize a
voyage. However, consideration of other technologies is made in developing a system
architecture that will support a full and comprehensive modern vessel sensor suite.
4.1

Overall approach

Specific tasks are formulated within study areas to investigate answers to the research
questions identified in this dissertation. The setting within which these studies are
performed is described including two research vessels used as test beds for experiments
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and environmental sensor data collection using 3D-FLS and other instruments along
with the various inputs required for their performance; the processes and procedures
employed to acquire, manage and evaluate these inputs; the outcomes to be achieved as
a result of these processes and procedures; and the metrics used to measure these
outcomes in determining whether the results are correct or not. Expectations are
provided as to the results along with areas of risk encountered in performing each of the
study tasks that may alter expectations or invalidate the premise upon which the
question itself was based. Results are recorded throughout the performance of each
study task, and comparisons are made with expected results. Conclusions are then
drawn as to whether the questions have been answered along with rationale as to why
or why not. Finally, lessons learned are documented regarding errors in input, process,
product and/or metrics; assumptions made and actual proceedings; and expectations
and outcomes.
4.2

Areas of study

Several specific areas of study were followed during the course of this research. Details
on these studies are provided in the paragraphs below.
4.2.1

Study area 1: 3-dimensional forward looking sonar data acquisition

The acquisition of 3-dimensional forward-looking sonar (3D-FLS) data has been
performed supporting experiments to obtain and extract sensor data of sufficient
resolution to accomplish the following:
•

Perform hydrographic survey of the sea bottom,

•

Detect hazards to navigation present in the water column or attached to the
bottom, and

•

Create a 3-dimensional surface topography model to be included as a portion of
the characteristics of Virtual AtoN.

3D-FLS systems produced by different manufacturers were used in the acquisition of
data in an effort to determine whether measurements taken by different systems with
varied capabilities using different methods and algorithms can achieve similar results.
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The EchoPilot 3D-FLS with a range of 200 meters utilizes two one-dimensional arrays
of receiving transducers, with the arrays mounted at a predetermined angle relative to
each other so as to receive reflected sound waves from different respective segments of
the water in front of the vessel that are separated from each other in a horizontal plane.
The transducer arrays emit sound waves into non-overlapping segments of water,
reflected by the underwater floor back to the transducer arrays, which convert them to
electrical signals. The electrical signals are processed to calculate a three-dimensional
position of each point on the underwater floor (EchoPilot, 2012). Positioning of the two
transducers is recommended by the manufacturer near the stern of the vessel where
three-axis movement may be minimized. This unit provides only raster data from which
soundings were extracted using a method previously developed by this researcher
(Pendleton & Wright, 2002). Only soundings information was available from this
system to analyze potential to perform hydrographic survey, with no capabilities
evident for hazard to navigation detection.
Data was also acquired using the FarSounder model 500 3D-FLS with a range of 500
meters. This system utilizes one sonar transducer combined with a roll, tilt and yaw
sensor mounted at the bow. A raw data signal is generated and transformed into an
image rotated responsively to the sonar sensor's orientation generating a complete
image with a single transmission (FarSounder, 2008). In-water target multi ping
stabilization was also used to detect hazards to navigation that are not attached to the
bottom such as shipping containers floating at or just below the surface, icebergs, large
debris and debris fields, and possibly whales and other marine mammals and large fish
that may lie in the vessel’s path. A software development kit helped ease the use and
analysis of data at sea and post-voyage for Virtual AtoN creation. High-resolution
digital data from each of the approximately 200 hydrophones on the single transducer
representing both soundings and hazards to navigation were available directly available
from this system. This access to the internal data structures containing the vector data
from which the raster images are derived is useful for generating the soundings data in
a format suitable for use by hydrographic agencies.
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In making comparisons between 3D-FLS depth measurements and ENC soundings,
specific hydrophone data is examined with respect to the closest location(s) to the
corresponding sounding as shown on the ENC. This is accomplished by analyzing pingby-ping 3D-FLS hydrophone coordinates based upon bearing and distance with ENC
sounding positions.
Sensor data resolution for both systems were examined to determine sufficiency for
charting near coastal and inland locations to IHO order 1A survey and Virtual AtoN
verification requirements as described in appended Paper 3. Issues pertaining to 3DFLS measurement accuracy, precision and repeatability were examined in both cases
considering systematic, spurious and random errors as part of this evaluation. The
comparisons made between the two systems were to determine strengths and
weaknesses in their data content and representation for study purposes, and not to
evaluate each from a product point of view. A key factor in this evaluation is any
potential differences in accuracy or induced error as a result of the raster to vector
conversion performed on the EchoPilot data, as compared to the direct digital data
access without conversion permitted by the FarSounder system. The analysis of sonar
data supports work efforts performed under Study Areas 2 and 4.
4.2.2

Study area 2: Virtual AtoN establishment from hazard to navigation data

Hazards to navigation and identifying class definitions are based on examples likely to
occur in the Arctic and the tropics, but are also commonly found worldwide. These are
obtained from the United States Code of Federal Regulations (33CFR64) where three
specific hazard attributes are identified as follows:
•

Hazard to Navigation means an obstruction, usually sunken, that presents
sufficient danger to navigation so as to require expeditious, affirmative action
such as marking, removal, or redefinition of a designated waterway to provide
for navigational safety.

•

Obstruction means anything that restricts, endangers, or interferes with
navigation.
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•

Structures mean any fixed or floating obstruction, intentionally placed in the
water, which may interfere with or restrict marine navigation.

Specific examples of hazards to navigation were identified by examining navigation
charts from those portions of the Arctic where detailed surveys have been conducted,
followed by tropical coral reef regions, and then other regions where such hazards,
obstructions and structures exist. This examination also covers Notices to Mariners
where hazards to navigation have been identified but are not yet charted. Attempts were
also made to identify specific examples that provide realistic test cases that replicate
hazard to navigation attributes and characteristics during actual in-water testing using
3D-FLS. This includes objects and features that are attached to and project from the
bottom such as shoals, rocks, ledges, reefs and wrecks. Also included are test cases that
represent in-water hazards within the water column, the presence of which is
opportunistic in nature and not necessarily abundant or easily found in the natural
environment. Similar targets such as buoys were used when available and appropriate.
Differences in precision and accuracy are considered between hazards to navigation
attached to the bottom and those drifting within the water column. This is anticipated
due to potential differences in resolving targets that lie on a plane where adjoining
hydrophone signals may tend to promote averaging of measurements, as opposed to
detecting and characterizing a target that exists in free space without reference to
adjoining hydrophone signals. Bottom targets are detectable with 3-dimensional
characteristics, while depth information for hazards to navigation drifting in the water
column may not be readily discerned.
The detection of hazards to navigation is accomplished in real time by the FarSounder
system itself directly from the sonar data, eliminating any possible delay that may be
incurred as a result of post-processing sonar data. The EchoPilot system has no specific
capability for this purpose and detection is dependent upon user interpretation of sonar
data presented in the visual display. Post processing of the raster data provided by this
system would be required to detect hazards to navigation, which is beyond the scope of
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this research. Presentation on navigation displays in a form that is easily interpreted
considering human factors is discussed under Study Area 5.
The process used in acquiring 3D-FLS data, analyzing the data to detect hazards to
navigation, developing ENC and then displaying ENC data on ECDIS is illustrated in
Figure 4.1. High resolution data representing a 3-dimensional topological model of the
sea floor in areas where the bottom rises to above 50 or 100 meters, depending on make
and model of 3D-FLS, is acquired live and displayed to the watchstander on ECDIS in
real time while a vessel is making way. Hazards to navigation that are present either
attached to the sea floor or suspended in the water column between the surface and the
sea floor are detected and also displayed as momentary Virtual AtoN using appropriate
symbology in accordance with existing ECDIS protocols, with minor variation to depict
the virtual nature of the notification.
3D-FLS Real Time
Survey Ahead of
the Vessel

Bottom Contours
ECDIS
Hazards to Navigation
Transient
AtoN
Virtual AtoNVirtual
(momentary)

High Resolution
3D-FLS Data

ENC
Hydrography

Hazards to
Navigation

Chartmaking
Authority

Aids to Navigation
Authority

Navigation
Chart

Static Virtual AtoN
Dynamic Virtual AtoN

Figure 4.1: Correlation of 3D-FLS data flow with national authorities and Virtual AtoN
creation for electronic navigation chart development and display to mariners on ECDIS.

This data is also recorded and subsequently transmitted for use by national
hydrographic authority in chart making, and also by national AtoN authority for
determining the placement of AtoN, including static and dynamic Virtual AtoN for
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inclusion in navigation charts. This information is embodied within an ENC for display
to mariners on ECDIS.
The methodology used in this research is illustrated in figure 4.2. The objectives to be
achieved are defined and boundary conditions and constraints identified as the first step
in our analysis. Once completed, the assessment of risk can then be performed. This is
accomplished by first identifying potential hazards and development of a scenario by
which their causes and consequences may be examined, followed by the identification
of options to control risks and to compare benefits of each of the options. Finally,
recommendations are provided based upon the hazards identified, the options to reduce
or eliminate their occurrence, or the consequences and associated costs and benefits.

Figure 4.2: Risk assessment methodology

The objective of this research is to identify the various factors and reduce associated
risks that may lead to the unintentional grounding of vessels, especially in remote
regions where hydrographic surveys to modern standards are rare and navigation charts
are incomplete and inaccurate. Also included in this objective is allision with objects
that exist either afloat or present in the water column that may cause an accident. A
further objective is to examine new sensor technologies and reduce the occurrence of
unintentional groundings and how this may be accomplished. This includes results
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obtained directly through new technology use along with products and capabilities
obtained indirectly through the post-processing and secondary use of data. Examples of
new technologies include 3D-FLS and Virtual AtoN that do not require the use of AIS
radio technology or physical infrastructure of any kind for its use.
This analysis is limited to SOLAS vessels that are likely to operate in the Arctic
including those involved in community re-supply, bulk cargo transportation, fishing
activities and tourism. Scope is also limited specifically to spatial and geographical
uncertainties along transit routes that may lead to unintentional grounding.
Ship systems include those generally considered under the e-Navigation umbrella and
communication systems needed for provisioning of meteorological and oceanographic
data associated with weather, tides, currents and waves (sea state). This includes
ECDIS, AIS, GNSS, Radar, Sonar and communications system components providing
maritime safety information broadcasts. Also considered is hydrographic data for
creating navigation charts, including ENC, in their present form and also with detailed
hydrography data integrated within the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO)
S-100 framework standard Universal Hydrographic Data Model. Specific reference is
made to the draft S-102 High Definition Gridded Bathymetry standard that supports
development of new navigation products not possible under the S-57 and previous
hydrographic standards (IHO S-102). New products can include tools for navigation by
georeferencing to known features that exist on the bottom to supplement positioning
information provided by GNSS and AIS. This same hydrographic data is used for the
design, implementation, placement and verification of AtoN in the Arctic to guide
vessels along their routes (Wright and Baldauf, 2015 and 2015a).
Limitations include risk to personnel, environmental and property damage. A
prototype case is developed to illustrate the factors involved to generalize to other
segments of the Arctic fleet. Choice of route illustrates a typical trade for the vessel
type and size. There is 100% ENC coverage for this route and ECDIS availability is
assumed. However, ENC data content in terms of soundings and other data useful for
navigation over many portions of this route is sparse and even non-existent in many
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areas. Paper charts for these areas are not required when electronic charts are in use,
and high speed vessels are not considered.
A generic model characterized by functions and capabilities inherent to ship
navigation was defined representing an integrated collection of systems, including the
interactions of functions and systems appropriate to unintended grounding.
4.2.3

Study area 3: Value added for hydrographic and AtoN authorities

The focus of this study area included cognizant national authorities in the United States:
the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration – NOAA (responsible for
hydrography) and the Coast Guard (responsible for AtoN) and elsewhere under
appropriate national and international authorities. Research efforts undertaken
determined whether geographical references can be established to assess the feasibility
of verifying positions of Virtual AtoN as being correct as part of a determination of
their watching properly. The study focused on accomplishing this using several
measures of a vessel’s apparent position to determine if it is different from the expected
position. Additional research includes the assessment of the capability to verify Virtual
AtoN that can also be extended to the verification of physical AtoN and AIS radiobased AtoN to spawn the creation of more robust verification methods.
Methods used in analyzing the value added for hydrographic authorities are specified in
terms of soundings and features deliverables required of commercial contractors
performing hydrographic services and include specifications that gridded data must
meet, survey coverage and resolution and quality control (NOS, 2015). These methods
include adjustment for errors that may be encountered during survey including
corrections to echo soundings and uncertainty assessment that include instrument error
corrections (draft, speed of sound, attitude, error budget analysis for depths and
uncertainty budget analysis for depths) and quality control (multibeam sonar calibration
and positioning system confidence checks). Although 3D-FLS data is currently not
included as part of the investigations currently being performed by the IHO CSBWG,
consideration is also being given to conformance with basic system and sensor
descriptions, metadata and data formats relevant to the working group’s functions.
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Methods used in analyzing the value added for AtoN authorities reflect those
promulgated for use by the U.S. Coast Guard involve processes governing the
establishment of an AtoN system, review and modification of AtoN systems, survey
requirements, marking systems and system design and configuration, and correction of
AtoN discrepancies as pertains to federal and private AtoN (USCG M16500.7A). The
ability to automate such processes was considered, enhancing the ability of present
AtoN authority personnel members dedicated to perform this task. Second,
consideration was also made regarding the integration of algorithms to perform these
automated verification tasks into ECDIS installations whereby every passing ECDISequipped vessel can routinely and without human assistance perform AtoN verification
of position and watching in best water while making way on a continuous basis. Such
algorithms would track the position of each Virtual AtoN in relation to the vessel route
of transit and correlate the single beam echo sounder measurements with the
bathymetric model contained within the ENC. When there is little or no correlation
between these two data sources alarms may be generated to alert the watchstander of a
possible condition that either the vessel is not in the correct position or the bottom
conditions relative to the Virtual AtoN has changed. Statistics of Virtual AtoN position
verification results may be maintained for each one encountered.
4.2.4

Study Area 4: Virtual AtoN data object verification

The concept of Virtual AtoN verification arose out of a critical need to ensure their
suitability and correctness in cyberspace without having the luxury of a physical
presence for comparison. With the susceptibility of AIS and GNSS to spoofing,
jamming and outages, it is essential this issue be adequately addressed to ensure safety
of navigation (AIS, 2015).
The approach followed to verify Virtual AtoN as watching properly in terms of
positively identifying the aid, determining it is displaying the proper characteristics and
is in its proper position was conceived during this research based upon georeferencing
of physical objects to topological features contained within an ENC, and navigation
using georeferencing by virtue of topography following using echo sounder
measurements. This approach may be described as follows:
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A Virtual AtoN that is watching properly (AtoNwp) is “on its assigned position
(AtoNpos) exhibiting the advertised characteristics {AtoNchar(1-n)} ∗ in all respects”
(USCG, M16500.7A).
AtoNwp = AtoNpos + {AtoNchar(1→n)}
where: AtoNpos = TRUE
{AtoNchar1 + AtoNchar2 + AtoNchar 3 + … + AtoNchar (n-1) + AtoNchar n} = TRUE

and:
given:

AtoNpos The correct position of the AtoN is the location given in latitude
and longitude conforming with the precision standards of accuracy
classification expressed as the radius of a circle around the
assigned position of an aid to navigation within which the aid is
considered to be on station (USCG, M16500.1C).
Characteristic1: Light List number.
Characteristic2: Name of the aid to navigation.
Characteristic3: AtoN geographic position in latitude and longitude.
Characteristic4: Not applicable to Virtual AtoN.
Characteristic5: Not applicable to Virtual AtoN.
Characteristic6: Not applicable to Virtual AtoN.
Characteristic7: Not applicable to Virtual AtoN.
Characteristic8: Aid remarks, seasonal remarks, and Private AtoN identification.
Characteristic9: Symbol for aid to navigation included on navigation charts and ENC.
Characteristic10: Latitude and longitude coordinates comprising the boundaries of the
AtoN geographic area used for georeferencing.
Virtual AtoN verification is therefore represented by the following assertions:
Assertion A (name verification)
1. The Virtual AtoN name contained within the navigation chart/ENC as displayed
on ECDIS is the same name as that contained within the Light List.
∗

Note: Characteristics are numbered in accordance with U.S. Coast Guard Light List format.
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Assertion B (Light List number verification)
1. The Virtual AtoN number contained within the navigation chart/ENC as displayed
on ECDIS is the same number as that contained within the Light List.
Assertion C (symbol verification)
1. The Virtual AtoN symbol contained within the navigation chart/ENC as displayed
on ECDIS is the same symbol as that contained within the Light List.
Assertion D (position verification)
The method of Virtual AtoN position verification involves the comparison of live echo
sounder data to bathymetric data over the vessel’s track using three factors, including:
1. Depth (D) after adjustment for height of tide and vertical offset of transducer to the
water’s surface,
2. the change of depths (dD/dt),
3. and the rate of change of depths (d2D/dt2)
for a locus of points (P) within geographic area (A) along the route (R) as recorded by
the vessel single beam echo sounder.
Research in this study area encompasses how the use of environmental, physical and
electronic characteristics; performance requirements, and database representations for
Virtual AtoN can help to determine whether they are watching properly and performing
their proper function. Also included were experiments simulating the verification of a
Virtual AtoN obstruction mark for a wreck that exists in a well-charted area and the
second experiment involves verification of Virtual AtoN lateral marks in an area
lacking adequate hydrographic survey.
In experiments related to verifying Virtual AtoN as watching properly, 3D-FLS data
was compared to single beam echo sounder measurements along the same tracks
representing nominal GNSS operating conditions and performance, and different tracks
that represent compromised GNSS operation and performance as a result of natural
effects of the Ionosphere and tropospheric ducting and due to intentional interference
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resulting from denial of service attacks, spoofing and aliasing. Throughout these
experiments the obtaining and recording of positions of the data collection platforms,
3D-FLS sensors, and bench marks using a GPS receiver were performed in accordance
with US National Ocean Service specifications (NOS, 2015a).
Additional experiments focused on demonstrating the use of these same methods to
verify physical AtoN. These results are described using a representative sampling of the
thousands of data points shown in reduced form for clarity. A significant focus of this
study area included assessing the ability to verify Virtual AtoN are watching properly
despite the unavailability of precise positioning information normally obtained using
GNSS, AIS and other sources due to a variety of manmade and natural events.
Virtual, physical as well as AIS AtoN characteristics associated with position are
generally ascertained using GNSS to compare the measured position with the charted
position. In the case of physical AtoN and synthetic AIS AtoN there is a physical AtoN
present at the location as well as an AIS/ECDIS representation to corroborate the GNSS
fix. For AIS virtual AtoN and Virtual AtoN the problem becomes more complicated
since there is no physical AtoN presence at all. A fix developed based upon bearings
taken to physical landmarks and features would be a suitable method for determining
location only in the case where such features were visible and not obscured or out of
visual or radar range.
However, there is another means to take such a fix through reference to ground. This
may be accomplished, again using modern technology, by ground referencing to obtain
position verification using known surface landmarks through sonar bearings. This can
include bottom features obtained through bathymetric ENC models compared to live
echo sounder measurements made during the transit of a vessel over time intervals
using running averages and derivative trend information. An ENC containing high
resolution hydrographic data is required to implement this approach using the concepts
illustrated in figure 4.3 where depths associated with the correct Virtual AtoN position
can be readily determined at high resolution. This is envisioned using the IHO S-100
Universal Hydrographic Data Model that that supports a wider variety of hydrographic-
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related digital data sources and products than the S-57 IHO Transfer Standard for
Digital Hydrographic Data. Specific reference is made to new spatial models to support
imagery and gridded data, 3-D and time-varying data, and new applications beyond
those of traditional hydrography. Such ENC can be integrated with ECDIS with the
proper resolution and correlation to determine bearings, produce the necessary fixes and
generate warnings.
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Figure 4.3: Georeferencing characteristics showing correlation between Virtual AtoN and
surrounding depths

Integral to each Virtual AtoN digital data object as <characteristic10> is high resolution
hydrographic data associated with the ENC. For example, tracks A and B in figure 4.3
represent non-regulated, recommended tracks not based on fixed marks associated with
depths along the track centerline at a span of predetermined width. The routes C and D
fairways are associated with depths along the route between the fairway boundaries
such as may be the case in areas where only channels are properly surveyed to modern
standards and adjacent waters may be poorly surveyed or not surveyed at all. Areas E
and F may represent restricted or exclusion zones through which vessel passage is
regulated while mark G may be positioned at any appropriate location where the waters
are properly surveyed.
Fix and bearing information to known physical environmental features such as
soundings for each Virtual AtoN can be taken during initial installation and encoded as
part of its characteristics. These characteristics can then be used anytime thereafter to
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verify position accuracy during normal use and subsequent verification. Encryption of
position characteristics data can ensure their security and validity. Such methods can
also detect the effects of AIS and GNSS jamming and spoofing since the presumed
location based upon GNSS would not coincide with environmental features of the
actual route of transit. Used with inertial navigation system backup, it would also be
possible to verify position in the event of GNSS outage.
An example of this approach is shown in figure 4.4 under conditions of nominal GNSS
operation and during GNSS spoofing activities are underway such as attempting to
highjack a vessel into hostile or restricted waters or to intentionally ground a vessel by
making watchstanders believe they are in one location when in fact they may be miles
away at a location unbeknownst to them.
Vessel Tracks Annotated with Depth Soundings
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Track A

Vessel subjected
to GNSS spoofing.

Track B

Vessel proceeding
with nominal GNSS.

Figure 4.4: Tracks of Vessels Illustrating the Effects of GNSS Spoofing

In the above situation Track B (in green) illustrates the path of transit of a vessel when
GNSS equipment is operating correctly and accurately depicts vessel position. Track A
(in red) illustrates a potential path of transit of a vessel while making way during a
GNSS spoofing attack. Even though in both cases the GNSS and ECDIS will show the
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vessel is adhering to the same track (Track B), during the spoofing event the vessel is
actually transiting a different course as illustrated by Track A. This is the same scenario
followed by a vessel in 2013 where scientists from the University of Texas successfully
spoofed the GPS on a yacht, directing it on a parallel path hundreds of meters off
course while the chart display showed only a straight line (Divis, 2013). Examination of
the vessel tracks illustrated in figure 4.5 show differences between ECDIS and echo
sounder indications under nominal and spoofed GNSS conditions.
Figure 4.5a shows that a close correlation exists between vessel’s echo sounder
measurements and the ENC depths displayed on ECDIS when both the GNSS and echo
sounder equipment are operating under normal conditions. However, there may be poor
correlation between the ECDIS representation of position and route and echo sounder
measurements depicting the actual terrain over which the transit is made when GNSS
spoofing activity is underway as shown in figure 4.5b. In this case the echo sounder
accurately depicts the physical environment below the waterline at the vessel’s actual
position while ECDIS indications are displaying an inaccurate position showing depths
that are very different than that which exists below the hull. Indeed, a vessel transiting
Track A is in jeopardy of grounding in the shallows depicted on this line of transit.
Vessel Tracks Annotated with Depth Soundings
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Figure 4.5: Correlation of ENC to echo sounder measurements during nominal GNSS

operation and during GNSS spoofing.

59

Watchstanders would be notified via alarms and other indicators that a discrepancy
exists between ENC and ECDIS indications of position as compared to echo sounder
sensor measurements of the actual physical environment. These indications would not
necessarily help the watchstander to directly determine actual position since navigation
by georeferencing is much more computationally complex than determining
navigational discrepancies by georeferencing. However, notification of the navigational
discrepancy would alert the watchstander of a condition in which caution is justified
and action should be taken to determine actual vessel position before proceeding further
on course.
4.2.5

Study Area 5: Virtual AtoN representation on navigation display systems

This study area analyzed the depiction of hazards to navigation using standard AtoN
symbology on IMO-compliant ECDIS. Although this effort is tailored to the specific
scope of this research, it was accomplished within the boundaries established by
existing AtoN initiatives of the U.S. Coast Guard where the physical characteristics of
AIS AtoN include the symbols for real, synthetic and virtual; and non-AIS Virtual
(NOAA AIS). NOAA also provides ENC depiction of the physical characteristics for
AIS AtoN that are also available for Virtual AtoN on ECDIS and includes symbols for
cardinal marks (N/E/S/W), lateral marks (IALA A/B port and starboard), isolated
danger, safe water, special purpose and emergency wreck marking (NOAA 2013). This
includes compliance with the fourth attribute of marking a hazard to navigation, where:
Markings mean the lights and other signals placed on or near structures, sunken
vessels, and other obstructions for the protection of navigation.
One of the primary references used in the performance of this task is IHO Publication
S-52, Specifications for Chart Content and Display aspects of ECDIS (IHO S-52).
Within the United States NOAA Chart No. 1 also provides guidance for ECDIS
symbols (NOAA, 2013a). Virtual AtoN are intended to exist only in ENC using very
similar symbols as presently existing for physical and AIS radio-based AtoN, and
display only on ECDIS.
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Chapter 5

Results

The ultimate outcome of this research includes a comprehensive definition of a Virtual
AtoN that requires no presence in the physical environment whatsoever, along with
definitions of constituent characteristics that comprise this aid. A detailed description of
a Virtual AtoN is provided in paragraph 5.1 of this chapter.
A significant impediment to achieving this outcome is a lack of adequate hydrographic
survey to modern standards in remote Arctic and tropical regions necessary to
determine where AtoN are most needed and to place them with precision sufficient to
verify they are on station and watching properly. To overcome this impediment the
results of experiments exploring the capability and utility of 3D-FLS are described. For
properly equipped vessels it will be possible to also safely transit uncharted and poorly
charted waters with an increased level of safety that is not possible under existing IMO
carriage requirements for vessel equipment.
Two significant outcomes resulted from the use of this technology. First, the capability
of 3D-FLS to detect hazards to navigation directly in the path of a vessel in real time
resulted in the creation of a new type of Virtual AtoN with momentary duration capable
of detecting imminent hazards to navigation in real time that has not previously been
possible. Second, 3D-FLS can provide high resolution swaths of hydrographic data that
appear to be comparable with multi-beam sonar used for hydrographic survey. Such
independently sourced data can supplement national authority survey efforts through
the crowd sourcing.
The research leading up to this outcome has been documented in the form of the results
of studies and experiments described in peer-reviewed papers published in academic
journals and in conference proceedings, presentations made at industry and academic
forums, and previously unpublished findings that are included within this dissertation.
Of these papers, five that best describe the various aspects of this research have been
selected and appended to this dissertation.
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Paper 1 provides a general description of what constitutes a Virtual AtoN, followed by
a presentation of findings regarding potential Virtual AtoN implementations, their
capabilities and limitations, and their use. This discussion is described in paragraph 5.2.
Results are discussed in paragraph 5.3 and provided in Paper 2 that can be used to
verify that Virtual AtoN are deployed in the correct position and watching properly by
displaying the appropriate characteristics while in use. Further elaboration is provided
on verifying proper implementation of requirements and validating intermediate and
final results throughout the entire development lifecycle.
Paragraph 5.4 describes Paper 3 wherein is presented the results and findings of field
studies using different 3D-FLS systems that pertain to accuracy in terms of their
potential to provide topography data to support hydrographic survey in regions that are
poorly surveyed or not surveyed at all. This paper also presents findings on the use of
topography data obtained using 3D-FLS to help verify Virtual AtoN are in their correct
position and watching properly.
In paragraph 5.5 results are presented regarding vulnerability and risk assessment for
Arctic voyages as a result of the combination of poorly surveyed waters and limitations
of environmental sensing capabilities in modern vessels. The potential advantages of
expanding these sensing capabilities using 3D-FLS and resulting risk control options
are also discussed.
Paragraph 5.6 discusses the contents of Paper 4 that describes the potential use of
Virtual Aids to Navigation and 3D-FLS as a means for developing strategies to avoid
groundings and preserving the Arctic environment.
Paragraph 5.7 discusses the results of the initial investigation described in Paper 5 of
the capabilities of 3D-FLS to detect hazards to navigation at cruising speed through an
in-depth analysis of the Costa Concordia tragedy. Insight into bridge alerts and alarms
that may have been generated had 3D-FLS been installed, operational and observed just
prior to the grounding are also provided.
5.1

Description of a Virtual Aid to Navigation

The technical definition of a Virtual AtoN as pertains to this research is:
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Apparatuses comprising one or more digital information object(s), systems and
methods that can improve situational awareness by providing guidance pertaining
to characteristics of the physical environment external to a vessel to help a
mariner determine position and course, to warn of dangers or of obstructions, or
to give advice about ship routing without requiring a presence in the physical
environment external to a vessel.

The implementation and realization of a Virtual AtoN may be static in nature where its
characteristics do not change such as when emulating a physical AtoN, may be
dynamic where its characteristics may change in either or both the time and/or spatial
domains as a result of changing environmental features and/or to accommodate
properties unique to a specific vessel such as draft and speed. It may also reflect
characteristics that exist momentarily or for only short periods of time. Such invention
is essential to enhance safety of navigation as vessel traffic in areas such as the Arctic
that is expanding in vessel traffic volume both within and transiting the region, yet the
necessary physical infrastructure in terms of buoys, beacons and other physical and
radio-based devices can be difficult or impossible to place and maintain in this hostile
environment that stretches across vast distances. This also applies in tropical regions
where sensitive environmental features such as coral reefs prevent the placement of
sinkers to affix physical AtoN. Virtual AtoN may also be used to designate positions of
tactical significance in planning and executing military, search and rescue and
emergency relief operations.
This concept was defined as a consequence of examining responsible national authority
practices identified in Study Area 2 and implementation requirements identified in
Study Area 3 through elaboration as to the apparatus, systems and methods establishing
the embodiment of Virtual AtoN and descriptions of various means of implementation.
5.1.1

Embodiment

The embodiment of a Virtual AtoN may include:
• Apparatus designated as short range aids to navigation traditionally represented as
beacons, buoys, lighthouses, lightvessels, lines, daymarks and traffic signals,
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• Apparatus designated as positions, routes, tracks, areas, zones and other regions that
are safe for navigation or transit,
• Apparatus designated as positions, routes, tracks, areas, zones and other regions
from which navigation or transit may be restricted or excluded,
• The above apparatuses that encompass a high resolution three-dimensional digital
terrain model data of the sea bottom at and in the vicinity of the position wherein
the apparatuses are located and designated for use,
• Systems of one or more apparatuses that together comprise a Virtual AtoN,
• Methods that enable the use of virtual aids to navigation to enhance the safety of
vessel navigation, and/or
• Methods to verify that virtual aids to navigation are in their proper geographical
position (on station) and exhibiting their correct characteristics (watching properly).
These apparatuses, systems and methods may be employed where freedom of
movement of shipping is inhibited by restricted sea-room and where there is the
existence of hazards and obstructions to navigation, limited depths, critical depths or
unfavorable oceanographic conditions. They may be used to implement routes
organizing safe traffic flow to stay clear of fishing grounds, wildlife preservation areas
or the organization of traffic through these areas; and to implement routes preventing or
reducing the risk of pollution or other damage to the marine environment caused by
ships through allision or grounding in or near environmentally sensitive areas. They
also may be used to implement tracks along which previous experience has shown, so
far as possible, these tracks are free of dangers and along which ships are advised to
navigate.
Guidance to mariners may be provided pertaining to characteristics of the physical
environment external to a vessel that are relatively static in nature and do not change
over relatively long periods of time, where these characteristics are dynamic in nature
and subject to change over relatively short periods of time or are in effect for
designated periods of time, and/or are provided in real-time and exist only momentarily
or for very short periods of time. Guidance to mariners may also be provided to
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determine position and course, to warn of dangers or of obstructions, or to give advice
about the location of a best or preferred route.
Characteristics of the physical environment external to a vessel that are relatively static
in nature and do not change over relatively long periods of time include information
regarding rocks, sea mounts, ledges, reefs, wrecks, drilling platforms and other natural
and manmade static hazards to navigation that may persist within a geographically
defined area in the environment over months, years, decades and centuries.
Characteristics of the physical environment may also be dynamic in nature, subject to
change over relatively short periods of time or in effect for designated periods of time
may pertain to shoals, wrecks, construction sites and other natural and manmade
dynamic hazards to navigation that may persist within changing geographically defined
areas in the environment over days, months and years. Characteristics of the
environment may also be determined in real-time that are momentary in duration and
exist only for very short periods of time that may pertain to ice bergs, growlers,
flotsam, jetsam, buoys that are adrift, marine mammals and other natural and manmade
hazards to navigation. These hazards may persist within changing geographically
defined areas in the environment over seconds or minutes.
Virtual AtoN apparatuses, systems and methods may be considered to be of primary
navigational significance (Category 1), of navigational significance (Category 2), or
less navigational significance (Category 3) than Category 1 or 2.
Virtual AtoN characteristics may be realized in physical form and media such as
navigation charts and maps and/or may be realized in electronic form and media
integral to human-machine interfaces such as analog and digital electronic monitors and
signage. Their characteristics may be stored in electronic, optical and other media,
form(s) and format(s) such as databases, data depositories and data archives; may be
integrated into electronic navigation charts (ENC), electronic chart navigation and
display systems (ECDIS) and other software, systems and apparatuses used to contain
and present navigationally significant information to mariners using a human-machine
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interface; and may be accessed, retrieved, sorted, manipulate, arranged, classified
and/or operated upon by a computer or computational device.
5.1.2

Essential Elements

In assessing modern AtoN system requirements three primary elements must be
considered in terms of system functions, capabilities and the duration of the services
provided by AtoN: functions, capabilities and durations.
Functions. Functions traditionally accorded to mariners by AtoN have been manifest as
physical beacons and buoys whose functions based upon color, shape, topmarks and
other characteristics have explicit meaning in the context of their use. Their placement
within an overall AtoN system is used to denote tracks, routes, areas and limits
implemented across the entire waterway using a systematic approach. Emulation of
these same functions can be accomplished using Virtual AtoN to supplement physical
AtoN. They may also be used when the deployment of physical AtoN or AIS AtoN is
difficult or impossible. Virtual AtoN can provide additional capability to facilitate the
electronic display of lines and symbols that represent areas, routes, tracks and limits
directly on ECDIS or other system(s) by emulating the physical or AIS AtoN that are
typically used to denote these functions or exhibiting new capabilities that are not
possible with physical or AIS AtoN.
Capabilities. Capabilities for implementing AtoN functions have historically been
viewed from a static point of view where, upon completion of a waterway design,
physical AtoN are deployed to required locations. The ability to provide dynamic AtoN
capabilities where their characteristics can change based upon a function of time and
other factors has only recently been accomplished using AIS AtoN broadcasting area
special messages. Virtual AtoN can be used to display in real time the detection of
underwater hazards to navigation detected using 3D-FLS.
Duration. The use of physical beacons, marks, ranges and other apparatus including
AIS AtoN continues to be the preferred method of deployment for channels, routes and
other locations. Changes are made primarily resulting from experience and maintenance
issues as they arise and not based upon new design and implementation methods.
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Virtual AtoN can also perform these same functions designed for use over long periods
of time, the temporary marking of wrecks and other features as well as marking features
with very short or momentary significance like a shipping container that is adrift,
growler or whale directly in the vessel’s path.
5.1.3

Symbology

Traditional short range AtoN include marks in the form of beacons and buoys, ranges
and other apparatus. A primary reference used in developing symbols representing
these apparatuses is IHO Publication S-52, Specifications for Chart Content and
Display aspects of ECDIS (IHO S-52). Within the United States NOAA (2013a) Chart
No. 1 also provides guidance for ECDIS symbols.
A small sample of possible Virtual AtoN symbols similar to existing Cardinal, Lateral
and Special Purpose marks in ENC and display on ECDIS are shown in figure 5.1:
Cardinal Marks

V
North

V
East

V
Isloated
Danger

V

V
West

South

Lateral Marks
IALA A
IALA B

V

V

V

Starboard

Port

Starboard

V
Port

Special Purpose Marks

V

V

V

Emergency Starboard
Wreck
Mark

Safe
Water

V
Port

Figure 5.1: Symbols for marks.

These Virtual AtoN symbols are alike to and differ from physical AtoN and AIS AtoN
as shown in Figure 5.2 in the following manner:
1. The basic mark symbol is identical in all cases. This is an existing symbol that is
in use and presently found in ENC and displayed on many ECDIS;
2. AIS AtoN utilize the basic mark symbol surrounded by a magenta circle denoting
a radio AtoN. The letters “V-AIS” are also posted alongside the AIS AtoN mark
to designate it as a virtual mark created by an AIS transmitter. This is an existing
symbol that is in use and presently found in ENC and displayed on many ECDIS;
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Cardinal Marks

V

V-AIS
Physical AtoN
(existing)

AIS radio-based AtoN
(existing)

Virtual AtoN
(proposed)

Figure 5.2: Comparison between physical AtoN, AIS AtoN and Virtual AtoN Symbols for
marks.

3. Virtual AtoN utilize the basic mark symbol followed by the letter “V” posted
alongside the mark to designate it as a Virtual AtoN. This is a proposed mark for
Virtual AtoN that is experimental in nature and presently not in use. It is not
found in ENC and presently cannot be displayed on ECDIS.
Not all ECDIS are presently equipped to display many of the symbols currently
identified for use. Introduction of an extended symbol set into new ECDIS systems will
begin in 2017 and continue after this date for older systems.
The capability of Virtual AtoN to emulate physical AtoN can also support new
functionality that is not possible with physical AtoN. For example, some additional
short range AtoN symbols that exist to represent tracks, areas and zones are illustrated
in Figure 5.3.
Tracks and Routes

Areas and Zones

F

E
F

A

B

C

D

No-Entry

Figure 5.3: Experimental Virtual AtoN symbols for tracks, areas and zones.
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These symbols may all be implemented as Virtual AtoN. Tracks A and B represent
non-regulated, recommended tracks with two way vessel traffic not based on fixed
marks. Route C represents a fairway designated by regulatory authority with minimum
depth or maximum authorized draft. The width of the fairway, along with traffic
separation zone D, is indicative of the span through which vessel traffic may safely
pass. Area E represents an intuitive approach to designating a geographic area with
irregular boundaries to supplement the present “–“, “┬“ and “< ” symbols found on
ECDIS that require interpretation. Area F represents a geographic area whose
boundaries expand a specified radius from the center, one implementation of which
could be represented as shown using well understood “no-entry” symbols.
The tracks, routes, areas and zones illustrated here reflect only a small portion of
symbols presently available, and soon to be available using ECDIS. There exists
opportunities for further expansion of ECDIS symbols to include characteristics and
capabilities that are not yet implemented, and possibly those not yet even conceived as
the potential for Virtual AtoN technology becomes more fully realized.
5.1.4

Characteristics for Georeferencing

Virtual, physical as well as AIS AtoN characteristics associated with position are
generally ascertained using GNSS to compare the measured position with the charted
position. In the case of physical AtoN and synthetic AIS AtoN there is a physical AtoN
present at the location as well as an AIS/ECDIS representation to corroborate the GNSS
fix. For AIS virtual AtoN and Virtual AtoN the problem becomes more complicated
since there is no physical AtoN presence at all. A fix developed based upon bearings
taken to physical landmarks and features would be a suitable method for determining
location only in the case where such features were visible and not obscured or out of
visual or radar range.
5.2

Virtual Electronic Aids to Navigation for Remote and Ecologically

Sensitive Regions
Paper 1 provides a comprehensive discussion regarding the overall Virtual AtoN
concept as envisioned by this research and several of the possible implementations
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thereof. The results described were defined in part as a consequence of experiments and
findings as part of Study Area 1 that relate to the acquisition, use and analysis of 3DFLS data in identifying environmental conditions below the waterline relevant to AtoN
creation and placement. This encompasses requirements definition pertinent to the
establishment of AtoN and the examination of traditional physical AtoN and AIS AtoN
characteristics. Early in this research it became evident that robust and high resolution
3D-FLS sensors could provide new capabilities in terms of performance resiliency that
could detect and possibly overcome many disadvantages inherent in overreliance on
GNSS and AIS technologies for vessel navigation. Also resulting from these studies is
the identification of momentary objects and events representing potential hazards to
navigation such as cargo containers, marine mammals, ice bergs, growlers and other
phenomena for which the provisioning of existing AtoN is not possible. This resulted in
the creation of Virtual AtoN with momentary duration concept described in this paper.
Significant elements that comprise Virtual AtoN are placed into perspective with
physical AtoN and AIS AtoN in figure 5.4.
Function

Behaviour

Duration

Physical AtoN

Static

Permanent
Temporary

Static

Permanent
Temporary

Static
Dynamic

Permanent
Temporary
Momentary

• Beacons.
• Buoys and Day Marks.

AIS AtoN
• Buoys and Day Marks.

Virtual AtoN
•
•
•
•
•

Buoys and Day Marks.
Tracks.
Routes.
Areas.
Limits.

Figure 5.4: Essential Aids to Navigation (AtoN) elements.

Additional results were obtained as a consequence of examining responsible national
authority practices pertaining to AtoN creation, provisioning and maintenance
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identified in Study Area 2. The concepts associated with Virtual AtoN can generally
work in harmony with existing AtoN practices that result in their establishment by
responsible national authority. An exception is the creation in real time of momentary
Virtual AtoN outside of the purview of competent national authority due to their
requirement for quick and timely implementation.
Results obtained as a consequence of Study Area 3 were realized in terms of new
capabilities for providing AtoN services using Virtual AtoN in areas where these
services are presently not possible such as in remote Arctic regions where the harsh
weather prevents AtoN placement due to ice movement. This also applies in both the
Arctic and tropical regions where the great distances involved and the lack of
infrastructure, vessels and staffing capabilities prohibit proper AtoN use and
maintenance.
Human factor issues investigated as part of Study Area 5 resulted in the determination
that the display of Virtual AtoN should be wholly integrated into ECDIS displays
presently mandated by IMO for SOLAS vessels and with which mariners are required
to be trained in its operation. Technical issues pertaining to this topic were addressed
and examples provided as to how such issues may be resolved using existing ECDIS
capabilities. Further analysis of notification and alarms that are possible to be issued as
a consequence of hazard to navigation detection and resulting notifications are also
discussed separately within Paper 5 as described in paragraph 5.7.
Additional research results are shown below where a buoy with a floating presence
within the water column just below the waterline was detected using 3FD-FLS as
shown in Figure 5.5.a. The position of this buoy was placed within an ENC as shown in
figure 5.5.b.
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a. Buoy detected using 3D-FLS

b. Sonar contact placed over ENC buoy

Figure 5.5: Momentary Virtual AtoN detected using 3D-FLS.

5.3

Correlation of virtual aids to navigation to the physical environment

In Paper 2 a method is described to verify the performance of Virtual AtoN to help
ensure they are watching properly through the use of georeferencing to bottom features
and characteristics obtained through electronic nautical chart (ENC) models and/or live
sonar data compared to live echosounder readings using running averages and
derivative trend information. This approach also utilizes IHO S-102 ENC capabilities to
attach tangible physical attributes and characteristics to a virtual data object that has no
other physical presence (IHO S-102). This is especially important in an era when both
AIS and GNSS on which precise positioning is based are subject to spoofing, aliasing,
jamming and denial of service attacks that threaten to render AtoN useless or even pose
a hazard to navigation.
Two results emerged from Study Area 3 that are highly significant in terms of value
added to national AtoN authorities. First, the ability to verify Virtual AtoN can also be
extended to the verification of physical AtoN and AIS AtoN. This capability can spawn
the creation of more robust verification methods that may be automated to a great
extent, thereby enhancing the efficiency of present AtoN authority staff members
dedicated to this task. Second, the algorithms to perform these automated verification
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tasks can be integrated into ECDIS installations such that every passing vessel can
routinely and without human assistance perform AtoN verification of position and
watching in best waters while making way on a continuous basis.
Results from Study Area 4 are provided illustrating how environmental, physical and
electronic characteristics; performance requirements, and database representations for
Virtual AtoN can determine they are watching properly and performing their proper
function. There are presently no other methods identified within industry or
Government for the verification of Virtual AtoN. This includes the results of
experiments performed simulating the verification of a Virtual obstruction mark for a
wreck that exists in a well-charted area and the second experiment involves verification
of virtual lateral marks in an area lacking adequate hydrographic survey. Results from
additional experiments are also provided to demonstrate the use of these same methods
to verify physical AtoN using a representative sampling of the thousands of data points
available in the high resolution geospatial model of the sea floor obtained through
hydrographic survey.
A significant outcome of these experiments is confirmation of the ability to help verify
Virtual AtoN are watching properly despite the unavailability of precise positioning
information normally obtained using GNSS, AIS and other sources due to a variety of
manmade and natural events.
5.4

Hydrographic Survey in Remote Regions: Using Vessels of Opportunity
Equipped with 3-dimensional Forward-Looking Sonar

Paper 3 describes the results of two different sets of experiments designed to explore
the usefulness and versatility of commercial off-the-shelf 3D-FLS to carry out different
tasks. The first set of experiments focused on determining its accuracy in representing
the physical environment in which it operates, and the second set involved determining
its capability to provide data of sufficient resolution to assist in verifying position using
geographical features of the bottom.
The data sources for Paper 3 include two conference papers that are not appended to
this dissertation but are included under Other Related Papers and Publications in
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paragraph 1.7 and listed under References. The first paper describes detailed results
obtained under Study Area 1 that represent initial efforts to extract vector data from 3DFLS measurements to determine their accuracy when compared to the nautical chart
that is the legal standard for vessel navigation (Wright and Zimmerman, 2015). The
second paper describes results obtained under Study Area 4 from experiments further
expanding upon previous efforts involving verification through georeferencing (Wright
and Baldauf, 2015). These previous efforts are reported under the discussion in Paper 2.
Differences between different vessel transit track data sets positively indicate the
detection of GNSS and/or bottom topography anomalies.
The results of these two sets of experiments are examined to arrive at a conclusion as to
whether a high quality 3D-FLS with suitable range, regardless of manufacturer, is
capable of providing high resolution data necessary to accomplish the stated objectives
of these two sets of experiments. Results pertaining to value added for national
hydrographic authorities as a consequence of Study Area 3 research indicates 3D-FLS
resolution is in accordance with hydrographic survey requirements of less than IHO
Orders of Survey 1a resolution with full sea floor coverage over a predetermined swath
of the bottom (IHO S-44). This result indicates a hybrid data product somewhere
between those provided by IHO Orders of Survey 1a, and 1b surveys that do not require
full sea floor search.
5.5

Cooperative use of 3-dimensional forward looking sonar and Virtual Aids
to Navigation in reducing risk for Arctic voyages

Results described include the identification of hazards using a scenario by which their
causes and consequences were examined. Options to reduce risks and/or their
consequences were also identified, followed by the recognition of options to control
risks and to compare benefits of each of the options. Recommendations are provided
considering the hazards identified, the options to reduce or eliminate their occurrence
and/or their consequences and associated costs and benefits.

74

5.5.1

Identification of Hazards

Groundings can occur through a wide variety of indirect and direct causes. A list of
system capabilities associated with voyage planning and execution, hazards that may
result from the loss or compromise of these capabilities and the potential consequences
of these hazards is shown in Table 2. Lack of hydrographic survey is an indirect cause
for grounding due to a lack of available information of the undersea environment
fundamental to the development of comprehensive, complete and accurate navigation
charts. This results in the creation of a navigation chart that contains large areas of
blank space lacking soundings and other information normally available to mariners.
Table 2: Factors pertaining to unintentional groundings and allision.
Capability Loss or Compromise
Hydrography
- Lack of Assets to Perform Surveys
Navigation Charts
- Lack of Soundings
- Uncharted Hazards to Navigation
- Different Datum
- ECDIS
Environmental Sensing
- Automated Identification System (AIS)
- Precision Positioning and Timing (GNSS)
- Tides and Currents
- Weather
- Sonar (Echo sounder, 3D-FLS)
- Radar
Aids to Navigation (AtoN)
- Virtual (Permanent/Temporary duration)
- Virtual (Momentary duration)
Human Error
- Inaction
- Action too little/too much
- Incorrect action
- Action too soon/too late
- Misdirected action

Hazard due to Effect of Loss or Compromise

Potential Consequences

Poor Navigation Charts

Improperly plan/monitor voyage.

Unknown depths along route
Danger posed to surface vessels
Different positions using the same coordinates
Warnings and alarms may be inoperable

Grounding
Grounding, Allision
Grounding
Grounding

Identification and location of vessels and AtoN
Loss of electronic position and time acquisition
Inaccurate depths along route
Unknown or inaccurate atmospheric conditions
Inaccurate or unknown depths along route
identification/location of vessels, AtoN, land

Grounding, Allision
Grounding, Allision
Grounding, Allision
Grounding, Allision
Grounding, Allision
Collision, Grounding, Allision

Unmarked hazards, reefs, ledges, shoals, etc.
Unmarked hazards floating in the water column

Grounding, Allision
Allision

Lack of knowledge, situational awareness
Inattention
Procedural deficiencies, poor learning
Poor communication
Miscalculation

Grounding, Allision
Grounding, Allision
Grounding, Allision
Grounding, Allision
Grounding, Allision

A direct cause of grounding is illustrated by the navigator of a vessel relying upon a
poor chart that may be lacking soundings information while attempting to transit an
area where bottom characteristics are unknown and any hazards to navigation that may
exist are as yet undiscovered. Another problem in the Arctic is the use of charts where
surveys were performed using a datum other than World Geodetic System 1984,
requiring a datum shift correction before a position can be plotted on a chart (WGS84,
Pub. 180). This also requires that GNSS are set to the same datum as the ENC. The
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various alarms integral to ECDIS that are intended to alert the watchstander of
insufficient water depth ahead along the transit route to prevent groundings will not
operate when the ENC does not contain this information.
Environmental sensing capability discrepancies are a potential cause of grounding
due to system failure and/or lack of situational awareness on the part of the
watchstander. With the sole exception of the echo sounder that provides water depth
directly below the hull, all navigational sensor coverage including AIS, GNSS and
radar is limited to the environment as it exists above the waterline and is capable of
detecting only secondary, indirect references that may indicate shoal waters or hazards
to navigation significant to grounding. Such references may include a rock or pinnacle
that extends above the surface of the water, or a physical AtoN or AIS AtoN that
depicts a hazard or obstruction.
The use of 3D-FLS to supplement the echo sounder in sensing the features and
characteristics of the underwater environment should be considered when transiting
unsurveyed and poorly charted waters. Such systems can be used at depths to 50 meters
or more at speeds to over 20 knots to detect hazards to navigation up to 1,000 meters
ahead of the bow. This has been shown to provide up to 1.7 minutes advance notice of a
hazard while cruising at speeds of 15 knots (Wright and Baldauf, 2015b). Human error is
also a significant contributor to factors relevant to hazard assessment.
The list of capabilities and resulting hazards in table 2 has been examined to
determine priorities for risk assessment, resulting in the creation of table 3.
Hydrography and the subsequent navigation chart capabilities are considered high
priority as these are essential tools for navigation. Direct environmental sensing and
aids to navigation, although essential to navigation, are given medium priority as some
degree of alternative capability is possible through human intervention if one or more
of these sensors are unavailable. Indirect environmental sensing of weather, tides and
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Table 3. Capability prioritization.

currents is not considered as these capabilities do not originate on the vessel itself but
originate elsewhere, and are provided through communications links. Human factor
issues are important considerations in a formal risk assessment and have not been
thoroughly investigated in this preliminary assessment.
5.5.2

Risk analysis

The following vessel and barge combination was chosen as a reference case for risk
modeling and as baseline for risk analysis from which generalizations may be made to
other segments of the fleet:
Barge for oil: L 180ft (55m), W 52ft (15m), D 14.5ft (4.4m); 2,400 DWT LT, 1100
GRT with 12,000 bbl. capacity trading between Anchorage, Kotzebue and
Kaktovik, Alaska. Push tug with engines rated at 1,350 HP total.
Vessels of this type provide home heating and diesel oil supplies to rural Alaska
communities along the western and northern coasts in the spring and autumn each year
(NSREP 2015). Supplies are transferred to shallow draft literage barges for local
delivery.
Although the area nearby the city of Anchorage is well surveyed and charted, the
areas to the north along the west coast and further around and to the east along the
northern slope of Alaska are poorly surveyed, if at all, and navigation charts are poor.
Proceeding north to Kotzebue only the five mile channel from clear water to the harbor
is surveyed with adjacent waters shown in blue without soundings in figure 5.6. Aids to
navigation are not charted at all, and are subject to being moved based upon constantly
changing bottom conditions. A portion of the route between Kotzebue and Kaktovik is
shown in figure 5.6a where spot and track line soundings predominate except directly
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along the shoreline. Such navigation chart coverage is common along the entire route.
The immediate area around Kaktovik and the harbor shown in figure 5.6b is well
charted, however most soundings disappear after leaving the shoreline.

(a) Channel to Kotzebue Harbor, AK (NOAA Chart 16161)

(b) Kaktovik, AK (NOAA Chart 16043)
Figure 5.6: Approaches and Harbor Charts for Kotzebue and Kaktovik, Alaska, USA.
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Risk assessment using existing technology – A process for risk assessment using
present technology is shown in table 4. Assessment of hydrography is made based upon
the recency of survey and the coverage of the survey along the route. Where
hydrographic surveys have recently been performed and absent significant storm
activity, is it likely that the surveyed bottom configuration still accurately represents the
present bottom configuration. As the time since the last survey becomes greater the
probability of changes in the bottom increases. However, when surveys are more than
30 years old another factor comes into play in terms of the lower resolution of older
sensors and technologies used to perform the survey. Multibeam sonars that provide
full bottom coverage at high resolution have only come into use since the 1990’s (NOS,
HHS). Prior to that single-beam echo sounders were used from the 1940’s to the 1980’s.

Earlier technologies included the wire drag survey introduced in 1904 and the leaded
line survey before then.
Coverage of survey refers to comprehensiveness in the area along the route of transit.
Full bottom coverage with soundings, depth contours and other topography and
hydrography features are given a lower risk factor than areas where only partial full
bottom exists in some areas and is absent in others. Likewise, track and spot soundings
and lack of depth contours and other features warrant a higher risk factor. A navigation
chart exhibiting a complete lack of soundings is given a high risk score. It is entirely
possible for a navigation chart to be of the most recent version and current to the latest
Notice to Mariners, yet still be entirely devoid of hydrographic information since no
survey may have ever been performed in the area covered by the chart.
Table 4. Risk factors.
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The assessment of environmental sensors is made on the basis of whether they are
operational or not operational. As these sensors are required carriage on SOLAS vessels
the only consideration given is to the increase of risk to conduct a voyage without them.
Assessment of AtoN is made on the basis of their presence along the route of transit
to guide the vessel. Although physical AtoN are generally plentiful in well surveyed
and well traveled areas, the Arctic has neither of these characteristics. Few physical
AtoN and fewer AIS AtoN exist in and around the Arctic except possibly in the
immediate vicinity of harbors during the warmer months.
Risk is evaluated by assessing each of the individual capabilities according to the
criteria listed and assigning a score corresponding to these capabilities. A total score
within the boundaries of low risk indicate that hydrography, navigational charts and
sensor capabilities are at or near their optimal state and a voyage under these
circumstances may be appropriate if all other criteria for getting underway are met. A
total score in the medium risk range indicates deficiencies exist in the recency of
hydrographic survey or the presence of AIS AtoN along the route. Neither of these
factors may indicate that a problem exists. However, caution should be exercised during
transit. A total score greater than 9 indicates a high risk voyage is possible and
additional planning and preparation is needed before attempting the voyage.
Risk assessment using emerging technologies – A process for risk assessment using
new technology to supplement existing technology is shown in table 5. Specific
reference is made to 3D-FLS to enhance situational awareness into the environment
below the waterline by providing a live rendering of the sea bottom and potential
hazards to navigation that exist either afloat or within the water column. This system
can provide an additional margin of safety when risk associated with a lack of current
and comprehensive hydrographic survey is high, and can also provide similar data and
functionality as an echo sounder, if necessary.
Further reference is made to the use of Virtual AtoN to replicate physical AtoN and
AIS AtoN functions on ECDIS and provide new capabilities for displaying hazards to
navigation detected by 3D-FLS that are afloat or in the water column. Capability is
provided to lessen the impact of GNSS and AIS service interruptions, spoofing and
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denial of service attacks, and AIS aliasing resulting in misleading position information.
This is accomplished through georeferencing to known bottom features and
characteristics as depicted in ENC created in accordance with the IHO S-102 standard.
Table 5. Alternative risk factors with inclusion of 3D-FLS and virtual aids to
navigation.

Risk is evaluated in the same way by assessing each of the individual capabilities
according to the criteria listed and assigning a score corresponding to these capabilities.
However, there is a difference in the determination of a total score by which risk
assessment is made, especially as pertains to hydrography since a live rendition of the
bottom configuration can now be viewed in real-time.
The modeled results indicate risk reduction as a consequence of including 3D-FLS to
gain insight into the underwater environment and to overcome the limitations of
hydrographic survey in areas where no or partial survey was performed, and also using
obsolete technologies that provide lower resolution and coverage than modern survey
methods. Redundancy in sonar equipment through the use of both an echo sounder and
3D-FLS can also serve to cross-check the performance of each individual system,
providing a means to detect sub-nominal performance in either and eliminating a single
point of failure that could otherwise go undetected. Further potential risk reduction is
possible when an echo sounder is used for navigation through georeferencing to known
bottom features and characteristics in conjunction with upgraded ENC developed in
accordance with the IHO S-102 standard that supports high resolution environmental
models.
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5.5.3

Cost benefit assessment

Reliable statistics for grounding in poorly surveyed and inadequately charted waters are
limited at best, and it would be premature to provide definitive cost-benefits analysis.
However, empirical observations can serve as a starting point for discussions. Using the
model barge-tugboat combination (Anchorage, Kotzebue and Kaktovik, Alaska) the
cost for 3D-FLS system acquisition and installation would be approximately $200,000
U.S. Cost avoidance resulting from the prevention of one significant grounding
accident in the Arctic may be on the order of several million dollars in terms of lives
lost, damage to hull and equipment, loss of cargo, search and rescue, pollution
remediation, salvage cost and the payment of fines and penalties. A valid comparison is
the approximately $2 billion US cost for salvage of Costa Concordia that grounded
under the exact conditions that 3D-FLS is designed to overcome.
The use of vessels of opportunity equipped with 3D-FLS to acquire high-resolution,
full bottom coverage hydrography as externally sourced data for navigation chart
development can be accomplished at very little relative cost on the order of hundreds of
thousands of dollars US. This can be compared to the multi-million dollar cost of
acquiring and operating a fleet of hydrographic survey vessels in the vast expanses of
the Arctic.
Accurate costs and benefits associated with the development, implementation and
deployment of Virtual AtoN are not yet available. It can be presumed that the cost of a
viable virtual AtoN program for vast remote areas where physical AtoN and AIS AtoN
are not practical would be far less than the alternatives of implementing existing aids
strategies or having no AtoN that may result in a significant accident in the region.
5.6

Arctic Environment Preservation through Grounding Avoidance

Paper 4 describes research exploring technological innovation to contribute to
substantially reducing pollution resulting from ship groundings and collisions that are
often caused by human factors. The goal of this research is to significantly increase
watchstander situational awareness of environmental conditions below the waterline.
This goal is especially relevant to ship navigation in the Arctic which poses unique
challenges requiring transit through shallow, draft-constrained coastal and archipelago
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waters that are relatively uncharted, lacking aids to navigation, without adequate search
and rescue facilities, and teaming with surface and underwater hazards to navigation.
Under Study Area 1 the contributions of 3D-FLS were examined with regard to its
capability to survey the sea bottom and to detect hazards to navigation attached to the
bottom and floating in the water column to aid in Arctic navigation. Study Area 3
results considering contributions of Virtual AtoN in the Arctic are described as a means
to extend AtoN services in the area. The significance of Virtual AtoN characteristics
used to verify these aids are in proper position and watching properly were also
examined in the context of the lack of surveys in this poorly charted environment.
Human factors in terms of the potential effects of terrorism were also considered under
Study Area 5. Factors relevant to the development of grounding avoidance strategies
were identified and the results of human reaction times to alarms and indicators
relevant to groundings using several case studies were provided.
5.7

Enhanced Situational Awareness through Multi-Sensor Integration

The development of the concept and basic functional and technological structure to
support enhanced situational awareness is explained and discussed in Paper 5 from the
perspective of the grounding of M/V Costa Concordia. Under Study Area 1 the
potential contributions of 3D-FLS in alerting watchstanders of the potential for
groundings are provided in a detailed examination of the final moments of the voyage
just prior to grounding. Human factors considerations under Study Area 5 are also
provided in terms of bridge alerts and alarm generation. Results of this study include
the identification of factors where the use of simulation to accomplish testing,
verification and validation to assimilate 3D-FLS into the integrated navigation system
(INS) environment. This is vital to ensure systems are properly integrated and mariners
are adequately trained prior to the introduction of the technology into widespread use
and as IMO carriage requirements.
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Chapter 6

Summary and Discussion

The aims and objectives of this dissertation as stated in chapter 2 are:
1. to investigate how safety of navigation may be enhanced in areas deficient in aids
to navigation,
2. to determine the means by which infrastructure may be created to deal with these
deficiencies, and
3. to establish how the implementation of this infrastructure may be accomplished in
a manner that is compatible with existing and evolving standards and practices.
This chapter summarizes and discusses the results of the research performed to
accomplish these aims and objectives highlighting the various outcomes achieved as
well as discussing their broader implications to enhancing maritime safety.
6.1 Navigation enhancements to Arctic, tropical, under developed regions,
disaster areas and war zones
The common denominator between the Arctic, tropical regions dominated by coral
reefs and sensitive ecosystems, under developed regions, disaster areas and war zones is
that all of these areas are or can be deficient in AtoN infrastructure in terms of beacons
and buoys that are traditionally used to aid mariners in navigating their vessels. The
reasons for this vary from environmental and economic conditions that prevent their
adequate installation, use and maintenance; to infrastructure having been damaged or
destroyed through natural and manmade occurrence. Also generally lacking in these
same areas is the high-resolution bathymetry that is needed to survey the sea bottom to
help determine where AtoN should be placed.
An approach was taken to enhance the safety of navigation in two steps by:
1. exploiting the capabilities of modern sensor systems that are currently available in
the commercial marketplace but are not necessarily mandated as part of IMO
carriage requirements for vessels under SOLAS or other regulatory accord, and
2. extending the existing IALA Virtual AtoN concept to create an entirely new type
of Virtual AtoN that requires no physical infrastructure whatsoever and possesses
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new characteristics and capabilities not available through any other means. These
Virtual AtoN may be verified as being on station and watching properly through
automated means, and can be implemented and maintained in extreme remote
areas regardless of weather conditions or access limitations.
A detailed Virtual AtoN implementation framework was established that includes a
definition specific to the use of this term in the context of this research, drawing
distinctions between both physical AtoN and the several variations of AIS AtoN. The
embodiments and essential elements comprising a Virtual AtoN are made in terms of
digital apparatus and characteristics, the system(s) of Virtual AtoN that may be created,
the methods to use and to verify their proper operation; and the functions, capabilities
and duration of services provided. This includes the introduction of new dynamic and
transient characteristics to supplement presently existing static AtoN characteristics, as
well as georeferencing as a characteristic that is entirely new to AtoN.
The definition of basic symbology and a range of suggested symbols capable of being
used with Virtual AtoN show great similarities in comparisons to existing AIS virtual
AtoN symbols. Sample implementations of static and dynamic Virtual AtoN featuring
different settings and functions in real world applications are provided for future
consideration in AtoN system design. Examples illustrate the creation and functionality
of solely Virtual AtoN implementations as well as possible hybrid AtoN systems
consisting of the integration of a mix of physical AtoN, AIS AtoN and/or Virtual AtoN
marking the same waterways.
Vessels of opportunity can transit remote areas with greater safety when equipped with
3D-FLS to acquire high-resolution hydrographic survey data that corresponds with the
legal standard for coastal vessel navigation in the form of ENC data in areas that are
considered to be well surveyed and charted. Information derived from detailed analysis
of experimental data make the case that 3D-FLS appears capable of providing the
equivalent of a hybrid of IHO Orders of Survey 1a and 1b resolution with full sea floor
coverage over a predetermined swath (Wright and Zimmerman, 2015).
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Discussion points include the following:
•

The Virtual AtoN framework includes a small subset of possible AtoN
configurations that are suitable to a limited number of real world applications. This
subset may serve as a basis for future expansion into a comprehensive suite of
Virtual AtoN suitable for widespread use across broad application areas.

•

Evidence is provided of measurement accuracy and repeatability to acceptable
tolerances when compared to ENC soundings. Systematic errors were considered
in terms of horizontal and vertical uncertainty and other factors such as vertical
offset between the sonar transducer and the water’s surface, roll/pitch error, track
error, tide adjustments, effect of GPS Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS)
and estimated positioning error (EPE) in determining adjusted 3D-FLS depths. No
evidence was detected of spurious errors or random errors introduced through
human or other causes.

•

Evidence is provided of measurement accuracy and repeatability to acceptable
tolerances for use in georeferencing direct to ENC data originating from 3D-FLS.
Differences in depth values caused by tide variation between predicted and actual
as well as between actual and mean lower low water as depicted in ENC were
considered a systematic error represented as a constant in direct measurements, and
are not present in derivative measurements for change in bottom slope and rate of
change in bottom slope. No evidence was detected of spurious errors or random
errors introduced through human or other causes.

•

In all cases of 3D-FLS and single beam echo sounder measurements the speed of
sound through the water were not measured, further contributing towards
systematic error. One attempt to overcome this limitation is through the use of a
normalized sound velocity of 1500 m/s recommended to the CSBWG for
consideration at the second meeting of this group (Olex, 2016).

6.2 Innovation and invention in ship operations
There are two areas of innovation and invention in ship operations that pertain to the
research results described in this dissertation. The first has to do with expanding
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watchstander situational awareness by providing direct insight in real time into the
environment below the waterline and ahead of the vessel to enhance the ability to detect
hazards to navigation and respond accordingly to avert these hazards. The second
involves the introduction of new concepts in navigation through the introduction of the
Virtual AtoN and the additional capabilities they are able to provide. This also includes
the ability of ships to serve as vessels of opportunity to acquire and disseminate to
competent national authorities both hydrography data and Virtual AtoN verification
results.
Voyages by vessels of all tonnages are presently conducted with an appalling lack of
situational awareness regarding the physical configuration of the sea bed forward of the
bow. Indeed, the only direct knowledge of water depth available to the watchstander is
typically in the form of a two or three digit number provided by an echo sounder
measuring the distance between the keel and the bottom at some point that is likely
amidships or astern, oftentimes hundreds of meters aft of the bow. The irony of this
situation is that the bow may be firmly grounded on a ledge while the echo sounder
may still be reporting hundreds of meters depth below the keel. All other information
sources by which a watchstander may ascertain water depths are through indirect means
by the use of a navigation chart created at some time in the past based upon an even
earlier hydrographic survey that may have been performed years or even centuries
before. Another source of relatively recent data that can be used for voyage planning
and execution is the Notice to Mariners. However, this source also suffers the same
latency problem as all other indirect sources.
Historically, AtoN are the means by which this problem has been solved. Their
placement along the boundaries of channels and routes known to be safe for navigation,
and their marking of hazards to navigation to warn mariners of peril have for centuries
greatly contributed to enhance the safety of navigation. However, AtoN do not exist in
the Arctic and other remote regions, and are not likely to be introduced anytime in the
near future due to lack of hydrographic surveys, the harsh environment, budgetary
constraints and numerous other reasons.
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One approach has been demonstrated in assessing potential vulnerabilities and risk
through the identification of hazards likely to be encountered in vessel operations in the
Arctic based upon existing SOLAS equipment carriage requirements. This can prompt a
reduction of potential vulnerabilities and the lowering of risk that may occur through
the introduction and proper use of the environmental sensing capabilities of 3D-FLS
onto the bridge are also described.
New capabilities have been created to assess vulnerabilities in Arctic transits through
the examination of risk, providing tools for voyage planning. The ability to determine
the amount of time provided to crewmembers to accomplish avoidance procedures has
been demonstrated in response from the detection of hazards to navigation on the sea
floor using 3D-FLS and the generation of Virtual AtoN with transient characteristics.
Further definition of these capabilities was accomplished through the performance of
several vessel grounding scenarios as a follow-up to the detailed analysis of the
grounding of Costa Concordia.
Discussion points include the following:
•

The potential to achieve “ship centricity” has been demonstrated by providing
watchstanders on the bridge with direct visibility into the underwater environment
using 3D-FLS. This new capability supplements the direct method of assessing
the sea bottom by identifying depth contours using an echo sounder, and indirect
methods of assessing the sea bottom through existing means such as navigation
charts and Notice to Mariners. Integration into existing navigation systems is
possible through ECDIS.

•

Further demonstrated is the ability of 3D-FLS to detect the presence of hazards to
navigation both affixed to the bottom and suspended in the water column.
Detection of such hazards can spur the generation of Virtual AtoN with static or
dynamic characteristics for display on ECDIS upon examination and direction by
competent national authority. Also, in-water hazards likely to exist for a relatively
short period of time such as may be caused by buoys adrift, growlers, large timber
or other objects can spur the creation of Virtual AtoN with characteristics that are
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momentary in nature for display on ECDIS. Such capabilities can provide
mariners with the capability to be proactive in their approach to navigation in
reducing groundings by providing specific guidance as to the actual bottom
configuration rather than what is believed to be the bottom configuration based
upon navigation chart data. The degree to which capability is effective to guide
mariners in avoiding groundings is yet to be studied.
•

Assessment of risk has been accomplished from the perspective of having the
advantages of new 3D-FLS capabilities for the bridge watch in providing an
additional margin of safety as opposed to not having such capabilities as is
currently the case in vessel navigation in poorly surveyed and charted waters. This
approach can form the foundation for future statistical analysis to assist in
predicting accidents based upon extrapolating vessel traffic and accident statistics
of the region. However, there does not yet exist a database of significance related
to vessel traffic due to the occasional and infrequent passage of vessels through
such areas. Moreover, the application of accident statistics obtained from sources
world-wide is not appropriate as the data is derived from a wide variety of vessels
under varying circumstances that cannot readily be extended to Arctic traffic and
navigation conditions.

•

The concept of using shipboard equipment assets to capture large volumes of
hydrographic data obtained using 3D-FLS was introduced. However, it is
emphasized that any such innovation in ship operations must be accomplished
without interference with existing crew responsibilities or adding to crew
workload.

•

Initial checklists created to assist in assessing vulnerabilities in overall capabilities
required for planning Arctic voyages and resulting risk can provide a basis for
considering 3D-FLS as an IMO carriage requirement.

6.3 Verification of Virtual AtoN watching properly
Determining that AtoN are on station in their correct position, and watching properly in
best waters and showing proper characteristics is an essential part of the overall AtoN
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verification process. This is accomplished through comparison between AtoN position
and characteristics on navigation charts, AtoN description as represented in the Light
List and supplemental information contained in Notices to Mariners.
The capability for hydrographic data provided by 3D-FLS when compared with single
beam echo sounder data to detect differences in the sea floor has been demonstrated
that are indicative of Virtual AtoN being on station and watching properly based upon
matching topography signatures between actual course taken and charted course. This
confirms georeferencing capabilities to detect Virtual AtoN improperly watching or not
watching in best waters as a result of differences in topography signatures between
actual course taken and charted course.
Virtual AtoN verification has also been demonstrated to automatically, and in real time,
correlate vessel positioning information to the physical environment in helping to verify
Virtual AtoN as being on station and watching properly. This is a new capability not
previously available to vessels. The only existing scenario that is similar is a AIS
virtual AtoN that may be broadcasting to a geographic position. However, in this case it
is incumbent upon the watchstander to determine whether the AIS virtual AtoN is
incorrect. 3D-FLS use in hydrographic survey as independently sourced data illustrates
the potential use of vessels of opportunity to perform this role.
A new process for deployed Virtual AtoN as well as the validation process throughout
the entire Virtual AtoN life cycle considers the integrity of Virtual AtoN data as may be
represented in complementary databases residing at both hydrographic and AtoN
authorities. It also includes automation of much of this part of the verification process.
Discussion points include the following:
•

The methods and processes identified for Virtual AtoN verification are based upon
existing AtoN verification methods and are intended to work cohesively with
physical and AIS AtoN verification.

•

The automation of Virtual AtoN verification may also be accomplished with
physical and AIS AtoN with the adoption of IHO S-102 Bathymetric Surface
Product Specification.
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6.4 Contributions to environmental protection and preservation
One of the essential outcomes of this research is the protection and preservation of
fragile ecosystems as exist in the Arctic and tropical regions in areas of coral reefs and
other critical habitat. The dynamic characteristics of Virtual AtoN may now be applied
to rapidly designate no-entry and restricted entry zones around wildlife protection areas
and refuges. This same concept can be applied to no-fishing and other areas on a daily
to seasonal basis. The potential for reduction in unintentional groundings has also been
demonstrated with potential benefits in significant reductions in loss of life, vessel and
cargos; and pollution with the subsequent fouling of the environment and loss of
wildlife. This includes Virtual AtoN verification providing a means to help ensure
Virtual AtoN are on station and watching properly and to reduce the chance of accident
resulting from AtoN failure. Sensor fusion technologies also illustrate additional
aspects of grounding avoidance and possibly the detection of other hazards to
navigation for which Virtual AtoN with momentary duration may be created to alert
watchstanders to their presence.
Discussion points include the following:
•

Analysis of groundings accidents resulted in the identification of critical elements
in the timing and unfolding of events. One of the factors considered, Watchstander
Response Time (to a grounding alarm), was selected at 5 seconds after initiation of
warning. Even with the quadrupling of response time to 20 seconds and a resulting
reduction in time to grounding of approximately 10% from 2.1 minutes to 1.9
minutes, significant time remained to effect corrective action to avert or lessen the
consequences of grounding

•

Vulnerability assessment and risk analysis was performed at three levels:
- Organizational level (e.g., cognizant national authority, shipping company)
- Workplace level (on the vessel itself), and
- Personal level (e.g., captain, watchstander)
Analyzing causal factors between these levels revealed the sequential relationships
that may potentially result in accident. A key element was indicated to be the lack
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of primary shipboard capabilities including sensors and other resources available to
thwart mishap when lacking outside, secondary resources such as accurate
navigation charts in well-surveyed environments and Notices to Mariners.
6.5 Virtual AtoN implications on human factors and training
Extensive measures have been taken to ensure Virtual AtoN conform to existing
standards and training conventions whenever possible. The use of existing ECDIS
symbology with minor modification may be accomplished to indicate the virtual nature
of the AtoN. The only exceptions are in cases of new dynamic capabilities and
momentary duration not available with existing AtoN. Likewise, the use of standard
ECDIS symbology has been stressed in depicting hazards to navigation detected while
making way.
Discussion points include the following:
•

Analysis of fatigue risks in the shipping industry often point to workload
redistribution as a means to reduce errors and incidents as part of a fatigue risk
management system (TNO, 2008). However, redistributing additional workload on
an already overburdened crew is not a satisfactory solution especially in light of
ever-increasing STCW requirements. The approach taken in this research focuses
on the display of 3D-FLS information and resulting Virtual AtoN targets using
existing ECDIS display requirements and symbology. This eliminates the need for
an additional display monitor dedicated to 3D-FLS on the bridge, as well as the
need for additional crewmember training in its use.

6.6 Regulatory contributions to Virtual AtoN establishment
The focus of this research has been primarily aimed at national authorities cognizant of
AtoN and hydrography, although authorities that pertain to environmental protection,
fish and wildlife preservation and other related jurisdictions are also appropriate. It is
these national authorities that comprise the membership of the larger, international
organizations that establish industry standards and practices in these related disciplines.
An example is the Coast Guard who is responsible for AtoN within the United States,
and who is the U.S. representative to the International Maritime Organization.
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Likewise, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration is responsible for
hydrography and chartmaking, and is the U.S. representative to the International
Hydrographic Organization. There are in addition, many non-Governmental and
industry organizations that are relevant to these issues. All such national organizations
are instrumental to setting the agenda at the various general and committee meetings of
the umbrella international organizations at which issues of vital concern are discussed
and decisions are made as to their disposition and solution.
Discussed throughout this research is the importance of working within the confines of
existing standards and recommendations that are established by these organizations, a
short summary of those referenced within this dissertation include:
•

International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea - SOLAS. (IMO)

•

International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters - the Polar Code. (IMO)

•

S-44. Standards for Hydrographic Surveys. (IHO)

•

S-52. Specifications for Chart Content and Display Aspects of ECDIS. (IHO)

•

S-100. Universal Hydrographic data Model. (IHO)

•

S-102. Geospatial Standard for Hydrographic Data. (IHO)

•

Aids to Navigation Manual - Administration. (USCG)

•

NOS Hydrographic Surveys Specifications and Deliverables. (NOAA)

•

United States Chart No. 1; Symbols, Abbreviations and Terms used on Paper and
Electronic Navigational Charts. (NOAA)

•

Guideline 1062, On the Establishment of AIS as an Aid to Navigation. (IALA)

•

Guideline 1081, On Virtual Aids to Navigation. (IALA)

•

Aids to Navigation Manual. (IALA)

The concepts of 3D-FLS and Virtual AtoN are not addressed in any of these documents
other than IALA 1081 that defines the concept of a Virtual AtoN but provides no
guidance regarding implementation. The initiative to address such issues must originate
from the national organizations which rely upon and take action based on the inputs,
advice and needs of their constituents. Coalitions between member states must act
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together to effect changes to carriage requirements, equipment standards and to make
meaningful changes in these areas.
6.7 Broader implications of these research results
Several of the key outcomes of this research are discussed in the following paragraphs.
6.7.1

Virtual aids to navigation

Virtual Aids to Navigation are conceptually foreign to the mariner, who traditionally
have relied on physical AtoN to provide much of the guidance needed for safe
navigation. The potential configurations of Virtual AtoN and AtoN systems, alone and
in combination with physical and AIS AtoN discussed in this dissertation provide a
glimpse as to the possibilities associated with their adoption and use. However, these
are just a small sampling of the true capabilities such aids may possess and of the
services they will be able to provide in the future. These services include those
provided directly to the mariner in terms of navigational guidance, as well as data feeds
associated with the autonomous verification of Virtual AtoN communicated from the
vessels to national AtoN authorities.
6.7.2

Greater automation in shipping

An obvious application for which Virtual AtoN are well suited includes providing
navigational guidance to the operators of present day vessels to vessels using increasing
levels of automation in the future. Being that the operators themselves are providing
virtual control and direction to the vessel in an artificial reality setting, it stands to
reason that there is no reason or requirement for physical AtoN associated with the
operation of highly automated or even autonomous vessels. Such vessels are expected
to transit amongst physical and AIS AtoN in coastal and harbor areas that are used for
navigation by all vessels. However, the concept of Virtual Private AtoN (PAtoN) can
come into play for proprietary use by only the shipping companies involved. Processes
similar to those currently used by national authorities for PAtoN provisioning and
deployment can be adapted for Virtual PAtoN. The advantages of such an approach
include the ability to provision literally hundreds to thousands of Virtual PAtoN
systems worldwide tailored to the needs of individual vessels and shipping companies,
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and to which only those vessels and companies have access. This approach alleviates
the crowding of harbors and waterways with multiple beacons and buoys, yet fulfills
the exact requirements of large numbers of vessels and company, government and
tactical military operations.
6.7.3

3-dimensional forward looking navigation sonar

The use of 3D-FLS should not be limited to remote and unsurveyed locations, but
should be encouraged for use by vessels of all sizes for routine operations worldwide.
The capability to provide increased situational awareness below the waterline ahead of
the vessel should not be overlooked, and it is incumbent upon the masters of all such
vessels to be knowledgeable of all aspects of the environment through which they pass
throughout voyage planning and execution. The examples are legion of vessel
groundings resulting from physical changes that occur due to storms and the natural
movement of sand and sediment due to currents in well dredged and charted inlets,
channels and passes. One notable example is the shoreline of New Jersey and the entire
New York metropolitan region in the U.S. where, as a result of Hurricane Sandy in
October 2012, a new inlet was created by storm action and wind and waves altered the
shoreline and sea floor (NOAA, 2014). By November 2012 NOAA’s rapid response
teams had many survey assets on the water in response to this storm (NCS, 2014).
NOAA was funded in 2013 to begin the task of redoing the coastal elevation models for
the entire area. During the interim period, many vessels passed along the coast with
little direct knowledge of the sea floor topography and the hazards to navigation that
included buildings, vehicles and debris washed into the sea that existed in their path
other than the two or three-digit depth indication provided by the echo sounder.
6.7.4

Crowd sourcing of hydrographic data

Rear Admiral G. S. Ritchie, the President of the Directing Committee of the
International Hydrographic Bureau, in his paper noted three possible technical
revolutions in hydrography with the introduction of these advances (Ritchie, 1982):
1. Echo-sounding after World War I,
2. Electronic positioning after World War II, and
3. Multibeam swath sounding in the 1960s
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The fourth possible technical revolution may very well entail the introduction of crowdsourcing techniques involving the use of many hundreds to thousands of vessels of
opportunity equipped with a variety of equipment ranging from simple echo sounders,
multibeam echo sounders and 3D-FLS in an unprecedented attempt to document the
vast expanses of the world’s oceans, seas and littoral waters. Such an approach may
bear the greatest fruit in the Arctic. Vessel traffic is increasing in the region in
synchronization with the introduction of 3D-FLS to aid vessels in safely navigating
poorly charted waters. The establishment of crowd-sourcing initiatives such as the IHO
CSBWG also has the potential to capture and make use of this high-resolution data to
supplement official hydrographic surveys and aid in chart making. The future
availability of broadband Internet access worldwide, including the Arctic using
terrestrial and satellite services will accelerate the transfer of terabytes of data for use in
this effort.
There are three challenges that must be addressed in the future to devise an effective
solution to this issue:
•

Equipping a fleet of vessels of opportunity with sufficient size and range to provide
significant and useful data collections. This may be accomplished through joint
industry, government and IMO initiatives to enhance safety of navigation by
encouraging the installation and use of 3D-FLS navigation sonars in remote and
poorly charted regions.

•

The distribution of extremely large volumes of data from remote data gathering
sources to crowd sourced data processing destinations. Several commercial firms
that include Google (Mountain View, CA, USA) OneWeb (Arlington, VA USA)
SpaceX (Hawthorne, CA USA) and Societe Europeenne des Satellites (SES,
Luxemborg) have initiated projects dedicated to providing worldwide broadband
Internet access within the next several years.

•

Data reliability and validity checking to ensure correctness. Large scale and big data
analytics utilizing trusted source criteria in conjunction with IHO data quality
monitoring functions will be needed to ensure data quality assurance. Issues
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pertaining to the user of tide and sound speed uncertainties in determining TVU
must still be addressed.
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Chapter 7

Conclusions

7.1 Findings
The findings of this research indicate the following:
•

A means to provision Virtual AtoN without requiring any corresponding physical
presence to remote locations and hostile environments has been created that can
overcome the limitations of physical AtoN, and is verifiable as being in a state of
“watching properly” as determined by being in its assigned position and
exhibiting the correct characteristics. This is a new navigational capability which
presently does not exist in the maritime domain that can provide greatly needed
infrastructure in the Arctic as well as in remote tropical regions where the
placement of sinkers to moor physical AtoN is hampered by live coral reefs.
Furthermore, the method created to verify Virtual AtoN provides resilience to
GNSS and AIS spoofing and denial of service attacks to which existing physical
and AIS virtual AtoN are susceptible.

•

The initial version of a Virtual AtoN resulting from this research provides a
foundation for experimental implementations in a suitable environment that may
be developed, tested and evaluated for mariner use.

•

Further findings indicate that, given proper hydrographic survey, the provisioning
of Virtual AtoN may be accomplished alone, or in combination with physical
AtoN and/or AIS AtoN to mark waterways and increase the safety of navigation
where AtoN do not presently exist.

•

3D-FLS can accurately, repeatedly and at high resolution perform measurements
over the sea floor that approximate soundings as represented in ENC data that is
the legal standard for coastal vessel navigation.

•

The hydrographic information provided by 3D-FLS appears to be of sufficient
resolution and accuracy to facilitate Virtual AtoN verification of position and
watching in best waters determination. This finding makes it possible to
accomplish this on an automated basis by all vessels using ENC and equipped
with an echo sounder during the normal course of operation. Such a capability has
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significant implications in terms of the design of integrated navigation systems in
terms of the implementation of new alarms, the criteria by which these alarms are
activated and the training of crewmembers in how to react and what procedures
are to be followed in the event of alarm activation.
A means to report such information to competent national authority responsible
for action in resolving deficiencies in Virtual AtoN deployment must be
developed.
•

A method to assess the viability of large-scale 3D-FLS data collection from
vessels of opportunity as a means to supplement responsible authority resources
in the crowdsourcing of hydrographic data for survey and the development of
navigation charts was created.

•

Capabilities to detect hazards to navigation suspended within the water column
that are not attached to the bottom were evidenced by 3D-FLS detection of buoys
in open water.

•

Virtual AtoN can provide new capabilities to actively, rapidly and dynamically
designate areas and zones to protect specific environmental habitat and wildlife
populations and that can be displayed to mariners on ECDIS.

•

The capability to passively utilize Virtual AtoN capabilities and automated
processes without requiring crewmember intervention or increasing crew
workload can further enhance environmental protection and preservation.

•

Coordination between national authorities for fish and wildlife preservation, park
services, hydrography and AtoN are essential to secure the greatest benefit from
Virtual AtoN capabilities described.

•

The reduction of risk in the world’s frontier is greatly enhanced through
introduction of new technologies to pioneer innovative approaches towards
enhancing Arctic infrastructure. The use of 3D-FLS and Virtual AtoN are two
technologies for which the Arctic is perfectly suited as a laboratory and testbed.
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7.2 Recommendations to stakeholders
•

The concept of truly virtual aids to navigation that require no physical
infrastructure is unique and unorthodox in many respects. National authorities
must retain cognizance over AtoN system design and provisioning processes, yet
the real-time nature of Virtual AtoN of momentary duration is not amenable to the
long timeframes that presently exist in the AtoN development life cycle. Further
research and prototype implementations are required to adequately test and ensure
all aspects of Virtual AtoN in their described implementations are verifiable and
supportable. Additional research is required to integrate Virtual AtoN into
existing AtoN development and provisioning systems.

•

The International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (the Polar Code)
should reconsider their rejection of mandating use of forward-looking sonar and
amend to specify 3D-FLS as a mandatory carriage requirement for vessels while
sailing in Arctic waters (IMO SDC 1). Absent this, acknowledgment of 3D-FLS
as the preferred implementation of the requirement for a second echo sounder as
currently specified in the Code (MSC.385(94)).

•

Further research is required to conclusively determine the usefulness,
effectiveness and limitations of 3D-FLS as an independent source of hydrographic
data as compared to multibeam sonar.

•

Coordination must exist between national hydrographic and AtoN authorities.
Post-processing of data to enhance 3D-FLS measurement accuracy by integrating
speed of sound and other factors need to be thoroughly investigated, along with
new sensor designs for sound speed measurement that may be integrated with 3DFLS systems. The timing and evolution of new hydrographic standards by which
ENC are created is well aligned with innovation in georeferencing techniques by
which navigation may be accomplished, and the performance of navigation
systems may be verified. Finally, the development of new tools by which
mariners can determine the depths of water ahead of the bow to fulfill
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requirements to maintain an effective watch can also serve to improve selfreliance in this demanding environment.
•

The IMO eNavigation initiative, and any follow-on initiatives, should provide for
a means to integrate new technologies beyond those currently pursued for
consideration as part of their inquiries.
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Vessel traffic in the Arctic is expanding in volume both within and transiting the region, yet
the infrastructure necessary to support modern ship navigation is lacking. This includes aids
to navigation such as buoys and beacons that can be difficult to place and maintain in this
hostile environment that stretches across vast distances. The results of research are described
which determine whether virtual electronic Aids to Navigation (eAtoN) existing entirely as
digital information objects can overcome the practical limitations of physical aids to navigation (AtoN) and Automatic Identification System (AIS) radio eAtoN. Capabilities unique to
virtual eAtoN that are not available using either physical or AIS radio technologies are also
examined including dynamic and real time properties and immunity to Global Navigation
Satellite System (GNSS) and AIS spoofing, aliasing, denial of service attacks and service
outages. Conclusions are provided describing potential methods of deployment based upon
similar concepts already in use.
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1. INTRODUCTION. The seascape is changing in terms of beacons used as short
range Aids to Navigation (AtoN) to provide regulatory guidance and information to
vessels. Their traditional role to help navigators determine their position, follow a
safe course and avoid dangers and obstructions remains unchanged. However, the
methods used for implementation and presentation to navigators and watchstanders
on the bridges of vessels are evolving and expanding using new technologies. The
results are a wider range of more capable AtoN that can now be deployed in more locations to supplement existing AtoN, as well as to regions where environmental factors
and remoteness have in the past prevented AtoN use. Instrumental to this change is the
concept of virtual electronic AtoN (eAtoN) presently implemented using Automatic
Identification System (AIS) radio technology viewable on the bridge where eAtoN
can be projected to locations where no physical AtoN exists. These may also be
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included within Electronic Navigation Charts (ENC) and displayed using Electronic
Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS).
The nature and outcome of new research is described focusing on the creation of
truly virtual eAtoN that require no physical infrastructure whatsoever and are
intended for use where physical AtoN and AIS eAtoN are impractical. This includes
the Arctic where ice can hole and sweep away buoys from their intended locations, the
tropics where sinkers cannot be placed on ecologically sensitive coral reefs, and other
areas where navigational infrastructure does not exist or has been destroyed due to war
or natural disaster. This concept is more than simply placing a symbol on a chart as it
includes high-resolution hydrographic and geospatial data correlation of the physical
environment to virtual eAtoN characteristics essential to their operation. This physical
data is also used to verify eAtoN are watching properly, defined by the US Coast
Guard as, “an aid to navigation on its assigned position exhibiting the advertised characteristics in all respects” (USCG, 2005a). The described implementation can overcome many vulnerabilities of Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) and AIS,
technologies essential to modern vessel navigation.

2. JUSTIFICATION FOR VIRTUAL eAtoN. A marine AtoN is a device or
system external to vessels that is designed and operated to enhance the safe and efficient navigation of vessels and/or vessel traffic (IALA, 2014a). There are limitations
to the present AtoN system that impede expansion to geographic regions which are experiencing significant growth in marine traffic yet are highly remote and ecologically
fragile. In the United States this includes thousands of square miles in the Arctic
encompassing the northern slope of Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, tropical regions
spanning the Hawaiian Islands to Midway Atoll and other US territories. Figure 1
(a) illustrates the volume and transit patterns of vessel traffic along a portion of
Alaska’s northern slope based upon ships using AIS to transmit their position and
other information (NOAA, 2015). These same areas are poorly charted, if they are
charted at all. According to the US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA), the Arctic is severely deficient in many capabilities extended
to the rest of the nation and large gaps exist in the information it does have illustrated
by empty white space on nautical charts of the region (NOAA, 2011; 2013). This is
shown in Figure 1(b) where empty white space is interrupted occasionally by track
lines and spot soundings that are often many miles apart.
The scale of these charts is 1:700,000, therefore the soundings appear inordinately
large compared to the actual geographic areas represented. According to the U.S.
Coast Guard, a situation to be avoided unless specifically warranted by unusual circumstances is the establishment of AtoN in areas not properly charted or where
they would invite the inexperienced to attempt a passage which would still be dangerous in spite of the AtoN (USCG, 2005b). The phrase “unusual circumstances” can be
applied directly to the Arctic, where vessel traffic is increasing and traditional AtoN
systems are inadequate and not practical. Virtual eAtoN can overcome many limitations that afflict physical AtoN and AIS eAtoN in these remote and harsh locations. A
significant need can be fulfilled using eAtoN for vessels to transit safely and efficiently
and avoid unintentional groundings, obstructions and hazards to navigation. The
problem of hydrographic survey insufficiency in much of the region can be solved
using 3-Dimensional Forward Looking Sonar (3D-FLS) to assist vessels of
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Figure 1. Comparison of AIS tracking of vessel volume and transit routes to official nautical charts
of the northern slope of Alaska, US.(a) (top) AIS vessel tracking across the Chuckchi and Beaufort
Seas. (source: NOAA, 2015). (b) (bottom) Mosaic of NOAA nautical charts 16004 and 16005
illustrating large areas of unsurveyed bottom.

opportunity to safely navigate uncharted waters while simultaneously capturing
high-resolution, full bottom coverage swaths of sonar data that can assist in the
development of nautical charts.

3. AIDS TO NAVIGATION: AN OVERVIEW. AtoN systems are intended to facilitate safe and efficient movement of vessels through a waterway. Their responsible
provisioning requires that systems be designed to meet the minimum requirements
for safe and expeditious navigation through special waters in accordance with the
type and volume of traffic and the degree of risk. Requirements will change due to
revised circumstances, the introduction of new technologies and increased demands
by crews, vessels and operations. The means to fulfill new requirements must also
change through the use of modern techniques, new tools and implementation methodologies in the analysis of sites, needs, simulation, and operations. In assessing modern
AtoN system requirements, three primary elements illustrated in Figure 2 must be
considered in terms of system functions, capabilities and the duration of the services
provided by AtoN.
3.1. Functions. The traditional functions accorded to mariners by AtoN have
been manifest as physical beacons and buoys whose functions based upon colour,
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Figure 2. Aids to Navigation (AtoN) elements pertinent to safety of navigation.

shape, topmarks and other characteristics have explicit meaning in the context of their
use. Their placement within an overall AtoN system is used to denote tracks, routes,
areas and limits implemented across the entire waterway using a systematic approach.
Emulation of these same functions can be accomplished using AIS radio-based eAtoN
and virtual eAtoN to supplement physical AtoN. They may also be used in their stead
when the deployment of physical AtoN or AIS eAtoN is difficult or impossible.
However, both AIS and virtual eAtoN can provide additional capability to facilitate
the electronic display of lines and symbols that represent areas, routes, tracks and
limits directly on ECDIS without having to emulate the physical AtoN that are typically used to denote these functions.
3.2. Capabilities. Historically the capabilities for implementing AtoN functions
have been viewed from a static point of view where, upon completion of a waterway
design, physical AtoN are deployed to required locations. The ability to provide
dynamic AtoN capabilities where their characteristics can change based upon a function of time and other factors has only recently been accomplished using AIS radiobased eAtoN broadcasting area special messages. One example is their use to broadcast race boundary lines that appear on spectators’ electronic charts marking a
safety zone during the 2013 America’s Cup races in San Francisco (Queeney, 2013).
Exploration of AIS dynamic operational information from both ship and shore installations can lead to further enhancement of AIS eAtoN capabilities. Real time reporting
capabilities are inherent in the design of physical AtoN by virtue of their presence in
the environment at the time they are viewed. Similar capabilities can exist using AIS
eAtoN to report the position of sensor arrays and other tows. Virtual eAtoN can
also be used to display in real time underwater hazards to navigation detected using
3D-FLS.
3.3. Duration. The use of physical beacons and marks continues to be the preferred method of physical AtoN deployment for channels, routes and other locations.
Changes are made primarily resulting from experience and maintenance issues as they
arise and not based upon new design and implementation methods. AIS eAtoN can
also be used to permanently mark features that are difficult to mark using physical
AtoN such as the Isolated Danger mark located on Tarapunga Rock in Doubtful
Sound near the South Island of New Zealand (Marinetraffic VIRT, 2016). Virtual
eAtoN can also perform the temporary marking of wrecks and other features in addition
to marking transient features that have very short or momentary significance such as a
shipping container that is adrift, growler or whale directly in the path of the vessel.
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Figure 3. Present AIS virtual eAtoN symbols with suggested non-AIS virtual eAtoN symbols.

4. eAtoN IMPLEMENTATIONS. A beacon is defined by the International
Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) as
“a fixed artificial navigation mark” that can be recognised by its shape, colour,
pattern, topmark or light character, or a combination of these (IALA, 2014b).
Beacons are realised in the IALA Maritime Buoyage System (MBS) using piles or
buoys as Lateral Marks, Cardinal Marks, Isolated Danger Marks, Safe Water
Marks, Emergency Wreck Marking Buoys and Other Marks (IALA, 2014c). They
are used to mark a landfall position, obstruction, danger or area; indicate lateral
limits of a channel and navigable waterway and turning points or junctions, bearings
or lines of position. The methods described using the IALA Region B MBS applicable
to the Americas, Japan, Korea and the Philippines also apply to the IALA Region A
MBS (IALA, 2014d).
4.1. AIS eAtoN. The eAtoN concept has recently been introduced using AIS
radio technology to emulate the characteristics of physical AtoN using their electronic
equivalents. Their capabilities for rapid deployment and update have proved very
useful in operational situations. AIS eAtoN may or may not be present at the deployed
location, depending upon their method of implementation which includes the following (IALA, 2008):
. Real: AIS signal broadcasts originate from a physical AtoN,
. Synthetic: AIS signals originate from a remote AIS base station and are broadcast
to a location where a physical AtoN exists, and
. Virtual: AIS signals originate from a remote AIS base station and are broadcast to
a location where no physical AtoN exists.
Infrastructure to support Very High Frequency (VHF) transmitters, receivers, power
and health monitoring must be present at a suitable location in the local environment
within line-of-sight to the AIS eAtoN deployment location due to radio range limitations. This requirement for physical infrastructure limits their deployment to accessible
regions where personnel and vessels to support the installation and maintenance of
these aids are available. Hundreds of locations exist worldwide where AIS eAtoN
are currently deployed, with the vast majority being Real and Synthetic aids. Their
capability to emulate physical AtoN can support new functionality that is not possible
with physical AtoN. Using the symbols shown in Figure 3 charts currently produced by
NOAA with AIS eAtoN present within ENC are displayed on ECDIS (NOAA,
2013b). A second line in this table has been added to suggest possible symbols for
(non-AIS) virtual AtoN display on ECDIS omitting the magenta radio station circle
and text for AIS. Not all systems are presently equipped to display many of the
symbols currently identified for ECDIS use. Introduction of an extended symbol set
into new ECDIS systems will begin in 2017 and continue after this date for older
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Figure 4. AIS AtoN Marking the Entrance and Exit from the San Francisco Traffic Separation
Scheme. Source: NOAA Chart 18645

systems. Symbols similar to those shown in Figure 3 are also contained in raster and
printed charts to depict virtual AtoN.
AIS eAtoN have been tested to mark the entrance to a Traffic Separation
Scheme (TSS), provide emergency wreck and obstruction markings, identify waypoints
and turning points, supplement existing physical AtoN, mark bridge abutments and
offshore structures alone and in groups to make them more visible. Examples of
wreck marking include a sunken former Russian Whiskey class submarine off
Denmark in February 2007 and the cargo vessel Omar N that capsized in the Baltic
Sea in October 2007 (FRV, 2009).
In 2008 AIS eAtoN were used to aid vessels on the approaches to the southern end of
Drogden Channel between Denmark and Sweden. In 2014 the US Coast Guard began
testing synthetic and virtual AIS eAtoN to mark reporting points in the offshore TSS
approaches to San Francisco as shown in Figure 4. They are also used to mark the
bridge towers to better alert mariners of their presence on the western span of the
San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge as shown in Figure 5 (USCG, 2014). Many additional AIS eAtoN have been deployed along both coasts, in the Great Lakes and in the
interior along portions of the western rivers within the US (Lewald, 2015).
4.2. Virtual eAtoN. The virtual eAtoN concept is enhanced beyond AIS eAtoN
technology as computer-generated and existing entirely as a digital data object with no
corresponding presence in the physical environment required for implementation.
Virtual eAtoN also include expanded functional elements beyond AIS eAtoN to
support static, dynamic and real time elements with permanent, temporary and transient durations. The basic definition of a virtual aid to navigation is (IALA, 2010):
“A virtual aid to navigation (Virtual AtoN) does not physically exist but is a digital
information object promulgated by an authorised service provider that can be presented on
navigational systems”,
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Figure 5. AIS AtoN Marking Bridge Towers on the San Francisco-Oakland Bridge.
Source: NOAA Chart 18645

where a digital information object is further defined as:
“An item or group of items, regardless of type or format that a computer can address or manipulate as a single object that will inform the user as to the characteristic of a Virtual AtoN”.

This definition is further amplified to describe Virtual AtoN use in informing mariners about dangers to navigation, safe waterways, caution and avoidance areas as may
be represented by a line, area, position or other form displayed graphically without
providing specific implementation mechanisms. Recommendations provided for the
provisioning of Virtual AtoN and their deployment under the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) e-Navigation initiative have thus far been limited to
AIS eAtoN that use VHF radio technology (IALA, 2011; NCSR, 2014).
The characteristics and benefits of virtual eAtoN have been explored by Wright and
Baldauf (2014) in research designed to enhance the safety of navigation for vessels in
regions that are uncharted or poorly charted. Each of these types of AtoN has their
unique functions, characteristics and associated advantages and disadvantages that determine how and where they may be deployed and how they are used by mariners.
4.2.1. Functions. Virtual eAtoN can provide the same beacon functions as AIS
eAtoN along with additional functionalities pertaining to areas and limits, and
tracks and routes that are not possible with either physical AtoN or AIS eAtoN.
4.2.1.1. Beacons and Buoys. Figure 6 illustrates the placement of virtual eAtoN
lateral marks at the entrance to and along a channel that is particularly difficult to
mark with physical AtoN in Kotzebue, Alaska, US.
Located 26 miles inside the Arctic Circle, much of the area is not surveyed and there
are constantly changing sandbars along the approaches. A note to this effect is posted
on the nautical chart along with advice to seek local knowledge when using this route
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Figure 6. Portion of NOAA Chart 16161 for Kotzebue Harbour, Alaska, US depicting the
placement of non-AIS virtual eAtoN where physical AtoN are normally not shown.

that spans several miles from clear water to Kotzebue Harbor. Physical AtoN are
placed each season along this route but are not marked on charts due to their
varying positions. This location provides circumstances advantageous to determining
the viability of virtual eAtoN as it represents a transitional point where VHF radio
coverage is also suitable for AIS eAtoN operation. This makes it useful to evaluate
the integration and performance of AIS eAtoN and virtual eAtoN. The route is also
sufficiently travelled to offer useful experience and feedback in their operation from
numerous vessels.
A prime location for the use of virtual eAtoN is remote and not easily accessible for
AtoN installation and maintenance and exhibits one or more hazards to navigation
that, if left unmarked, may result in significant risk to life, property and the environment. One such example is shown in Figure 7 along a possible Bering Strait TSS providing northbound and southbound traffic lanes through the narrow passage around
Big Diomede Island in Russia and Little Diomede Island in Alaska, US (MarEx,
2015). A hazard to navigation exists as Fairway Rock to the south and east of Little
Diomede Island.
Virtual eAtoN placed at entrance and exit positions along the TSS and along the
transit path centreline or at lateral positions would define the route. These could be
mixed with AIS eAtoN along the lanes of the TSS using VHF transmitters located
on Big Diomede and Little Diomede Islands respectively, with one additional AIS
eAtoN transmitting from Fairway Rock also possible. This figure depicts the use of
virtual eAtoN in combination with AIS eAtoN special purpose TSS buoys marking
the port and starboard sides of the traffic lanes separated by the two islands along
with radio reporting points at the ends of each lane.
Marking of hazards to navigation that heretofore has been difficult or impossible
due to the harsh environment and lack of accessibility may now be accomplished.
This includes sites such as the previously discovered but uncharted ledge in Resolute
Bay, Canada upon which MV Clipper Adventurer grounded in 2006 (TSB, 2012). In
this respect it might be reasonable to further integrate and investigate the potential
of virtual eAtoN for enhanced route, position or direct grounding warnings or alarms.
4.2.1.2. Tracks and Routes. In addition to virtual eAtoN temporarily marking
beacons, areas and limits, their use can be advantageous to mark tracks and routes
in cases where knowledge of previous recent transits can directly contribute to increasing the safety of navigation. One such example is the track of an icebreaker where the
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Figure 7. Portion of NOAA Chart 16220 showing a possible Bering Strait TSS and placement of
both AIS and virtual eAtoN.

route of transit may provide guidance to where ice may be substantially thinner and
more suitable for navigation. In this case it is likely the best representation would
take the form of a non-regulated recommended track not based on fixed or virtual
marks. Virtual eAtoN encoded characteristics represented by this track should
include vessel name and time of most recent transit, an expiration date and time
when the virtual eAtoN is no longer valid, heading information and possibly the shoalest depth value along a track as illustrated in Figure 8. Should previous hydrographic
survey data exist along the route of transit this information would already be included
in the ENC. However, when depths in the track are not known due to lack of survey a
reported shoalest depth using single-beam echo sounder measurements from the icebreaker may be encoded but identified as being unreliable.
4.2.1.3. Areas and Limits. Virtual eAtoN may also be used to mark specific geographic areas such as the Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands groundfish fishery designated conservation areas and protection zones. The availability of such functionality
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Figure 8. Portion of NOAA chart 16206 depicting virtual eAtoN icebreaker track on approaches to
Nome, Alaska.

is valuable where conservation measures requires rapid action to temporarily and spatially limit fishing efforts, especially in relation to closures around areas involving
marine mammals. One such implementation is shown in Figure 9(a), where transit
of the area is normally allowed between 1 April and 15 August with a permit.
During times when walrus activity is high it may be necessary to restrict entry with
little advance notice during the normally open to transit period as shown in
Figure 9(b) (FMP, 2015). This may be accomplished using virtual eAtoN depicting
area and limit boundaries without having to emulate one or more buoys to achieve
this same purpose. These boundaries may also rapidly expand and contract as local
needs dictate. Such functions can be used to place no-entry zones and advisory
areas near to coral reefs and other ecologically sensitive areas, disaster areas, race
and other events that require time and spatial restrictions. This applies to other restrictions that pertain to offshore wind farms, fishing, anchoring and diving as well as
marking bird and seal sanctuaries and marine parks.
Virtual eAtoN use in poorly surveyed regions where physical and AIS eAtoN are
not practical can also enhance the safety of navigation where charting data is inadequate or does not exist at all resulting in blank white spaces on nautical charts.
The use of aids to navigation in such areas is greatly restricted since the knowledge
of where to place them is deficient due to lack of soundings. To help solve this
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Figure 9. Portion of NOAA Chart 16315, Bristol Bay, Alaska depicting the Round Island virtual
eAtoN walrus protection area: transit permit active and inactive.

problem research was performed using 3D-FLS for navigating poorly surveyed regions
to avoid unintentional groundings (Wright and Baldauf, 2015a). Further research
involved assessing the usefulness, resolution and accuracy of 3D-FLS to supplement
hydrographic survey resources as externally sourced data (Wright and Zimmerman,
2015). The findings indicate that it is possible to perform examination with full
bottom coverage using 3D-FLS to obtain an accurate characterisation of the sea
floor, useful for nautical chart development and virtual eAtoN placement. Figure 10
provides an example of how multiple special purpose virtual eAtoN beacons may be
placed along a track with a swath of sonar data where neither soundings nor AtoN previously existed, itself a virtual eAtoN representing an area. This data can be obtained
from a vessel of opportunity equipped with 3D-FLS and used to define a route in an
uncharted area.
4.2.2. Capabilities. Beyond the functions virtual eAtoN are able to provide in
terms of use are the capabilities through which these functions may be delivered and
observed on the bridge of the vessel while underway. This can also extend to shorebased vessel traffic service operators (including fleet operation centre operators),
vessel owners and others involved in supervising vessel activity. Many of these capabilities are new, having become possible due to detailed hydrography data integrated
within the International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) S-100 framework standard
Universal Hydrographic Data Model and specifically the draft S-102 High Definition
Gridded Bathymetry standard that supports development of new navigation products
not possible under the S-57 and previous standards (S-102, 2012).
4.2.2.1. Dynamic Virtual eAtoN Positioning for Marking Coaxial Waterways.
One example of new capability is dynamically repositioning virtual eAtoN considering
vessel physical and performance characteristics rather than to maintain fixed geographic positions regardless of vessel size and draft requirements. This can be used
to mark a deep draft channel within a wider waterway, a portion of which is illustrated
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Figure 10. Portion of NOAA chart 16723, Controller Bay, Alaska, US depicting virtual eAtoN
special purpose buoys and soundings swath from 3D forward-looking sonar equipped vessel.

in Figures 11(a) and 11(b), and is different from related ECDIS capabilities as the physical bottom configuration characteristics of the virtual eAtoN existing within ENC are
used together with vessel draft parameters and live single-beam echo sounder measurements to determine lateral spacing requirements for channel width. This is based upon
detailed hydrographic surface topography model data and is accomplished in real time
considering bottom depths and the forward motion of the vessel. Here it is shown that
the bottom configuration offers a much broader geographic area for the safe navigation of a vessel with a two metre draft compared to a vessel with a four metre draft
where the vessels travel at the same speed.
4.2.2.2. Single and Group Virtual eAtoN. An additional layer of abstraction in
the overall AtoN scheme has been added with AIS virtual eAtoN that may be
placed on physical AtoN to supplement their characteristics, and at locations other
than AtoN to project AtoN characteristics to locations where no AtoN exist at all.
The introduction of completely virtual eAtoN provides an opportunity to further
extend AtoN capabilities to create a “group” virtual eAtoN representing a “system
of systems” that together provides capabilities beyond the sum of the individual
virtual eAtoN components is comprised. For example, the Kotzebue channel shown
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Figure 11. Portion of NOAA chart 12283, Annapolis, Maryland, US depicting mix of fixed
position AIS eAtoN and dynamic positioning of virtual eAtoN to mark coaxial waterways.

in Figure 6 and the possible configuration of a Bering Strait TSS shown in Figure 7 can
support new capabilities by linking individual virtual eAtoN characteristics when accompanied by detailed hydrographic surface model data in an ENC. This can include
automatic determination of changes and shifting of bottom contours resulting from
storm action and other causes by comparing the ENC terrain model data with live
echo sounder measurements while underway. This same process could be used to
detect whether AtoN (physical, AIS or virtual) are on station and watching properly
in good water. Furthermore, this technique would rapidly detect poor GNSS availability due to atmospheric interference, spoofing or a denial of service attack taking place
that results in the apparent vessel position being different from the actual vessel position based upon differences in bottom topography.
4.2.2.3. Real-time Hazard to Navigation Detection. Virtual eAtoN can be used to
contribute new alarms and methods to notify in real time watchstanders on the bridge

Downloaded from http:/www.cambridge.org/core. IP address: 151.225.111.30, on 10 Oct 2016 at 16:03:30, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at
http:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0373463316000527

14

R . G L E N N W R I G H T A N D M I C H A E L B A L DAU F

Figure 12. Live display of real time virtual eAtoN isolated danger mark using 3D-FLS integrated
with ECDIS.

of the detection of uncharted hazards to navigation when integrated with 3D-FLS adequate to support this capability. This includes shoals, ledges and rocks, as well as floating hazards and those suspended in the water column in the path of transit based upon
research performed by Wright and Baldauf (2015b). Notable case studies were presented illustrating how MVs Clipper Adventurer, Exxon Valdez, Rena and Costa
Concordia could have been provided 1·7 to 2 minutes advance warning of grounding
had 3D-FLS been installed and operational. This would have also been useful for
a situation such as was encountered by Carnival’s Ecstasy in April 2010 which
responded in very short time to miss a large, partially submerged data buoy adrift in
the Gulf of Mexico (Yanchudas, 2010).
The detection of such hazards to navigation can be accomplished using algorithms
already available within 3D-FLS. However, their display to watchstanders must
conform to existing human-machine interface conventions and standards. Hazards
to navigation may be displayed on ECDIS by placing an isolated danger mark
shown in Figure 3 directly at one or more positions where contact was made using
3D-FLS as illustrated in Figure 12. The background shown within this figure corresponds to many poorly charted and uncharted locations in the Arctic where ECDIS
is essentially blank since the underlying ENC contains no or sparse sounding information. The isolated danger marks shown in this figure represent a hazard to navigation
detected in real time while making way and within the range of the 3D-FLS providing
a significant acoustic target when compared to surrounding waters. These targets can
represent a shipping container, growler, whale or other target. A transient virtual
eAtoN is something that is neither permanent nor temporary in nature, and is likely
to exist only momentarily until the hazard passes. Such an approach is wholly unorthodox in terms of the present AtoN development lifecycle as the mark has not been promulgated by a competent authority. However, consideration by a competent national
authority of the processes that make such capabilities possible through the integration
of new technologies must be considered, especially when risk is heightened while transiting unknown waters.
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4.2.3. Virtual eAtoN Adoption. Examples of virtual eAtoN realised as beacons,
areas and limits, and tracks and zones are provided to illustrate functions that are possible. The capabilities described to employ these functions are also illustrative, as are
the specific characteristics that have been described for implementation.
Determination of virtual eAtoN adoption for future test, evaluation and/or operational use must be made by the competent national authority after the development and
validation of the processes required to assure their performance and technical viability
have themselves been validated.
4.2.4. IHO S-100 Framework Standard. A key component of virtual eAtoN implementation includes high resolution three-dimensional digital terrain model data of
the sea bottom incorporated into ENC represented as IHO S-102 High-Definition
Gridded Bathymetry featuring level 1 (harbour) 0·02° x 0·02° grid sizes and a final
surface grid resolution of 0·0001° or approximately 8 metres (Journault et al., 2012).
Sufficient resolution exists within these data to perform the verification of virtual
eAtoN physical characteristics using the metrics described and illustrated by Wright
and Baldauf (2015c). Similar resolution available from 3D-FLS data as a source for
hydrographic survey data from vessels of opportunity in inadequately surveyed areas
can accelerate the deployment of virtual eAtoN (Wright and Zimmerman, 2015).
Issues yet to be resolved include the transport architecture that will be used to
convey ENC from shore to on board vessels, cyber security enhancements needed to
ensure trust in data sources, training in the use of this infrastructure and the range
of new products to be delivered. One issue still to be addressed is the orientation of
gridded data with the meridians and parallels at the higher latitudes of the Arctic.

5. CONCLUSIONS. The ability of virtual eAtoN to emulate beacons and buoys,
tracks and routes, areas and limits and other functions with minimal investment and
recurring cost for physical assets and support infrastructure is very appealing to supplement physical AtoN and AIS eAtoN in the many inaccessible, remote and ecologically sensitive regions of the world. The trend of increasing budget constraints for AtoN
research, development, deployment and maintenance is contrasted with the rise in
vessel traffic in regions that are the least amenable to support such traffic. These
regions are the least surveyed, most remote, devoid of AtoN infrastructure, lacking
safe harbours and adequate search and rescue capabilities, and among the most ecologically fragile on the planet.
Results of this research reported to date indicate a realistic potential for the use of
virtual eAtoN, especially in locations and regions where traditional AtoN are not practical or feasible. Evidence has been presented to indicate the proposed approach provides advantages over physical AtoN and AIS eAtoN in overcoming the vulnerabilities
and limitations of GNSS and AIS technology. New functions and capabilities available
using virtual eAtoN integrated with 3D-FLS can provide significant enhancements to
safety of navigation especially in regions that are not surveyed and remain uncharted
such as the Arctic. An initial starting point may include the adaptation of existing 3DFLS in-water hazard and obstruction detection algorithms to produce standard
ECDIS symbology. Also, the Polar Code should be amended to mandate 3D-FLS
as an echo-sounding device having forward-looking capabilities as a vessel carriage requirement in the Arctic (MSC.385(94), 2014). Alternatively, 3D-FLS should qualify as
one of the two already required independent echo-sounding devices.
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The concepts involved have already been proven in the aviation industry, where aircraft plying the airways at speeds orders of magnitude faster than vessels at sea routinely navigate in safety. All airborne AtoN are virtual. There is not one physical AtoN
suspended in the air to help guide aircraft to their destinations. The described implementation of maritime virtual eAtoN is firmly grounded in high-resolution geodetic
data traceable directly to the local environment in which they are deployed. Such characteristics provide the means by which assurance of their correct implementation and
watching properly can be established and continuously monitored. These concepts can
be extended to existing physical AtoN and AIS eAtoN, enhancing overall confidence
in short-range AtoN performance throughout the maritime industry.
6. NOTE. The symbols shown in Figures 3 through 12 are used for illustration purposes only and do not correspond with the current IMO Guidance (IMO Circ. 243).
DISCLAIMER
The opinions expressed are solely those of the authors and do not represent the U.S Coast
Guard, U.S. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, International Maritime
Organization, International Hydrographic Organization or any other organisation.
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ABSTRACT: Virtual electronic aids to navigation are being introduced into the present short range aids to
navigation system in the form of Automated Information System radio‐based aids. Research is also underway
into the development of their equivalents for use in regions that feature hostile environments, are poorly
charted and lack any infrastructure whatsoever to support traditional or radio navigation aids. Such aids are
entirely virtual in nature and exist only as a digital data object that resides within an electronic navigation chart
for display to mariners through an Electronic Chart Display and Information System. They are at present
experimental in nature, and are not intended to replace existing physical or radio‐based aids to navigation.
Results of research are described in terms of fulfilling traditional navigation aid functions and the development
of new functions that are only possible using virtual aids. Their advantages in design and implementation are
highlighted, as are their limitations and shortcomings as compared to present methodologies. Notable,
however, is the approach used to overcome limitations and shortcomings by considering attributes of the
physical environment to ensure their proper location and display of correct characteristics. Such an approach is
unique in the modern world, yet it emulates ancient methods of navigation using known landmarks and terrain
features.

1 INTRODUCTION
Virtual aids to navigation (AtoN) are defined by the
International Association of Lighthouse Authorities
(IALA) as something that “does not physically exist
but is a digital information object promulgated by an
authorized service provider that can be presented on
navigational systems” (IALA O143). Truly virtual
aids that do not require physical infrastructure of any
kind are still relegated to the future. However, similar
capabilities are presently being implemented through
the use of Automated Identification System (AIS)
radio‐based devices that can project their presence
directly from a buoy or other physical location such as
a bridge abutment. AIS radio AtoN are electronic in
nature and distinguished from physical AtoN with

the addition of an “e” to the AtoN designation
(eAtoN). They can project their presence to remote
locations where, for example, a buoy should exist but
placement and/or maintenance of a physical AtoN is
too difficult. The intended location must be in the line
of sight of the very high frequency (VHF) radio
required to originate AIS transmissions. One such
example is an Isolated Danger mark located on
Tarapunga Rock in Doubtful Sound near the South
Island of New Zealand (Marinetraffic VIRT).
This concept is revolutionary to vessel navigation
in much the same manner as was the introduction of
radar – with many of the same problems likely to be
encountered in terms of training and operation. Real
potential exists to instill new vessel navigational
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capabilities that cannot be achieved using traditional,
physical AtoN. However, the probability of
encountering many limitations and fragilities unique
to virtual eAtoN is high, and it is necessary to
anticipate and adequately prepare for such
eventualities to ensure safety of navigation is
maintained.
This paper describes research into the
development of truly virtual eAtoN that do not
require radio transmitters or other physical presence
at the eAtoN location. Significant portions of this
research addresses eAtoN needs critical to their
proper installation and verification of performance by
authorized service providers and safe and reliable use
by mariners. An expanded range of eAtoN physical,
performance, environmental and computational
factors are considered in this analysis. Strategies are
also provided to overcome some of the potential
vulnerabilities of such devices at various points in the
eAtoN lifecycle to avert threats by opportunists to
render such devices themselves useless or even
hazardous to navigation.

2 PHYSICAL ATON VS. VIRTUAL EATON
Physical AtoN have been used for thousands of years
to guide vessels along their routes and provide
assurance of safe passage using known landmarks
and structures to indicate safe waters. In the modern
era technology has provided us with buoys,
lighthouses, light ranges, day marks and other
devices to accomplish this capability. AtoN
complemented with radar, depth sounders, precision
positioning and timing devices broadens situational
awareness by helping identify environmental features
and tracking vessel progress while underway.
Virtual eAtoN are intended to supplement and not
replace existing AtoN in areas where the timely
marking of hazards to navigation can be performed
faster and more effectively than placing physical
AtoN. This may be on a temporary basis until
physical AtoN can be installed such as in marking
new wrecks or where previously uncharted hazards
to navigation are detected. They can also be installed
on a permanent basis where the use of physical AtoN
is problematic or not possible. This includes coral
reefs where sinkers cannot be placed due to their
adverse environmental effects, in the Arctic where ice
movement can carry away physical AtoN, and along
rivers and tributaries where water levels and channel
locations are subject to frequent change. Another
possibility is that eAtoN functionality can provide
flexibility in terms of purpose and positioning that
may be tailored to the unique requirements of
individual vessels for determining adequate widths of
channels, placement locations and other capabilities
such as aid to vessels having lost their way and in
need of position assistance.

3 EATON IMPLEMENTATION TECHNOLOGIES
The IALA definition of a virtual aid to navigation
cited earlier provides no direction as to the
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implementation technologies through which such a
capability may be achieved. However, earlier
guidance recognized that AIS can be applied to AtoN
to further improve and enhance services to mariners
and assist AtoN authorities to ensure the safe
provisioning of such aids to navigation as the volume
of traffic justifies and by the degree of risk (IALA
G1081).
The use of AIS to effect eAtoN implementations
must rely on physical infrastructure to accomplish
their objectives. This in itself is not problematic in
areas where ready access is available and adequate
financial resources exist to install and maintain such
physical infrastructure. However, this is not the case
over vast portions of the planet where eAtoN
capabilities are needed most – the Arctic and in
sensitive tropical regions. Indeed, regions that are
without adequate financial resources and those
affected by war can benefit from the ability to rapidly
install eAtoN without physical infrastructure that
fulfill the IALA definition, “does not physically exist
but is a digital information object”. Such an approach
requiring no physical infrastructure has recently been
presented that can overcome other limitations such as
the lack of hydrographic survey, sporadic and low‐
bandwidth communications, and an absence of
government support (Wright and Baldauf 2014). Both
such implementations require eAtoN presentation on
navigational systems, with the primary system for
navigation being the Electronic Chart Display and
Information System (ECDIS) (MSC 82). AIS signals
are also presented on radar and other appropriate
displays.
AIS eAtoN have been deployed along both coasts
of the United States, in the Great Lakes and in the
interior along portions of the western rivers. (Lewald
2015). Deployment of these eAtoN is being
accomplished in an effort to best determine their use
and application for future waterway guideline
development. Descriptions may be found in Local
Notice to Mariners chart corrections and illustrated
eAtoN portrayals on paper charts, electronic nautical
charts (ENCs) and radar for:
 Physical AIS eAtoN: AIS signal broadcasts
originate from a physical AtoN,
 Synthetic AIS eAtoN: AIS signals originate from a
remote AIS base station and are broadcast to a
location where a physical AtoN exists,
 Virtual AIS AtoN: AIS signals originate from a
remote AIS base station and are broadcast to a
location where no physical AtoN exists but are
displayed on ENCs and ECDIS.
(USCG 2014; see also IALA G1062).
The US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration (NOAA) announced an expanded set
of symbols used to portray AIS eAtoN on ECDIS and
that NOAA charts would be updated to add AIS
eAtoN locations (OCS 2014). These symbols include a
magenta radio ring surrounding the AIS eAtoN
reflecting the radio transmission of the signal, which
does not apply to non‐AIS virtual eAtoN.

4 CHARACTERISTICS
The term “characteristics” when used in relation to
AtoN have generally referred to their physical and
performance aspects as can be readily seen and
measured to determine whether they are “watching
properly” which is defined by the U.S. Coast Guard
as, “an aid to navigation on its assigned position
exhibiting the advertised characteristics in all
respects” (USCG 2005). However, with the
introduction of eAtoN that exist solely as digital
information objects this concept has become
somewhat muddled. Even virtual eAtoN have a
physical presence on navigation display devices such
as ECDIS and radar.
The following paragraphs attempt to clarify these
issues by introducing their digital representations
within the context of characteristics by which an
assessment of watching properly may be determined.
A discrepancy is defined as any failure of an AtoN to
display its characteristics as described in the Light
List or to be on its assigned position. When a
discrepancy is reported, a response level for its
correction is determined based upon severity and
availability of assets (USCG 2005a).
The lines of demarcation as to whom discrepancies
are to be reported must also be redrawn. The US
Coast Guard is the cognizant organization for
reporting AtoN discrepancies, while NOAA is
cognizant for charting discrepancies that include
ENCs and ECDIS. However, if AIS or virtual (non‐
AIS) eAtoN are portrayed incorrectly on a chart this
occurrence should also be reported to the US Coast
Guard.

4.2 eAtoN Characteristics
Both physical and synthetic AIS eAtoN share the
characteristics cited in the previous paragraph with
their associated physical AtoN that must be
considered during verification and when reporting
discrepancies. However, this does not necessarily
apply to AIS or non‐AIS virtual eAtoN since neither
are associated with a physical AtoN. Although the
IALA definition of virtual AtoN describes them as
data objects, they actually do exist in the physical
sense when they are depicted on a navigational
display to be observed and acted upon by a
watchstander. The physical characteristics of AIS
eAtoN include the symbols for physical, synthetic and
virtual; and non‐AIS virtual (USCG 2014). ENC
depiction of physical characteristics for virtual eAtoN
(AIS and non‐AIS) on ECDIS includes symbols for
cardinal marks (N/E/S/W), lateral marks (IALA A/B
port and starboard), isolated danger, safe water,
special purpose and emergency wreck marking (OCS
2014). The bulk of eAtoN characteristics exist in the
form of data object representations in the domain of
the authorized service provider. In the United States
this is the Coast Guard and NOAA. These
characteristics include the Light List number, type of
aid, name, position, class, inspection dates and other
information.
eAtoN performance characteristics are determined
in part by the specifications for each specific device.
From a practical perspective for operational
verification they either work as specified (operational)
or don’t work (not operational) in much the same
fashion as a racon installed on AtoN.

4.3 Data Object Characteristics
4.1 AtoN Characteristics
For traditional AtoN, two main aspects of their design
encompass various characteristics that must be
verified to determine they are watching properly.
These include:
 Physical, and
 Performance.
Physical AtoN characteristics consist of nominal
operating and discrepant conditions and include type
(buoy, daymark, range, lighthouse, racon) color,
shape, numbering, light features (red/green/yellow,
flashing/
steady/occulting),
sound
features
(bell/gong/horn/ whistle), position (lat/long, on
station, off station, adrift, missing, not marking best
water) as well as condition (sinking, stranded,
capsized, excessive rust). Performance aspects include
light and sound intensity, racon (operational, not
operational, operating improperly), rhythms and rates
of installed devices, and visibility (day boards faded,
lights/numbers obscured), etc. (USCG 2010).
AtoN are documented and described in databases
(ATONIS/USAIMS, ENC) and data products (e.g.,
Light List, Notice to Mariners, Coast Pilot). However,
these data objects and representations are secondary
to their physical manifestation in terms of
performance. Indeed, physical AtoN have existed and
stood watch properly for centuries with little more
representation as “data objects” than a written note
on a hand‐made chart.

Recently efforts have been undertaken by IALA to
define a common structure resulting in the creation of
a Product Specification for AtoN Information (IALA
PS1). This specification is intended to include
information about lights, buoys, beacons, racons, AIS
and sound signals and can also form the basis for the
exchange of virtual AtoN information. Figure 1a
summarizes the key elements of the AtoN application
schema in its current form while figure 1b integrates
the essential elements of virtual eAtoN.
Critical to this schema is the establishment of
single and group virtual eAtoN that can share
geospatial model point, curve and surface data to
provide new capabilities for virtual eAtoN operation.
This is accomplished through inheritance of attributes
between group virtual eAtoN and the individual
constituent virtual eAtoN elements. Included is a
capability for live comparison between known
hydrographic data used for chart production and
single‐beam echosounder data obtained from own
vessel sensors to help determine the validity of GNSS
positioning information. Additional capabilities can
include automated verification of virtual eAtoN
watching properly, which may also be extended to
physical and AIS eAtoN.
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Figure 1. Virtual eAtoN application schema embedded
within the IALA AtoN
Information Product Specification
1XX, draft 0.0.5 – June 2013.

4.4 Virtual eAtoN Adoption
Examples of virtual eAtoN realized as beacons, areas
and limits, and tracks and zones in the text that
follows are provided to illustrate functions that are
possible. The capabilities described to employ these
functions are also illustrative, as are the specific
characteristics that have been described for
implementation. Determination of virtual eAtoN
adoption for future test, evaluation and/or operational
use must be made by competent national authority
after the development and validation of the processes
required to assure their performance and technical
viability have themselves have been validated. A
discussion of these concepts follows.

5 VIRTUAL EATON LIFE CYCLE
CONSIDERATIONS
There is a dual responsibility for the ultimate safety
and efficiency of vessel traffic and protection of the
environment by competent national authority. A
simplified flow of tasks performed by each authority
is illustrated in figure 2. The first responsibility
involves performing hydrographic surveys to
determine the configuration of waterways and the
development of nautical charts that accurately portray
survey results. The second responsibility has to do
with the design, provisioning and maintenance of
AtoN systems based upon these surveys. Historically
under normal circumstances these authorities
perform their tasks accurately and efficiently.
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Figure 2. Virtual eAtoN life cycle representing roles of
national hydrographic and AtoN authorities.

However, the rapid expansion of vessel navigation
in the Arctic has exposed deficiencies of existing
capabilities to perform hydrographic surveys,
produce updated nautical charts and design AtoN
systems to keep pace with this expansion. For
example the original NOAA Arctic Nautical Charting
Plan published in 2011 proposed the creation of 14
new charts. As of the 2015 update to this plan three of
these charts have been produced and released for use
by the public with no definite schedule to produce the
remaining 11 charts identified in the Plan (NOAA
2015).
There are many ways that new technology and
virtual eAtoN can contribute towards enhancing the
safety of navigation. This includes the gathering of
high resolution, full bottom hydrographic data from
3‐dimentional forward looking sonar (3D‐FLS)
equipped vessels of opportunity to supplement scarce
national hydrographic resources to help in eAtoN
positioning. The expansion of capabilities provided
by physical AtoN through the use of AIS eAtoN
technology can also be further accelerated through the
deployment of virtual eAtoN in areas not suitable for
physical AtoN or AIS eAtoN. This would also
embrace new eAtoN concepts such as the display of
recent transits by icebreakers within a set time frame
as well as the real time detection of hazards to
navigation for display on ECDIS on a momentary or
transient basis while the hazard exists. Discussion of
these concepts in terms of the AtoN development
lifecycle is provided in the paragraphs that follow.

5.1 Establishment of Requirements
Determination of requirements for traditional AtoN,
AIS eAtoN and virtual eAtoN is based jointly upon
the results of hydrographic surveys and the needs
associated with vessel navigation. The factors
comprising each of these needs are assessed by
different independent organizations according to
different regulations. Coordination and cooperation
between national authorities for hydrography and
buoyage is essential to effect comprehensive national
systems. Adequate representation and participation
by national representatives in activities and
committees of the International Hydrographic
Organization (IHO) and International Maritime
Organization (IMO) can help ensure effective
implementation and compliance with international
standards.
5.1.1 5.1.1 Hydrographic Survey
Decisions
regarding
the
performance
of
hydrographic surveys are made by competent
national authority based upon guidance provided
through the IHO concerning how hydrographic
surveys are performed, the products of these surveys
and the methods by which survey and AtoN
information is depicted in nautical charts. For the
purposes of this discussion reference is made to
shallow water surveys in areas of less than 100 meters
in depth in accordance with IHO Standards for
Hydrographic Surveys (IHO SP44). Specifically, this
refers to Order 1a surveys intended for harbors,
harbor approach channels, recommended tracks,
inland navigation channels and coastal areas with
high commercial traffic density. Many hydrographic
survey projects require the use of multibeam
echosounders capable of obtaining hundreds more
soundings per unit time than single‐beam systems
and cover a wide swath of the sea floor. Other
methods include the use of side scan sonar systems to
assist in detecting objects that project from the sea
floor. Both of these systems provide nearly 100
percent bottom coverage of the sea floor, greatly
enhancing the ability to detect hazards undiscovered
by less modern surveys.
An alternative form of multibeam sonar that
appears suitable for hydrographic survey is 3D‐FLS.
Some systems are capable of scanning wide swaths of
the sea floor with up to 100 percent coverage. Rather
than being aimed athwartships at right angles to the
path of transit, 3D‐FLS is aimed directly ahead of the
vessel and is used as a navigation sonar to avoid
vessel grounding on uncharted shoals and to detect
hazards to navigation that reside below the waterline
both attached to the bottom and floating within the
water column. With a range of up to 1,000 meters, a
60 degree conic projection and vertical range to
depths of up to 50 meters, widespread use of such
equipment by vessels in uncharted regions such as
the Arctic and sharing of this data through
independent sourcing could well supplement national
hydrographic survey resources in these areas.
Although research into the use of this technology to
supplement surveys is in the earlier stages and
generally related to autonomous underwater vehicles
(see i.a. Zhang et al, 2008 and Suman et. al, 2015);
Wright and Zimmerman (2015) determined that full

sea floor swath data obtained using 3D‐FLS is useful
for nautical chart development and virtual eAtoN
placement. The availability of detailed hydrographic
sensor data through any or all of these resources is a
first step towards determining locations suitable for
establishing waterways regardless of whether
traditional AtoN or eAtoN are intended for use.
5.1.2 AtoN Requirements
The identification of AtoN requirements is based
upon the combination of hydrographic survey results
and the needs of vessel navigation. The main
objectives to be achieved in defining requirements
include assisting navigators in identifying their
position, determining a safe route of transit, warning
of dangers and obstructions, promoting the safe and
economic movement of commercial vessel traffic and
the safe and efficient movement of military vessel
traffic and cargo of strategic military importance. This
includes reasons for rejecting other obvious or more
economical solutions to the problem that might be
indicated from an examination of the relevant
nautical chart such as, for example, physical AtoN
and AIS eAtoN. As much as practical, AtoN are
established within the confines of the lateral system to
mark channels and other areas of safe water as well as
hazards to navigation and wrecks (USCG 2005b,
2005c).
The process used to define requirements in terms
of initial justification based upon user needs, benefits
accrued and the cost to achieve these benefits remains
unchanged. Justification is accomplished on a site by
site basis, and general guidance for accomplishing
this for virtual eAtoN is provided later in the text in
the discussion on design. However, the availability to
use virtual eAtoN as an option to fulfill AtoN
requirements becomes apparent as new capabilities
are created in previously inaccessible locations.
Characteristics associated with the implementation of
virtual eAtoN are defined based upon the same
criteria as for traditional AtoN, but may be moderated
in terms of guidance and advisories rather than
regulatory requirements. This may be especially
warranted, for example, to reduce or eliminate
warnings from ECDIS due to close proximity to buoys
rather than reporting points.

5.2 Design
The design of virtual eAtoN systems and the selection
of individual elements thereof is performed to define
the data constructs and types that comprise the
characteristics of the digital data object illustrated in
figure 1. The original IALA AtoN application schema
is modified to incorporate abstraction, encapsulation
and inheritance properties required to implement
geospatial characteristics that comprise essential
elements of the concept. However, there is nothing in
this modified schema that is necessarily unique to
virtual eAtoN. Both physical AtoN and AIS eAtoN
can also take advantage of these characteristics to
bolster the automated verification of their watching
properly and to obtain the same benefits of immunity
to disruption of GNSS and AIS services. The concepts
of individual and group virtual eAtoN are also
introduced that enable the inheritance of
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characteristics of individual virtual eAtoN amongst
the group virtual eAtoN in this system of systems
implementation. The products of design should be
tested using simulations and through emulation of
the processes used in the creation of the design to
determine compliance with and traceability to
requirements and to detect potential deficiencies in
implementation and use.
An example of a permanent implementation of
virtual eAtoN is where the individual system
elements (VirtualAtoN) consisting of green and red
lateral marks correctly depict the conventional
direction of buoyage along a channel. The IALA AtoN
Information Product Specification convention is
followed with the addition of two new characteristics
one of which points to a geospatial surface
(GM_Surface),
curve
(GM_Curve)
or
point
(GM_Point) of the area in the vicinity of the virtual
eAtoN within the ENC. A second characteristic
identifies a live single‐beam echosounder digital data
stream obtained via a vessel’s sensor bus (e.g., NMEA
2000 or equivalent) that is compared to the ENC to
provide automatic, real‐time checking of GNSS and
AIS functionality along with verification that the
virtual eAtoN are watching properly. The system
comprising a channel (GroupVirtualAtoN) includes
each individual (VirtualAtoN) element and points to
a geospatial surface model (GM_Surface) that
corresponds to the overall group. This group model
exceeds the sum of individual virtual eAtoN elements
as it also includes areas of transition, allowing for
seamless verification of each element of the system
and the entire system itself.
An example of a permanent and complex hybrid
system is a traffic separation scheme (TSS) that
contains AIS eAtoN and virtual eAtoN combined
with communication reporting points along two
distinct transit corridors separated by a boundary
between them. Rather than using green and red
lateral marks, special purpose TSS buoys can be used
to represent the port and starboard sides of the traffic
lanes. However, the same process in accordance with
the modified IALA AtoN application schema is used
in defining each individual element of the system and
the entire system of systems.
Another example of a permanent virtual eAtoN is
where soundings data along with the boundaries of
the useful data are delineated using multiple special
purpose marks in an area that contains sparse or no
soundings data at all. A likely origin for such data is
envisioned to be the result of independently sourced
inputs promulgated via cognizant national authority
from a vessel of convenience equipped with 3D‐FLS
capable of providing a swath of full bottom coverage.
Such data would undergo several stages of quality
checking based upon compliance with product and
process verification standards prior to issuance.
The permanent dynamic marking of coaxial
channels using virtual eAtoN is accomplished
through the introduction of additional characteristics
that describe vessel draft and speed in combination
with the geospatial surface model (GM_Surface). One
of two or more distinct group virtual eAtoN
(GroupVirtualAtoN) models are selected in real time
based upon assurance of adequate bottom clearance
considering vessel draft, turning requirements based
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upon vessel speed and momentum, and other
relevant criteria.
A much simpler design of a temporary individual
virtual eAtoN is comprised of a set of curves
(GM_Curve) that correspond to the boundaries of the
no‐transit zone. The symbols for no‐entry can be
dynamically placed on ECDIS and dependent on the
scale to which the system is set, affecting both the
number of symbols and the density in which they are
displayed. The actual effective times for the area can
be encoded within the ENC and updated periodically
as revisions become available.
The AIS track that comprises a portion of a virtual
eAtoN depicting the recent path of an icebreaker is
another example of a temporary mark. AIS data is
correlated with the ENC geospatial curve model to
create a soundings representation for the track used
with live single‐beam echo sounder data to verify
virtual eAtoN are watching properly and not being
spoofed or interfered with through the interruption of
AIS and/or GNSS services. The useful duration of the
track can be determined by cognizant national
authority based upon contemporary observations of
environmental and other conditions and encoded
within the AIS data and/or the (VirtualAtoN) feature
itself.
A new virtual eAtoN capability is also introduced
for marking transient or momentary potential hazards
to navigation. Available only as a result of enhanced
situational awareness of the underwater environment
made possible using 3D‐FLS, these represent hazards
affixed to the bottom that include reefs and ledges,
and hazards present within the water column such as
growlers, shipping containers and whales. An
example is where one or more Isolated Danger marks
are displayed on ECDIS at positions that correspond
to the hazard locations. A similar capability using 3D‐
FLS is already integrated into many existing ECDIS
installations via a vessel’s sensor bus network, but
this must be further refined in terms of display
features, symbols and operator training to become an
effective means of alerting watchstanders to real time
hazards to navigation.

5.3 Implementation
Once the AtoN requirements and design tasks have
been completed, the products of these tasks must be
forwarded to cognizant authority for inclusion into
nautical charts. This is accomplished in parallel with
preparing to deploy virtual eAtoN through the
performance of local surveys to confirm positioning
and other tasks as may be deemed necessary prior to
their introduction. In all implementation tasks it is
vital ensure that the processes used during
requirements definition and design ensure the correct
virtual eAtoN aid is created and translates into a
proper implementation of the aid.
Feasibility of the approach is enhanced through
the identification of challenges encountered during
development and testing, the implementation of
contingency plans in recognition of these potential
challenges, and maximizing possible opportunities
that result throughout the development life cycle. An
example of such a challenge includes the

identification of differences between the conditions
represented by the most recent survey, which may be
years out of date, and present‐day conditions that
reflect a different bottom configuration as a result of
storm activity and bottom shifting due to currents.
Achievability
is
heightened
through
the
identification and management of significant risk
elements throughout the development process.
Metrics are needed to determine development
progress and overall system effectiveness. This is
accomplished by continually reassessing the virtual
eAtoN implementation plan and deviation from plan
for resource use (human, facilities, etc.) and risk
assessment in terms of task achievement, effort
indicators and milestone fulfillment. Requirement
and design modification processes need to be
established along with tracking of changes needed
throughout development to facilitate metric reporting
of requirement, design and implementation of both
ENC and virtual eAtoN. Metrics focusing on risk
assessment of the quality and structure of the
schedule, work breakdown structure consistency,
critical path analysis and the identification of high
risk activities and events, and risk mitigation
scenarios should also be identified.
The system is complete when all steps necessary to
implement the virtual eAtoN system have been
identified and metrics established to ensure
measurable progress indicates completion. This
approach will ensure virtual eAtoN feature and
capability traceability to product specification and
design, system configuration stability, adequacy of
testing, and overall system maturity.

5.4 Verification
The same processes and procedures used to verify
physical AtoN and AIS eAtoN characteristics in
determining they are watching properly can be
applied to virtual eAtoN. However, additional
procedures are required in verifying virtual eAtoN
across three levels that include:
 Data object,
 Technical performance, and
 Physical characteristics
Data object verification involves a continuous
process used by cognizant authorities and service
providers to examine AtoN‐related data across
multiple
databases
to
detect
errors
and
inconsistencies inherent to database operations as
well as hacking and infiltration. Verification of virtual
eAtoN technical performance focuses on determining
that the system is operational and performs the
required
functions.
Verification
of
physical
characteristics for establishing and verifying virtual
eAtoN is based upon references to features that exist
within the local environment.
Further
insight
into
verifying
physical
characteristics of virtual eAtoN was demonstrated by
the authors in experiments under nominal conditions
as well as when precise positioning information that
should normally be available using GNSS, AIS and
other sources was unavailable due to a variety of
manmade and natural events (Wright and Baldauf
2015). Under nominal conditions experimental results

indicated that live sensor measurements coincided
with expectations in terms of local physical
environmental features represented by a geospatial
surface model of ENC soundings and echosounder
depths indicating a high level of confidence of proper
positioning. Under conditions simulating GNSS/AIS
unavailability, denial of service and spoofing,
discrepancies were found between vessel position
sensor
measurements
and
local
physical
environmental features that provided a high level of
confidence that virtual eAtoN could not be verified as
watching
properly.
Environmental
feature
discrepancies were also identified as well as
differences between depths represented by ENC
soundings and depths reported by the echosounder
after compensating for tide levels, hull depth and
transducer offset. Differences were also detected
between the bottom slope derived from ENC
soundings and bottom slope derived from
echosounder readings. An additional measure was
examined where significant differences were detected
between the rates of change of the bottom slope
derived from the echosounder readings as compared
to the ENC. An example of this process is provided in
paragraph 7 of the text.

5.5 Maintenance
The use of independently sourced 3D‐FLS data
obtained from vessels of opportunity can provide
significant advantages to the update and maintenance
of all AtoN (physical, AIS and virtual) as well as
nautical charts on a continual basis, and can
supplement existing hydrographic survey resources.
No significant differences are anticipated in the
maintenance of databases and the installation and
operation of virtual eAtoN beyond the normal
evolution and enhancement of the methods, processes
and procedures already established by cognizant
national authority for physical AtoN and AIS eAtoN.

6 LIMITATIONS AND VULERABILITIES
Potential limitations and vulnerabilities associated
with the implementation of eAtoN technology exist,
some of which are described below. With careful
planning and diligent design and implementation
practices these limitations may be managed and
overcome to ensure their reliable and verifiable
operation is achieved.

6.1 AIS Broadcast Range
The range of AIS broadcasts in the VHF Frequency
spectrum is limited to line of sight based primarily
upon the height of the base station transmitting and
vessel receiving antennae. The range of VHF signals is
estimated at nominally 20 miles at sea (USCG 2015).
This limits the placement of AIS eAtoN to achieve
reliable performance at other than remote locations to
a distance of less than 20 miles, especially inland
where terrain and ground‐based structures can
interfere with signal propagation (Baldauf 2008).
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AIS is also subject to the effects of Tropospheric
ducting that can propagate VHF signals hundreds of
miles from their origin (Biancomano 1998). Such
effects can introduce interference sources to signals
from AIS stations within the nominal AIS reception
range and can result in performance reduction of AIS
both ashore and on vessels (ITU 2007).

6.2 AIS Spoofing and Jamming
The ability to spoof and jam AIS broadcasts has
particular significance where AIS eAtoN signals are
used for vessel navigation. A lack of security controls
can facilitate a ship being diverted off course by
placing eAtoN in undesirable or even dangerous
locations inadvertently, for hijacking or for other
nefarious purposes (Simonite 2013).
The vulnerabilities of AIS have also resulted in its
use by criminals to an attempt to evade law
enforcement (Middleton 2014). Another report found
that AIS data is being increasingly manipulated by
ships that seek to conceal their identity, location or
destination for economic gain or to sail under the
security radar, and concludes that this is a fast
growing, global trend undermining decision makers
who rely, unknowingly and unwittingly, on
inaccurate and increasingly manipulated data
(Windward 2014).

6.3 GNSS Spoofing and Jamming
Similar to AIS, Global Navigation Satellite System
(GNSS) signals can also be spoofed and jammed
causing unreliable and even deceptive navigation
signals to be received by vessels (Forssell B. 2009). A
recent example is an experiment by a group of
University of Texas at Austin researchers where a
yacht was driven well off course and essentially
hijacked using spoofing techniques (Zaragoza 2013).
This phenomena was also the subject of a recent
article in the US Coast Guard Proceedings
acknowledging this as being of concern beyond the
maritime industry to include the transportation sector
as a whole (Thompson 2014). Jamming can have the
same effects as an outage, as was demonstrated in
2010 when numerous, low power personal privacy
jammers were detected as interfering with GPS
involving airport operations at Newark, NJ
(Grabowski 2012).

6.4 GNSS Outages
The worldwide GNSS is comprised of the United
States GPS, Russian GLONASS, European Galileo and
Chinese BeiDou systems which are at various stages
of completion. These multiple systems imply that
backup capabilities exist if one or more of these
systems were to go out of service, either temporarily
or on a permanent basis. This was demonstrated
during the ten‐hour GLONASS outage that occurred
on 1 April 2014 where a Broadcom 47531 receiver
performing the simultaneous tracking of GPS,
GLONASS, QZSS and BeiDou signals was able to
successfully identify and remove the bad GLONASS
satellite positions (Gibbons 2014). Multiple GNSS
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receivers are only beginning to come into the
commercial marketplace. Under normal conditions
the performance of these systems is likely to equal or
exceed existing, single technology systems.
All GNSS regardless of technology used are
subject to the same atmospheric and signal
propagation limitations, multipath interference, orbit
errors, satellite geometry and orbital debris. One or a
combination of such factors may degrade GNSS
signals to reduce their accuracy or make their signals
unreliable or unusable. With the discontinuance of
Loran and no commitment to establish any backup
system to GNSS using a fundamentally different
positioning technology such as that used by eLoran,
there is presently no alternative available for
navigation other than that provided by traditional
aids to navigation. The georeferencing of eAtoN to
bottom features may help to reduce the overall effect
of GNSS outages.

6.5 Database Hacking
One of the greatest vulnerabilities of eAtoN is their
primary existence as data objects in cyberspace,
without having a traditional physical presence to
provide backup in the event of their electronic
corruption or disappearance. This property makes
them susceptible to hacking and denial of service
attacks that can render them useless or even
detrimental and hazardous to navigation.
Widespread corruption can occur at the source
databases within which eAtoN objects reside at the
authorized service provider. In the United States this
responsibility is shared between the Coast Guard for
AtoN and the Light List, and NOAA for ENC that
form the nation’s navigation charts. Corruption can
also occur at the local level, where individual or
groups of eAtoN in the same geographical area may
be corrupted.
Initiatives exist at both the Coast Guard and
NOAA aimed at defending their computer networks
from attacks (Radgowski 2014; NOAA 2014). Both
initiatives acknowledge the threats involved and are
steps in the correct direction to manage and even
overcome the adverse effects on national security
imposed by these threats. Issues that pertain to eAtoN
design, development and implementation cross
agency lines, barriers and firewalls; making the
solution to these problems even more difficult.

7 METHODS FOR VERIFICATION
There are three levels at which verification of eAtoN
must be considered. The first level focuses on where
they are represented in electronic form as data objects.
Numerous vulnerabilities can exist ranging from
simple data entry errors to the intentional hacking,
manipulation or destruction of the data content.
Compounding the severity of the problem is that
eAtoN data is represented in multiple data systems
across Government agencies that may be altered or
modified from their original content, making the ENC
a product of collaborative datasets.

The second level of verification is the actual
technical performance of the eAtoN device and
mechanisms themselves. The third level involves
verification of the physical eAtoN characteristics as
manifest at the deployed location on ECDIS.

7.1 Data Object
A data object defined as an item or group of items,
regardless of type or format that a computer can
address or manipulate as a single object implies
characteristics contained within the database are
highly correlated with the unique eAtoN object it
represents. The corruption of these data can
fundamentally alter the behavior, functionality and/or
performance of eAtoN. Such corruption can occur
throughout the lifecycle of the object from the
characterization of data as requirements, design of the
structure in which these data reside, initial entry of
the data into the data structure, process of extracting
the data, its fusion with other data to effect a process
or outcome using a navigational display, and the final
representation of the data in its intended use for
navigation.
The process flow depicted in figure 3 provides a
simplified example of a generic verification process
that could be used on a continuous basis by cognizant
service provider(s) to examine the contents of
multiple
databases
to
detect
errors
and
inconsistencies caused by database hacking as well as
errors inherent to database operations. This approach
is conceptually aligned with the United States
Department of Homeland Security Continuous
Diagnostics and Mitigation (CDM) Program designed
to protect government networks and their data.
7.1.1 Database Structures
Multiple databases and data structures distributed
geographically across different government agencies
host the data required to create, implement and
support eAtoN operations. These include legacy
systems already supporting AtoN characteristics
modified to support eAtoN and the equivalent data
requirements within the ENC, with legacy processes
used to integrate these data and create their final
products. The implementation and hosting of eAtoN
data representations exists on different data platforms
and host software, with diverse formats and timing of
system updating and maintenance. How these data
and relevant metadata are shared, the flow of these
data managed, and the processes and frequency
through which this occurs is the focus of the
Committee on the Marine Transportation System
(CMTS), a Federal interagency coordinating
committee in the United States. This should be
accomplished in a manner that coincides with the
update and revision cycles of the contents of the data
structures independent of the development of
products derived from the data contents. This also
requires proper filtering and assurance that the
destination system and associated processes be
sufficiently robust so as not to be overwhelmed by the
volume of data received.

Figure 3. eAtoN Data Object Verification Process.

7.1.2 Data Normalization
Prior to initiating data object verification it is
necessary that the contents of the data streams be
processed and normalized from their native formats
contained within the source databases to a common
format ensuring proper comparisons of the data may
be accomplished. This includes data for both AtoN
and eAtoN since they are integrated together into the
same legacy systems; ensuring data objects for both
forms are verifiable and can be verified using the
same process. This also requires that inputs of
metadata, human interface and guidance, a priori
data, and other machine data necessary to perform
verification are prioritized and properly associated
with the data for subsequent processing.
The product of the data normalization stage
represents the totality of the data from all sources
necessary to accomplish verification:
DEeAtoN(n) = {DeAtoN(n), EeAtoN(n)}

(1)
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where D=AtoN/eAtoN; and E=ENC data objects. Note
that the process flow of figure 3 has been simplified to
show eAtoN data, however both AtoN and eAtoN
data objects from the same data sources can be
verified using this same technique. These data are
provided at a rate sufficient to process changes in
synchronization with the data at their source
databases.
7.1.3 Verification Process
Verification of normalized data is accomplished with
the knowledge of changes that are supposed to have
occurred and the implication that any other changes
that may be detected are therefore discrepancies. Each
individual normalized AtoN/eAtoN data object is
compared to the change list to determine whether it is
contained within the set of changes expected for that
specific individual process:
DEeAtoN(n) ∈ {DEeAtoN(Δ)}

(2)

If the data object is part of the set of changes then
the characteristics of the normalized data object are
compared to those on the Change List to ensure their
proper implementation:
DEeAtoN(n) = DEeAtoN(nΔ)

(3)

where an affirmative result causes a determination of
the AtoN/eAtoN as a verified data object and a
negative result causes a determination of a data object
discrepancy.
If the data object is not part of the set of changes
then the characteristics of the normalized data object
are compared to those of the previous revision (n′) of
the data object:
DEeAtoN(n) = DEeAtoN(n′)

(4)

where an affirmative result causes a determination of
the AtoN/eAtoN as a verified data object and a
negative result causes a determination of a data object
discrepancy.
Completion of individual data object verification is
achieved with a determination of verified or
discrepancy, wherein metrics are generated followed
by the examination of the next data object:
DEeAtoN(n) → MetriceAtoN(n)

(5)

DEeAtoN(n) = DEeAtoN(n+1)

(6)

Upon detection of the last data object, data object
verification for this process run is completed and
initiation of Technical Performance is then followed
by Physical Characteristics verification.
7.1.4 Metrics
Data object examination is complete when steps
necessary to determine verification or discrepancy
have been achieved. Metrics to measure verification
progress and resultant products must be established
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to indicate process completion and performance
scores are created to indicate product quality and
deficiency levels. Such metrics must also ensure
feature and capability traceability to product
specification and design, stability of software
configuration, adequacy of depth and breadth of
testing, and overall product maturity. Configuration
controls and trouble reporting procedures need to be
established to track the rate, type and severity of
discrepancies as well as required changes to software,
processes, design, and requirements resulting from
discrepancies found and corrected.

7.2 Technical Performance
Verification of the technical performance of AIS
eAtoN lies primarily in determining that the system is
operational and performs the required functions.
General guidance on this subject may be found in the
appropriate IALA guidelines (IALA G1028).
Guidance on verification of AIS equipment should be
found in the technical specifications, acceptance test
procedures and maintenance test procedures
appropriate for specific equipment configurations.

7.3 Physical Characteristics
The existence of eAtoN as data objects without having
a traditional physical presence does not necessarily
preclude their verification using many of the same
physical parameters as AtoN. This may provide an
ideal opportunity to demonstrate the use of
technology to resolve doubts and concerns regarding
navigation strictly by electronic means rather than
traditional methods by using live environmental
sensor data to obtain fixes to known landmarks,
structures, bottom terrain features and buoys.
Many of the physical characteristics of physical
and synthetic AIS eAtoN are shared with their
associated AtoN. Characteristics unique to physical,
synthetic and virtual eAtoN include type, position
and operational status as well as the presentation of
these characteristics on navigational displays, e.g.,
radar and ENC/ECDIS. The highest priority is
depiction of position, which is closely followed by the
other characteristics.
7.3.1 Position
The easiest and most risky means of verifying the
eAtoN characteristic associated with position is
though the use of GNSS to compare the measured
position with the charted position. In the case of
physical and synthetic eAtoN there is a physical AtoN
present at the location as well as an AIS/ECDIS
representation to corroborate the GNSS fix, assuming
that verification of AtoN position has already been
accomplished. Prudence would dictate that bearings
to physical landmarks and features be also made to
further confirm the reliability of the fix.
For AIS and non‐AIS virtual eAtoN, the problem
becomes more complicated since there is no physical
AtoN presence at all. A fix developed based upon
bearings taken to physical landmarks and features
would be a suitable method for verifying location

only in the case where such features were visible and
not obscured or out of visual or radar range.
However, there is another means to take such a fix
through reference to ground. This may be
accomplished, again using modern technology,
through verification using known surface landmarks
(radar bearings to known landmarks, etc.). This can
include bottom features obtained through wireform
and/or point cloud ENC models compared to live 3D‐
FLS and/or echosounder measurements made over
time intervals using running averages and derivative
trend information. ENC information is already on
board vessels in the charting equipment (e.g., ECDIS)
and requires the proper resolution and correlation to
determine bearings, produce the necessary fixes and
generate warnings. Such capabilities are possible
through the use of the IHO S‐100 Universal
Hydrographic Data Model that supports a wider
variety of hydrographic‐related digital data sources
and products than the IHO S‐57 IHO Transfer
Standard for Digital Hydrographic Data. Specifically,
this includes new spatial models to support imagery
and gridded data, 3‐D and time‐varying data, and
new applications beyond those of traditional
hydrography.
Fix and bearing information to known physical
environmental features for each eAtoN can be taken
during initial installation and encoded as part of its
characteristics. These characteristics can then be used
anytime thereafter to verify position accuracy during
normal use and subsequent verification. Data
encryption of position characteristics can also be used
to ensure their security and validity.
Such methods can also be used to detect the effects
of AIS and GNSS jamming and spoofing since the
presumed location based upon GNSS is likely to not
coincide with environmental features. Used with
inertial backup, it would also be possible to verify
position in the event of GNSS outage. Data obtained
from echo sounder measurements using this
technique on ground tracks 1, 2 and 3 shown in figure
4 may appear similar to that shown in table 1.
Transit of the intended track (Track 2) is
dependent upon accurate GNSS position correlation
with chart location data. Should either AIS or GNSS
spoofing or jamming occur resulting in inaccurate
positioning, differences in both the depth and/or the
rate of change of depth profiles between the intended
and actual transited courses would be detectable. For
example, should spoofing occur where the vessel
believes itself to be on the intended Track 2 based
upon AIS/GNSS sensor readings yet follows either of
error Tracks 1 or 3, deviation from the proper course
will be detected through comparison of derived
bottom feature and contour data illustrated in table 1
with independently obtained echo sounder readings
even though AIS and/or ECDIS is falsely displaying
the intended course. Should GNSS jamming or outage
be encountered, these same bottom reference data can
be used with inertial system backup to continue
navigation and accurately update the vessels position.

* Track 1

+ Track 2

# Track 3

Figure 4. Divergent Ground Tracks 1 and 3 Compared to the
intended Ground Track 2.

Table 1. Difference and Rates of Change of Error Track 1
and Error Track 3 from Intended Track 2 shown in Figure 2.

7.3.2 Other Characteristics
Once verification of accurate eAtoN positioning
has been accomplished, verification of additional
characteristics that include eAtoN type, name, etc.,
would be performed by examining the contents of the
AIS/ECDIS information on the navigation display. For
example, the type indication should correlate with the
proper valid symbol for cardinal marks (N/E/S/W),
lateral marks (IALA A/B port and starboard), isolated
danger, safe water, special purpose or emergency
wreck marking as published for that location. eAtoN
name and other characteristic verification would be
accomplished using the same method.
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7.3.3 Metrics
Physical characteristic examination is complete
when all steps necessary to determine verification or
discrepancy have been accomplished. Metric results
provide traceability of verification and identify areas
where further product and process maturation is
needed. Data collection for many metrics can also be
automated, ensuring measurable progress in
completing verification and generating performance
scores to aid in their understanding.

8 PRESENT STAGE OF MATURITY
eAtoN technology is very much in an early stage of
development with only a handful of AIS virtual
eAtoN deployed in experimental evaluation program
locations worldwide. Non‐AIS virtual eAtoN
configurations are even less mature as theoretical
concepts and implementations have yet to materialize
outside the laboratory. Participation of the maritime
community is being actively solicited by cognizant
authorities and authorized service providers to ensure
progress is constructive and meeting user needs. This
is evidenced by U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
(USACE), NOAA, and Coast Guard invitations to
maritime stakeholders to participate in Future of
Navigation Public Listening Sessions and Navigation
Information Days throughout the country to collect
comments and feedback regarding requirements for
navigational information and service delivery system
needs (Smith 2014; NOAA 2014a). Additional AIS
eAtoN installations are being deployed throughout
the United States in an attempt to fulfill a wider set of
maritime needs.

9 CONCLUSIONS
Installation of AIS‐based eAtoN system facilities are
continuing as operational experience and results
showing their utility are documented. A critical need
exists for non‐AIS eAtoN technology for use in
remote and sensitive environments as described.
Further research and development should be
encouraged in this area.
Significant limitations and vulnerabilities exist in
the AIS and GNSS technologies that support eAtoN
operations. Spoofing and denial of service attacks will
accelerate due to the lack of security in both of these
areas as states and criminal organizations gain
experience in using and misusing these technologies.
Opportunities exist using currently available data
fusion and sensor technology to mitigate these
problems and reduce the severity of and even
eliminate their effects, increasing marine safety in
general and specifically the safety of navigation. The
techniques proposed for verification of eAtoN can
also be applied to improve and automate portions of
existing verification practices for all AtoN: physical,
AIS and virtual.
Potential also exists for expanding IMO e‐
Navigation capabilities through integration of 3D‐FLS
technology as a means for enhancing the safety of
navigation. One aspect of this is that the Polar Code
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should be amended to mandate 3D‐FLS as an echo‐
sounding device having forward‐looking capabilities
as a vessel carriage requirement in the Arctic.
Alternatively, 3D‐FLS should qualify as one of the
two already required independent echo‐sounding
devices.
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Areas of the world where the physical environment is relatively unknown in
terms of hydrographic surveys and nautical chart content are under
pressure from increasing vessel transits as well as tourism and exploration
for natural resources. These areas include the Arctic, Antarctic, and even
remote tropical regions. Research efforts are described that are intended to
exploit the capabilities of commercial off-the-shelf 3-dimensional forwardlooking sonar installed on expeditionary and other vessels of opportunity
that operate in these regions. This approach can provide high-resolution
full-bottom survey data to supplement the assets of national hydrographic
survey authorities in exploring and charting these regions.
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Introduction
The world’s frontier is represented by the Arctic, Antarctic, and some tropical regions, where
comparatively few have ventured and many dangers lurk in the paths of those who are illequipped and unprepared to deal with the risks and consequences inherent to operating there.
This includes mariners engaged in such operations as well as those whose mission is to rescue
them. In these regions hydrographic surveys to modern standards are rare and charts are unreliable. It is advantageous for a vessel to be equipped with sensors to detect bottom terrain ahead of
the vessel rather than to transit an area blind as to the perils that lie ahead. This topic has taken on
greater signiﬁcance as Arctic waters open up to increased vessel trafﬁc between ports that exist
within the region, as well as transits between Asia and Europe to reduce route distances and shipping times. This is demonstrated as Arctic Sea ice coverage reached the lowest recorded minimum
in 2012, averaging a rate of decline of 13.3% per year between 1981 and 2010 (NASA 2015). The
minimum sea ice coverage for 2015 was the fourth lowest of all previous satellite observations
(Vi~
nas 2015). In 2015, maximum sea ice coverage was the lowest on record (NOAA 2015a).
The present state of Arctic hydrography
According to the U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA),
the Arctic is severely deﬁcient in many of the capabilities extended to the rest of the Nation
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as there is virtually no geospatial infrastructure for accurate positioning and elevations;
sparse tide, current, and water-level prediction coverage; obsolete hydrographic data; and
poor nautical charts (NOAA 2011). Large gaps are acknowledged in the information that
NOAA does have, illustrated by empty white space on nautical charts of the region. Most
Arctic waters off of Alaska that are charted were surveyed with obsolete technology dating
back to the 1800s.
The Northwest Passage (NWP) and the Northern Sea Route (NSR) are the two primary
transit routes through the Arctic as shown in Figure 1. The portion of the NWP that crosses
the top of the United States includes the Beaufort and Chukchi Seas and the Bering Strait.
Figure 2 illustrates one of many areas in the Arctic, where soundings effectively do not exist
across a large portion of an ofﬁcial NOAA chart. Similar conditions exist on the Canadian
portion of the NWP where it was reported in 2009 that less than 10% of the Arctic in Canada
was surveyed to modern standards (Arctic Council 2009). Arctic survey coverage along the
NSR in Russia appears more comprehensive than the NWP, where recent efforts focused on
survey of the route’s least-studied areas encompassing over a 31,000 square km area of the

Figure 1. Arctic routes: Northern Sea Route (NSR) and Northwest Passage (NWP). Source: Arctic Marine
Transport Workshop, 28-30SEP2004, U.S. Arctic Research Commission. Annotations for Clipper Adventurer
and Hanseatic by Authors.
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Figure 2. Portion of NOAA chart 16161 for Kotzebue Harbor, Alaska with large areas of unsurveyed waters
shown in solid blue and without soundings.

sea ﬂoor (AMSA 2013). In addition to its use in the development of nautical charts, proper
hydrographic survey at high resolution with full-bottom coverage is essential to the placement of physical aids to navigation (AtoN) such as buoys that are used visually or by radar
to assist vessel navigation. However, AtoN are difﬁcult to place and maintain in the Arctic
due to the large distances involved and the movement of ice.
Increased trafﬁc in the Arctic
Despite these difﬁculties, vessel trafﬁc is increasing with the transit of 30 vessels through the
NWP in 2012 as compared to 2–7 vessels completing this transit each year from 1990 to
2006 (Macfarlane 2012; NTDENR 2015). NSR trafﬁc saw 46 vessels transiting in 2012
increasing to 53 in 2014 (NSRIO 2012, 2014). The potential exists between 2040 and 2059
for non-ice-classed vessels to navigate previously inaccessible areas of the Arctic without icebreakers (Sullivan 2013). Challenges posed by the environment, the lack of hydrographic
information, and AtoN by which vessels navigate increase the risk to vessels operating in the
Arctic. Shipping casualties in the region have risen from approximately one per year, with a
total of seven occurring during the period between 2002 and 2007, to an average of 45 per
year between 2009 and 2013 (Allianz 2014). Total losses experienced in the Arctic regions of
Russia, Canada, and Alaska were 46 (3.1%) of the 1,462 total losses worldwide between the
years 2002 and 2011. This increased to 6 (5.1%) of 117 total losses in 2012 and 4 (4.3%) of
94 total losses in 2013 (Allianz 2014, p. 12).
Greater consequences of Arctic groundings
Unintentional groundings can occur with greater frequency in areas such as the Arctic where
water depths are unknown, and represented the leading worldwide cause of oil spills of
greater than 700 tons between the years 1970 and 2009 (Butt et al. 2012; Nicolas-Kopec
2012; NMD 2011; TSB Canada 2013; Zhu et al. 2002). Even when not sustaining a total loss,
groundings have serious implications in terms of casualties to life, property, and the environment due to physical impact and chemical spills. Increasing vessel trafﬁc engenders more
severe consequences of grounding in remote regions, where harsh weather and a lack of
resources exists for search and rescue, salvage, pollution remediation, and support
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infrastructure. One example is M/V Clipper Adventurer that grounded in 2010 with 128 passengers on an uncharted shoal in Coronation Gulf, Nunavut in Canada along the Northwest
Passage, also illustrated in Figure 1. The Transportation Safety Board of Canada concluded
the route followed was inadequately surveyed, consisting of a single line of soundings in an
area where the depths were virtually unknown (TSB Canada 2012). Another example is the
grounding of Hanseatic in the Simpson Strait, Canada, in August 1996. The accident investigation report states that the ship ran aground when the Master was relying on a critical navigational buoy that had previously been moved by ice from its original position (TSB Canada
1996). Despite the eventual safe outcomes of both accidents there was signiﬁcant risk and
potential for adverse consequences.
Dramatic and highly publicized groundings continue to occur throughout the world
resulting in many lives lost, pollution of the seas and shorelines, salvage costs that have
been enormous, and incalculable damage to ecosystems and wildlife. The names of the
vessels involved have become infamous and include Exxon Valdez, Petrozavodsk, Rena,
USS Guardian, and Costa Concordia. Although accidents of such magnitude in the Arctic have yet to occur in the modern era, the combination of increased vessel trafﬁc in
the region, poor charts, harsh environment, and lack of infrastructure only increases
the potential that such a catastrophe will eventually take place in the region at an
unprecedented and calamitous cost.
Three-dimensional forward-looking sonar solution
The approach presented describes an opportunity to expand the scope and coverage of environmental data captured from vessels of opportunity plying these waters to help reduce the
many limitations of products available to mariners in the region. This is accomplished from
the perspective of using 3-dimensional forward-looking sonar (3D-FLS) as a means to navigate poorly-charted and unknown waters.
Previous research has investigated the use of relatively short-range FLS systems for use in
underwater obstacle detection and avoidance for use by autonomous underwater vehicles
(AUV) and remotely operated vehicles (Fallon et al. 2013; Ferreira et al. 2014; Koh et al.
2009; Martin et al. 2000). Others have considered the techniques of implementation and
image analysis using 2-dimensional FLS (Berdnikova et al. 2010; Hurtos et al. 2012). Recent
research in the area of 3D-FLS addresses both the technical aspects of such systems as well
as their use in obstacle avoidance by AUVs and ships (Assalih 2013, Yakubovski et al. 2014).
However, the use of 3D-FLS for hydrographic survey has received little attention by industry
or in academic research.
3D-FLS technology is relatively new to commercial shipping with range capabilities now
suitable for use by larger vessels. It is not designated as a requirement for carriage by vessels
of any sort by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) or national authorities. 3DFLS capabilities are currently judged based upon manufacturers’ performance speciﬁcations,
and their limitations are relatively unknown except for rules of thumb based upon range in
terms of depth. Yet the beneﬁts that result from its use may be enormous. Experiments are
described where results help to determine the accuracy of 3D-FLS with respect to the Electronic Navigation Charts (ENC) required for vessel navigation. Additional experiments are
described using 3D-FLS to identify bottom topography characteristics useful in verifying
position. The successful accomplishment of these experiments can form a basis to consider
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the data acquired from 3D-FLS as an independent means to supplement existing hydrographic resources worldwide for chart making and other maritime uses.

Objectives
Two different sets of experiments have recently been accomplished to explore the usefulness
and versatility of 3D-FLS to carry out different tasks. The ﬁrst focused on determining its
accuracy in representing the physical environment in which it operates, and the second
involved its capability to provide data of sufﬁcient resolution to assist in verifying position
using geographical features of the bottom. Based upon the results obtained in completing
these two objectives, an initial assessment was attempted to determine whether the quality
of such data may be useful to expand the corporate body of hydrographic knowledge for
poorly surveyed regions. Although embodying different requirements, our expectations are
that high-quality 3D-FLS with suitable range, regardless of manufacturer, should be capable
of providing data necessary to accomplish these objectives as follows:
(1) Comparing 3D-FLS full-bottom coverage measurements with an ENC derived from
hydrographic survey data. The expected result is a number representing a sounding
derived from 3D-FLS that can be compared with a sounding for the same location as
indicated on an ENC.
(2) Establishing geographical references to assess the feasibility of verifying positions of
virtual AtoN as being correct as part of a determination of their watching properly.
The expected result involves the calculation of several measures used to determine
whether or not a vessel’s apparent position is different from the expected position.
Modern 3D-FLS technology is designed to aid vessel navigation by creating a representation of the underwater environment enabling detection of bottom features forward of the
bow out to a distance of up to 1,000 m. This is contrasted with multi-beam sonar which is
used primarily for hydrographic survey by specialized vessels and not for navigation. With
both systems using similar technologies, the 3D-FLS transmitter is aimed forward instead of
downward. Bottom features, objects, and soundings are detected by determining range, azimuth, and elevation information using a sonar signal steered across and ahead along the
path of the vessel, or by creating a single ping from which snapshots of the environment are
obtained. It is presently available as a commercial off the shelf product and can directly and
signiﬁcantly reduce the risks of passage by those operating in Arctic waters.
Integral to these experiments are factors associated with bottom conditions and sea water
salinity. Bottom conditions can greatly inﬂuence sonar horizontal range, which can extend
from eight to twenty times the depth ahead. Sea bed topographies that slope upwards with
targets that are large and consist of hard rock and/or coral provide much better acoustic signatures than sandy bottoms covered by grass or vegetation or bottoms that slope downward.
Salinity can be highly variable, especially in the Arctic (Serreze et al. 2006). These experiments represent initial attempts to explore the effect of such factors on accomplishing the
objectives.
Two different locations, illustrated in Figure 3, were chosen to conduct these experiments
based in part on the availability of each system for use, sea bottom characteristics and the
properties of the water column. Narragansett Bay near Newport, Rhode Island, US was the
location of experiments conducted during 2014 and 2015 and is included in NOAA ENC
US5RI22M using a scale of 1:20,000. This area is open to the Atlantic Ocean with salt water,
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Figure 3. Survey sites near Newport, Rhode Island (shown in Figure 4) and Annapolis, Maryland (shown in
Figure 5). Source: NOAA chart 13003.

and the bottom consists primarily of mud and rock. It was surveyed by the National Ocean
Service between the years 1990 and 2011 with full bottom coverage. The Chesapeake Bay in
the vicinity of Annapolis, Maryland, US included in NOAA ENC US5MD22M was the location of experiments that were conducted in 2015. The scale of this chart is 1:25,000. This
area contains brackish water and was surveyed by the National Ocean Service between the
years 1940 and 1969 with partial bottom coverage. The bottom generally consists of mud
and sand with large areas of grass.
The ﬁrst objective was accomplished in the Narragansett Bay using System “A,” 500-m-range
3D-FLS system. The investigation examined sonar data accuracy, refresh rate, and span of geographic coverage to help assess the potential to supplement hydrographic survey efforts (Wright
and Zimmerman 2015). This system represents the latest technological state-of-the-art capable of
installation on vessels from approximately 10 m to the largest of vessels using one transducer
mounted at the bow, and is very similar to their other product having range capability to 1000 m.
These 3D-FLS systems are priced relatively near the top of the range for such equipment. This system was installed on the research vessel Cap’n Bert, owned and operated by the University of
Rhode Island Department of Fisheries, Animal and Veterinary Sciences.
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Table 1. Comparison between forward-looking sonar system speciﬁcations.
Speciﬁcations

System “A”

System “B”

Maximum detection depth (m)
Operating frequency (kHz)
Maximum detection range (m)
Vertical coverage ( )
Horizontal ﬁeld of view ( )
Maximum transmit power (Wrms)
Angular accuracy ( )
Roll/pitch compensation ( )
Roll/pitch accuracy ( )
Maximum vessel speed (kts.)
Screen refresh rate (seconds)
Equipment price ($US)

50
61
500/1,000
60
60 or 90
<1,500
1.6
§20
0.5
25
»1.6
» 140,000

100
200
200
90
60
Not speciﬁed
Not speciﬁed
Not speciﬁed
Not speciﬁed
Not speciﬁed
1–2
» 11,000

The second objective was accomplished in the Chesapeake Bay using System “B” 200 m
range 3D-FLS. This investigation focused on detecting bottom topography and features to
facilitate georeferencing as a means to determine position under compromised GNSS and
AIS conditions (Wright and Baldauf 2015). This system is suitable for installation on smaller
vessels of approximately 7–30 m in size, uses two transducers mounted at the stern of the
vessel and is priced an order of magnitude less than System “A.” System “B” system was
installed on a research vessel and test bed leased to GMATEK, Inc.
Speciﬁcations for both 3D-FLS systems are summarized in Table 1. Each transmits single
pings to create a mosaic representing a swath of the bottom topography and speciﬁc targets
ahead as the vessel progresses along its course. The systems chosen are representative of 3DFLS technology that is commercially available, albeit with different capabilities at widely
divergent prices. A signiﬁcant difference between these two systems is their data recording
capabilities. System “A” records high-resolution data from an array of hydrophones approximately every 1.6 seconds corresponding to each sonar ping. Bottom topography may be
reproduced both numerically and graphically in imagery using these data. System “B” does
not record depth measurement data in electronic format that is available for later analysis,
with the only available information provided live through the user interface.

Methodology
When evaluating the capability of 3D-FLS as a means to navigate by providing visibility into
the undersea environment, it is necessary to have a practical, reliable, and traceable baseline
for data against which comparisons may be made. For the purposes of this study there are
two possible criteria: The ENC that mariners are required to use for navigation, and multibeam sonar data obtained during hydrographic surveys from which ENC are created.
The legal requirement for all ship navigation irrespective of size is stipulated in IMO and
national regulations that nautical charts and nautical publications are required to plan and
display the ship’s route for the intended voyage and to plot and monitor positions through
the voyage (SOLAS 2011). Authorization for all the U.S. vessels to use ENC in fulﬁllment of
chart carriage requirements was issued by the U.S. Coast Guard in February 2016 (NVIC
01–16). According to NOAA speciﬁcations, the highest resolution that hydrographic data
can support is rarely needed, resulting in the use of a compromise grid resolution between
the highest resolution possible and a resolution required for navigation products (NOAA
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2015b). Grid resolution generally increases from the open ocean to coasts and embayments
to better represent sea ﬂoor complexity and shallow water features. The nautical chart is
then produced from scale-appropriate generalizations of the navigation surface elevation
model created from the survey data. For example, where multiple soundings of the same
value exist across a portion of the sea ﬂoor, one or more of the soundings may not be shown
on the chart. These generalizations are needed to create a visual chart representation of
soundings and other information that is suitable for viewing by mariners. Otherwise, nautical charts and the ENC that provide information for display on vessel Electronic Chart Display and Information Systems (ECDIS) used would be densely crowded with overlapping
numbers and symbols that would render the display unintelligible.
The legal standard by which ships are required to navigate are the ENC derived
from hydrographic surveys and not the hydrographic data itself. Comparisons in our
experiments were made between 3D-FLS data representing the undersea environment
and the ENC corresponding to the areas of transit where the experiments were conducted. This is consistent with the customary use of a single-beam echo sounder to
determine water depths corresponding to an ENC while a vessel is underway as a
means to ensure safe passage. Neither the 3D-FLS nor the single-beam echo sounder
perform speed of sound or salinity measurements to calibrate their performance to
International Hydrographic Organization (IHO) hydrographic survey standards. However, crowd sourcing of single-beam echo sounder data is currently being considered to
address a signiﬁcant lack of bathymetric data by IHO (NGDC 2016). The results
achieved in pursuing the objectives of these experiments will help determine the viability of independently sourced 3D-FLS data for this same purpose.
Experimental procedures
Objective 1
The vessel on which System “A” was installed transited a course of 180 (§2 ) at a speed of
5 kts. along a bottom that slopes downward from depths ranging from approximately 60 ft
(18.3 m) to 80 ft (24.4 m). This track is shown in Figure 4 spanning a distance of 0.41 nautical miles (0.76 km) with four prominent soundings laying along and abeam the track within
a range of 5–45 m from the track centerline. The charted locations a, b, g, and d were then
correlated with the closest position from which sonar ping data were available and where
sonar data provide coverage of the depth soundings locations (Positions A, B, C, and D).
Full-bottom coverage measurements were made at Positions a, b, g, and d along the transit
path. Positions 1–4 were identiﬁed on the NOAA chart as being the closest pings at right
angles to the depth soundings (Positions A through D) marked by “X” representing points
ahead of the vessel on the same distance arc abeam to where the ENC soundings lie that are
circled.
Data acquisition was performed at a rate of 1.6 seconds per ping resulting in full-bottom
image sampling every 13 ft (4 m) and accumulating 190 samples along the centerline of the
90 arc of sonar coverage along the entire transit route. Bearings were taken at four locations
along the transit route from the transducer location at the bow to the locations of four
soundings that appear on the ENC. Depth measurements made at each of the four sounding
locations were noted, adjustments were made based upon transducer offset and tides, and
subsequently compared with the soundings shown on the ENC.
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Figure 4. Portion of research vessel transit near Newport, Rhode Island along a track to assess 3D-FLS
accuracy, with soundings in feet (Wright and Zimmerman 2015).

Objective 2
The vessel on which System “B” was installed transited four different tracks from south to
north at a speed of 10 kts. along a bottom whose depth ranged from approximately 9 to 20 ft
(3–6 m). Data acquisition was accomplished by capturing raster screen images at a rate of
approximately once every 5 seconds resulting in sampling every 90 ft (27.4 m) and accumulating 14 samples along the centerline of the 60 arc of sonar coverage along each of the transit routes. Bottom topography data were acquired and compared with ENC soundings data,
with similarities noted between the sonar imagery and the ENC using the visual display. The
four tracks depicted in Figure 5, one of which (Baseline) passed directly over a wreck
depicted on an ENC and the other three tracks (Error West, Error Middle, and Error East)
transited along parallel courses that did not pass over the wreck. A simulated AIS virtual
AtoN was also placed over the wreck location in the ENC. Each track covers a distance of
approximately 0.2 nautical miles (370 m). The Baseline Track establishes a reference where
navigation was accomplished using valid Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) data,
while Error Tracks West, Middle, and East simulate navigation using erroneous GNSS data
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Figure 5. Wreck mark for simulated AIS virtual AtoN veriﬁcation by georeferencing near Annapolis,
Maryland showing correct track (Baseline Track) and error tracks (Error Tracks West, Middle, and East)
transited as a result of GNSS spooﬁng. Depths are in feet (Wright and Baldauf 2015).

as may result from spooﬁng and denial of service attacks caused by jamming or other nefarious deed.
The process shown in Figure 6 was followed to create a soundings model near a wreck
appearing on the ENC and in the Light List that contains a list of lights, sound signals, buoys,
daybeacons, and other aids to navigation (Light List V2). This was accomplished by producing
a surface elevation model of System “B” soundings data through conversion of raster image
attributes to vector values in a machine-readable layer supplementing the original ENC
soundings (Pendleton and Wright 2002). The technical approach integrated feature extraction
using edge detection algorithms and optical character recognition. In addition to soundings,
depth information is represented in part by lines and edges that interrupt relatively large uniform regions of the raster image. Methods used exploit a multiresolution analysis scheme
with the underlying principle being that the edges and lines of the sonar display features (e.g.,
soundings, contours, etc.) within the raster image contribute most of the information, while
numeric characters provide context. Data were also acquired from a single-beam echo
sounder installed on the research vessel during transit of the Baseline Track and traced over
the corresponding path in an ENC using GNSS. Data gathered were tested using the measure:
1. Depth soundings contained in an enhanced ENC comparison to single-beam echo
sounder depth measurements (D) adjusted for tide, transducer offset, and other relevant factors.
The research vessel transited the Baseline Track using correct GNSS data, and then Error
Tracks West, Middle, and East as a result of GNSS signals simulating spooﬁng that indicated
the vessel appeared to be transiting the Baseline Track. These paths were traced over the bottom terrain using a single-beam echo sounder and compared to values expected for the
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Figure 6. Process for virtual AtoN wreck mark veriﬁcation by georeference, using a machine-readable
soundings (depths) layer in the ENC.

Baseline Track in the full-bottom coverage ENC machine-readable soundings layer using
two additional measures that include:
2. Change of bottom slope represented in an enhanced ENC comparison to single-beam
echo sounder depth measurements (Dm).
3. Rate of change of bottom slope represented in an enhanced ENC comparison to singlebeam echo sounder depth measurements (Dma).

Results
Objective 1: Compare 3D-FLS full-bottom coverage measurements with an ENC
The measurement results accomplished during transit along the track shown in Figure 4 are
illustrated in Table 2. Vertical uncertainty averaged just less than 1.4 ft (0.4 m) and horizontal uncertainty approached 5 m using Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) Global
Positioning System (GPS) sensors. The elapsed time to transit the route was just under
5 minutes during which information from 190 sonar pings were obtained resulting in 2.1
gigabytes of data collected. Additional experiments were conducted at two other nearby locations in the survey area using the same methods, with similar results.
This scenario compares depth soundings obtained from the System “A” 3D-FLS with
soundings present on ENC of the same area. After compensating for vessel offsets and environmental factors, the differences in soundings measured by System “A” 3D-FLS and the
ENC ranged from 3 to 4.4 ft (0.9–1.3 m) at measurement depths ranging from 57 to 74 ft
(17.4–22.5 m), or 3–7% of the ENC soundings value. The measurements obtained are generally in line with expectations. Under ideal conditions, the differences in these measures would
be zero. In practice, anomalies due to bottom irregularities, offset tolerances, equipment
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Table 2. Comparisons between charted depths and 3D-FLS depths.
Charted depth

FL-sonar depth

Vertical uncertainty

Difference

Location

(ft)

(m)

(ft)

(m)

(§ft)

(§m)

(ft)

(m)

(%)

Position A
Position B
Position C
Position D

57
64
74
74

17.4
19.5
22.5
22.5

59
67
75
77

18.0
20.4
22.9
23.5

1.0
1.2
1.3
1.4

0.3
0.4
0.4
0.4

3.0
4.2
2.3
4.4

0.9
1.3
0.7
1.3

105
107
103
106

accuracies, and changes to the environment that may have occurred since the survey was performed on which the ENC was based. These measurements indicate that soundings measured
using System “A” 3D-FLS generally correspond to ENC in an area where recent survey has
been performed. One assertion that may be made given these results is that, in the absence of
soundings on an ENC that is blank, the soundings shown on System “A” are likely to be similar to that of an ENC had hydrographic survey been performed. Further study in this area is
needed to establish a sufﬁciently large sampling to deﬁnitively substantiate this assertion.
Objective 2: Establishment of navigational references based upon bottom features
and characteristics
Measurement results for transit along the Baseline Track shown in Figure 5 reﬂects accurate
GNSS positioning and transit on three Error Tracks, where GNSS positioning is compromised based upon simulated spooﬁng or denial of service conditions. The elapsed time to
transit the routes was approximately 5 minutes during which information from 49 sonar

Figure 7. Measures of depth and slope of research vessel transit along a track, with soundings in feet
(Wright and Baldauf 2015). The horizontal axis corresponds to consecutive soundings measurement locations from south to north for each track shown in Figure 5. (a) ENC soundings and echosounder depths
comparisons (ft); (b) ENC soundings and echosounder depths comparisons (%); (c) bottom slope comparisons between reference and alternative tracks; and (d) bottom slope rates of change between reference
and alternative tracks.
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pings were obtained resulting in 100 megabytes of data collected. Comparisons between
measured values for these tracks are illustrated in Figure 7.
Baseline track
Depth soundings (D) and the differences in depth soundings were calculated between the
Baseline Track echo sounder measurements and the ENC machine-readable soundings layer
obtained using the System “B” 3D-FLS. For the Baseline Track in Figure 7a the extremes of
the measurements obtained ranged from a low value of ¡1 ft to a high value of 2 ft (¡0.3 to
0.6 m).
Change of bottom slope (Dm) between the Baseline Track echo sounder measurements
and the ENC machine-readable soundings layer obtained using System “B” for the Baseline
Track ranged from ¡135 ft/nautical mile (nm) to 68 ft/nm (¡22.2 to 11.2 m/km). Rate of
change of bottom slope (Dma) between the Baseline Track echo sounder measurements and
the ENC machine-readable soundings layer obtained using System “B” for the Baseline
Track ranged from a value of ¡0.120 to 0.080 ft/sec2 (¡0.019 to 0.013 m/sec2). These values
in themselves are not particularly signiﬁcant except when compared to the Error Tracks, as
discussed below.
This scenario represents the case where GNSS measurements correspond to the
actual desired ground track being followed. The measurements obtained for the three
measured parameters: D, Dm and Dma, are generally in line with expectations. Under
ideal conditions the differences in these measures would be zero. In practice, anomalies
due to bottom irregularities, offset tolerances, equipment accuracies, differences in the
methods by which single-beam and multi-beam echo sounder measurements are performed and inaccuracy attributed to the raster to vector process that was used can contribute towards these results.
The values obtained are slightly better than expected but still in line with other measurements taken at different survey locations in the same area when repeating this experiment.
These results indicate an apparent correlation exists between ENC soundings and sonar
measurements along a known track, a critical ﬁnding that indicates proceeding with the
computation of additional measures for verifying positioning is warranted.
Error tracks
Depth soundings and the differences in depth soundings (D) between Error Tracks West,
Middle, and East echo sounder measurements and the ENC machine-readable soundings
layer for the Baseline Track are shown in Figures 7a and 7b. These values ranged from ¡4 to
7 ft (¡1.2 to 2.1 m) between the single-beam echo sounder readings and the bottom topography. This represents 5–78% of the depths of between 9 and 21 ft (3–6 m) as a result of following terrain that was different from the ENC soundings model.
Differences in the change of bottom slope (Dm) are shown in Figure 7c between Error
Tracks West, Middle, and East echo sounder measurements and the ENC machine-readable
soundings layer for the Baseline Track. These values ranged from ¡270 to 473 ft/nm (¡44.4
to 77.8 m/km) as a result of following terrain that was different from the ENC soundings
model. Differences in the rate of change of bottom slope (Dma) shown in Figure 7d between
Error Tracks West, Middle, and East echo sounder measurements and the ENC machinereadable soundings layer for the Baseline Track. These values ranged from ¡0.160 to 0.120
ft/sec2 (¡0.022 to 0.019 m/sec2) as a result of following terrain that was different from the
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ENC soundings model. Additional experiments were conducted at two other nearby locations
using non-AIS virtual AtoN lateral marks and the same methods, with similar results.
This scenario represents the case where a lack of correspondence exists between GNSS
and the actual ground track being followed since GNSS measurements are purposely being
spoofed and altered to show a false course. The measurements obtained for the three measured parameters: D, Dm, and Dma, are again generally in line with expectations. Speciﬁcally, signiﬁcant differences in bottom contours are being detected at the actual route of
transit as compared to the desired route. Under ideal conditions, the differences in these
measures would be anything but zero, with the actual difference dependent upon the bottom
characteristics. However the effect of bottom characteristics resulting from transiting an
incorrect route would be cumulative to these anomalies as shown in Figure 7.
Differences between the Baseline Track and Error Track data sets positively indicate the detection of GNSS and/or bottom topography anomalies suggesting the location of the vessel and/or
the environmental conditions deviate from the expected. In terms of the positioning of virtual
electronic AtoN and determining whether it is watching properly, the implications of these ﬁndings may include that the AtoN is in the wrong position, or the geographic location where the
AtoN is located may no longer be suitable due to changes in bottom conﬁguration due to storms,
currents, or other natural phenomena since AtoN deployment.

Discussion
Inputs and results
Data from System “A” system originated directly from the transducer hydrophones and was
obtained through the system computer independent of the user interface. These results
appear to be repeatable based upon the measurements performed at two different locations
as well as at the same locations on different days. They also appear to be accurate for navigation purposes based upon comparison to the baseline ENC used in fulﬁlling objective (1).
Data obtained in pursuing objective (2) was acquired from System “B” system indirectly
from the transducer hydrophones as interpreted and represented to the user through the raster interface since direct access to these data was not possible. The results obtained were
repeatable and also appear to be accurate within the speciﬁed range when compared to the
ENC and the measurements obtained using single-beam echo sounder in this experiment.
Clearly indicated in this outcome is that a vessel following Error Tracks West, Middle, or
East rather than the intended Baseline Track would be able to identify a position error without the use of GNSS or AIS, or with the use of GNSS/AIS that was not indicating the proper
position. This is signiﬁcant in that such capabilities could have detected poorly surveyed bottom and possibly help to prevent incidents such as the 1992 grounding of Queen Elizabeth 2
off Martha’s Vineyard, Rhode Island and the incorrect positioning that led to the 1995
grounding of Royal Majesty near Nantucket Island, Massachusetts in the United States
(MAIB 92, NTSB MAR97/01). The bottom conﬁgurations for both areas are similar to those
featured in these experiments in that bottom terrain depth and slope varied along the routes
of transit. Evaluation of this approach in areas with steady bottom depths across the entire
experiment setting has not yet been accomplished.
In both of these experiments, comparisons were made between the 3D-FLS and the
ENC with which mariners are legally obligated to use for vessel navigation. The next
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test of the precision of these measurements should be accomplished through comprehensive experiments designed to compare 3D-FLS data against hydrographic survey
data obtained using multibeam sonar, the baseline from which ENC themselves are created, corrected for speed of sound and salinity. These experiments should be performed
simultaneously with 3D-FLS data acquisition under controlled conditions and to the
same requirements as for hydrographic surveys in general. Plans are currently being
prepared to accomplish this at several locations along the Arctic coast of Alaska. However, the results obtained thus far provide a basis to demonstrate the feasibility of such
experiments.
Field of view and area measurement
System “A” has a maximum range of 500 m given ideal depths and bottom conﬁgurations. However, assuming nominal sound propagation conditions and a distance to
depth ratio of 8:1 for estimating sonar range, a depth of 50 m can serve as a safety
margin for which grounding may become a concern in costal navigation. At this depth
an effective range can be estimated at 400 m along the centerline of the sonar. Given a
60 arc of coverage ahead of the bow, a swath of approximately 430-m width is possible. With a 90 arc of coverage a swath of 800-m width is possible. However, with the
most frequently sampled areas within these arcs being toward the centerline, a conservative estimate of effective swath coverage may be achieved by halving these values to
215 and 400 m, respectively. These values are within the same range of values (195–
390 m) for maximum swath width typically available for multibeam sonars from various manufacturers. The primary difference is that 3D-FLS may enhance safety of navigation by providing watchstanders with visibility ahead of the bow by which hazards to
navigation may be avoided, while traditional multibeam sonar is directed downward
toward the bottom and provides no indication as to what lies ahead.
Sound speed measurements
The measurement of sound speed propagation through the water is a routine and necessary
practice in the performance of modern hydrographic surveys. Such measurements were not
performed during the experiments described as this is not practiced while using forwardlooking navigation sonar, which is intended for grounding and allision avoidance. Nor is
this practiced while using single-beam echo sounders to measure water depth. IMO mandates an echo sounder as a carriage requirement on vessels conforming to the Safety of Life
at Sea (SOLAS) convention as a means to verify water depths below the keel. It is used in
conjunction with nautical charts and ENC in planning and executing voyages. The post
processing of data obtained from independently sourced single-beam echo sounder and 3DFLS to improve accuracy through consideration of speed of sound factors should be further
investigated. However, this limitation should not preclude the use of the high-resolution
data products obtained from 3D-FLS to independently supplement existing multibeam sonar
sources of hydrographic data. Further, the coverage and consistency of 3D-FLS data are
more precise with orders of magnitude greater geographical coverage than single-beam echo
sounder data that are currently becoming widely available in the public domain through
crowd sourcing initiatives.
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Process for veriﬁcation by georeference
The process illustrated in Figure 6 was used to acquire 3D-FLS data, normalize the data into
a common format, and insert these data into a machine-readable ENC layer. This same process can be used with traditional multibeam sonar data to achieve the same result. Additionally, this veriﬁcation process using georeferencing could also be used to verify whether
physical, AIS radio-based, and virtual AtoN are watching properly.
International hydrographic organization S-100 universal hydrographic data model
Reference has been made repeatedly in the text regarding “full bottom coverage ENC
machine-readable soundings layer.” This experiment was envisioned with the S-100 Universal Hydrographic Data Model in mind that supports a wider variety of hydrographic-related
digital data sources and products than the IHO S-57 IHO Transfer Standard for Digital
Hydrographic Data. Speciﬁc reference is made to new spatial models to support imagery
and gridded data, 3D and time-varying data, and new applications beyond those of traditional hydrography. Further potential also exists for expanding IMO e-Navigation capabilities through the integration of 3D-FLS technology.
Additional study limitations
Additional uncertainty exists within the experimental results as statistical processing of the raw
data correlated to a gridded depth product was not accomplished and a validated uncertainty
model does not presently exist in relation to ENC. The next logical step in this research is following an approach considering these criteria as may be achieved with the additional use of multibeam sonar with measurement of sound speed, salinity, and other environmental factors in
conjunction with 3D-FLS. Further research in these areas is planned.

Conclusions
The results obtained in the performance of experiments to accomplish the two objectives of
this research appear to support the following conclusions:
1. Apparent correlation was found to exist between the data acquired from 3D-FLS and the
ENC mandated for use in vessel navigation at the two separate geographical locations
described, as well as at other locations examined during these experiments. It is notable
that these results were obtained from two systems with different capabilities and characteristics produced by different manufacturers. Results were found to be repeatable and consistent at different times and locations using the described methodology.
2. Salinity and bottom slope and consistency in terms of rocky bottom versus sandy and
grassy bottom does not seem to have been a signiﬁcant factor in these experiments as
strong sonar returns were evident and consistent at the survey sites using both 3D-FLS
systems. This may be attributed to the relatively shallow depths surveyed at both locations. However, shallow areas are those of most interest to this study. Further exploration of these factors will take place in future experiments.
3. The data obtained from 3D-FLS appear sufﬁciently comprehensive to support the objectives of national hydrographic authorities in surveying unknown waters such as found in
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the Arctic and contributing to nautical chart development as independently sourced data
under present standards as well as under the IHO S-100 Universal Hydrographic Data
Model. Further study of post-processing methods to enhance 3D-FLS measurement values
to integrate speed of sound and other factors should be performed. Innovation is desirable
in the design of sensors to measure sound of speed that may be integrated with 3D-FLS
and echo sounder equipment to further enhance the accuracy of these systems.
4. Based upon the results of these two sets of experiments an assertion can be made that
the use of 3D-FLS in areas such as the Arctic can provide watchstanders with a useful
and accurate tool to determine the depths of water ahead of the bow to fulﬁll IMO
requirements to maintain an effective watch. Further, it can be an invaluable resource
to detect uncharted and unmarked shoals, reefs, shelves, rocks, and other underwater
hazards to navigation that may jeopardize safe vessel navigation.
5. Future research should only consider 3D-FLS systems that provide direct access to
hydrophone data through a suitable electronic interface. The raster-to-vector conversion process that was used with System “B” system provides an unnecessary layer of
overhead that can introduce error and inaccuracies in the data. This lack of data interface stymies data collection for subsequent hydrographic use.
6. In addition to the positive outcome achieved for hydrographic survey, the authors see
potential for the use of FL-sonar onboard vessels as part of an integrated bridge environment. Although integration of 3D-FLS into ECDIS has occurred in several instances, further research into standard symbology and user interface issues, operator
training and vessel outﬁtting requirements is warranted. Contributions to improvement of navigator situational awareness may be investigated and established by further
experimental studies using bridge simulators and analyzing the behavior of navigators.
A useful side beneﬁt may be the collection of useful hydrographic data.
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Arctic Environment Preservation through
Grounding Avoidance
R. Glenn Wright and Michael Baldauf 1
Abstract Research results are described that explore technological innovation to
reduce ship groundings and collisions by significantly increasing watchstander
situational awareness to environmental conditions below the waterline. This is
especially relevant to ship navigation in the Arctic requiring transit through
shallow, draft-constrained coastal and archipelago waters that are relatively
uncharted, lack aids to navigation, without adequate search and rescue facilities,
and teaming with surface and underwater hazards to navigation. Add to these risks
the potential for satellite service outages, denial of service and spoofing along
with hacking and possible terrorism in various forms. Such conditions and events
create excessive risk to life and property through grounding and greatly expose the
environment and wildlife to pollution damage through oil and chemical spills.
Results of research accomplished to date are provided and strategies developed to
enhance ship owner and operator diligence in better preparing for Arctic transits.
Recommendations for future work in related capacities are also provided for
enhancing the Polar Code, International Maritime Organization (IMO) carriage
requirements and the Convention on Standards of Training, Certification, and
Watchkeeping (STCW).
Keywords grounding, Arctic navigation, underwater sensing, geo-referencing,
GNSS, spoofing, forward-looking sonar
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Introduction

According to statistics of accident investigation reviews issued from various
sources ship groundings are the leading cause of large oil spills, yet human error
remains one of the main reasons for their occurrence. The underpinnings of
groundings contributed to or even caused by direct human error can in many cases
be traced to the watchstander simply being unaware that grounding was about to
occur. This illustrates an extraordinary lack of situational awareness regarding the
specific underwater terrain in which the vessel was operating and a loss of
orientation toward ongoing events [1,2]. Such occurrences may be due to the fact
that the only direct knowledge available to the watchstander regarding the
physical environment below the waterline being a two or three-digit number
provided by an echo sounder that represents depth immediately beneath the keel –
and nowhere else. Deduction of grounding implications based upon such scanty
sensory inputs is problematic at best, and is easily overlooked if the watchstander
is distracted by another task. Modern Integrated Navigation Systems according to
IMO Performance Standards [3] provide alarm facilities that can be configured to
warn of crossing a safety depth contour that may assist in avoiding groundings.
However, these alarms do not work properly where few if any soundings exist
within the electronic navigation chart (ENC) data, and in areas exhibiting rapid
changes in depths as warning is likely to come far too late to avoid rising bottom
terrain.
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Research is presently underway leading to the invention and application of new
technology that can aid in reducing vessel groundings. One focus specifically
chosen for this research is the Arctic, where new inroads are being made to
explore this pristine frontier and make it accessible to pioneers ready to exploit
claims to natural resources and to open new trade routes. The geological and
ecological aspects of the Arctic as represented by the Northern Sea Route (NSR)
and the Northwest Passage (NWP) are described to illustrate the unique
characteristics of these routes that make them particularly vulnerable to grounding
events, and why the consequences of groundings in these areas are intensified.
Also discussed are the vulnerabilities of technology used routinely in worldwide
ship navigation that are accentuated in the Arctic environment, considering both
the limitations of equipment as well as susceptibilities to human factor
deficiencies and man-made interference and disruption. The potential for this
research to contribute towards building new infrastructure in areas where the
establishment of traditional infrastructure is difficult or impossible is identified.
Accomplishments achieved to date are also cited that illustrate the potential to
approach the goal of increasing watchstander situational awareness of the
underwater environment along the route of transit, along with problems
encountered and limitations identified in this work.

2

New Technology to Navigate a New World

The navigation capabilities of modern vessels plying the world’s oceans include
ENC representing the latest in multibeam full coverage hydrographic surveys
contained within and displayed to watchstanders using Electronic Chart Display
Information Systems (ECDIS). Vessel positioning is accomplished to accuracies
of a few meters using Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) integrated with
a growing number of sophisticated sensors and tracked by other vessels and landbased operators, service and support organizations using terrestrial and spacebased Automatic Identification System (AIS) receivers. Physical aids to
navigation (AtoN) are supplemented with AIS-based AtoN capable of being
placed where physical aids cannot.
Unfortunately, little of this is true in the Arctic. Navigation charts are in many
cases blank or are inaccurate. Hydrographic surveys rarely exist and, if they do,
are likely to be decade’s old and performed using obsolete technology. Satellite
positioning systems and communications can be unreliable. Physical AtoN cannot
be placed throughout much of the Arctic due to ice movement and AIS-based
AtoN lack infrastructure required for their use.
It is quite possible for mariners today to be in much the same situation as the
explorers of the 15th and 16th centuries when aiming their bows towards the
unknown. However, research is currently underway to help reduce this problem,
the timing of which is especially significant in that the Arctic is experiencing
increasing vessel activity resulting from the development of natural resources as
evidenced by the 22 July 2015 granting by the U.S. Bureau of Safety and
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Environmental Enforcement of final approval for drilling by Shell Oil at the
Burger Prospect in the Chukchi Sea off Alaska [4]. Transit shipping across the
Arctic is also dramatically increasing to take advantage of shorter routes between
Europe and Asia. This is made possible in part due to diminishing sea ice
coverage opening shipping routes that have previously been impassible. These
routes include the NSR across the top of Russia and Norway, and the NWP along
Denmark (via Greenland) and through Canada and along the United States that
span thousands of nautical miles across shallow coastal seas and archipelagos
where the potential risk for grounding is high. Accentuating these risks is the
harsh climate that can cause the breakdown of machinery vital to safe vessel
operation. The lack of adequate hydrographic survey and accurate nautical charts
providing sparse depth information along much of this route can also render
modern ECDIS equipment ineffective and unreliable.

3. The Arctic Routes
A series of different sailing lanes, the NSR covers some 2,200 to 2,900 nautical
miles depending upon ice conditions. Likewise, the NWP covers a distance of
about 1,300 nautical miles from Baffin Island to Banks Island plus another 1,000
nautical miles from Banks Island to the Bering Strait. These routes are illustrated
in Figure 1.

Source: Arctic Marine Transport Workshop, 28-30SEP2004, U.S. Arctic Research Commission.

Fig 1. Arctic Routes: Northern Sea Route (NSR) and Northwest Passage (NWP)
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A great variety of wildlife can be found in the Arctic including over 35 species
of mammals such as whales, seals and walrus, and other carnivores that include
polar bears [5]; over 200 different species of birds that occur in marine and coastal
areas [6]; over 65 species of fish that include salmon, cod, herring, flatfishes,
halibut, whitefish, pollock and sharks [7]; and many species of invertebrates that
include sea urchins, anemones, jellyfish, crabs and worms [8].

3.1

Northern Sea Route

The NSR encompasses all routes across the Russian Arctic coastal seas from Kara
Gate (at the southern tip of Novaya Zemlya) to the Bering Strait [9]. Shallow
waters generally characterize the length of the coastline from the NorwegianRussian border in the west (in the Barents Sea) to the Bering Strait where average
depths of the East Siberian and Chukchi seas are 58 meters and 88 meters
respectively, the Laptev Sea where 66 percent of its area along the coast is in
depths of 100 meters or less, the Kara Sea with an average depth of 90 meters and
the Barents Sea with 10-100 meter depths along the coast in the southeastern
region sloping to depths of 200-300 meters to the northwest [10]. Depth
limitations at various straits along the route result in an overall controlling depth
of 12.5 meters [11]. Approximately thirteen million seabirds nest along Russia’s
Arctic coastline [12]. Wrangel Island is home to the most important onshore
denning habitat for polar bears in the Arctic and the largest site for a Pacific
subspecies of walrus. Laptev walrus is a subspecies endemic to Russian waters
while the Barents and the Kara Seas play a pivotal role in maintaining populations
of the endangered Atlantic walrus. The White Sea is the breeding area for the
entire Northeast Atlantic population of the harp seal, the keystone species in the
pelagic ecosystem now affected by the climate change. Six of the sixteen Large
Marine Ecosystems (LMEs) defined as areas of heightened ecological significance
in the Arctic exist along the NSR [13].

3.2

Northwest Passage

The NWP is comprised of the marine routes between the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans along the top of North America that span the straits and sounds of the
Canadian Arctic archipelago and along the northern slope of Alaska in the United
States [9]. This archipelago is comprised of approximately 36,000 islands with
variable depths, especially as the continental landmasses and islands are
approached, providing a highly complex geography for vessel navigation [14].
The overall controlling depth is 10 meters [11]. The Alaska portion of the NWP
north of the Bering Strait is bordered by sea ice in the winters of all years and
pack ice may be just offshore all summer. Most of the coastline is sedimentary and
portions have extensive barrier islands and lagoon-forming spits. Beach ridges
surrounding aquatic habitats, serpentine barrens, limestone outcrops, marshes,
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sloughs and other ecologically important and fragile regions in the arctic and
western coasts provide habitat for many unique species of plants and animals [15].
Four of the sixteen LMEs defined as areas of heightened ecological significance in
the Arctic exist along the NWP [13].

4. Increasing Arctic Groundings
The increase in shipping activity in the Arctic engenders corresponding increases
in groundings that comprise a significant percentage of shipping casualties. Data
depicting such a trend indicates shipping casualties in Arctic waters increased to
45 per year between 2009 and 2013 from only 7 during 2002-2007. Damage to
machinery caused a third of these incidents, higher than the average elsewhere,
reflecting the harsher operating environment [16]. When viewed in terms of total
losses, the Russian Arctic/Bering Sea and the Canadian Arctic/Alaska experienced
46 (3.1%) of the 1,462 total losses worldwide in the ten year period between 20022011; increasing to 6 (5.1%) of 117 total losses worldwide in 2012 and 4 (4.3%)
of 94 total losses worldwide in 2013 [17]. The potential environmental impact of
groundings may include containers lost overboard from vessels aground but
otherwise intact that wash up in the Arctic. An incident occurred in 2004 when a
container tank filled with plastic polymers was lost from a vessel enroute to Korea
from South Africa four months earlier that washed up close to a remote Russian
community in the Commander Islands in the Bering Sea [18]. Attempts to move
the container led to spilling about 15 tons of the chemical. Local residents were
poisoned and the community did not understand how to handle such an emergency
[19]. Ståle Hansen, President and CEO of the Skuld Property and Indemnity (P&I)
Club, recently cited cost estimates of $500 million to remove the wreck of the
container ship M/V Rena that grounded in New Zealand and stated that the
potential cost of such incidents in the Arctic would almost certainly be
significantly higher [20].
Groundings involve a moving navigating ship either under command, under
power, or not under command that are drifting, striking the sea bottom, shore or
underwater wrecks [21]. Casualty data shows groundings are consistently at or
near the top of the most frequent types of shipping accidents [22-25]. Where
accidents resulted in oil spills over 700 tons in the years 1970 to 2009, grounding
was the leading cause at 36%, followed by collisions at 29% [26]. Although not all
groundings result in a total loss, the consequences of groundings can result in a
serious accident in terms of cost to the safety of crew, vessel and cargo and
damage to the environment due to physical impact and chemical spills.
The causes of groundings are many and include loss of machinery (e.g., engine,
rudder, propeller and/or anchor); poor hydrographic surveys and nautical charts
that fail to accurately depict bottom contours and identify hazards to navigation;
human factors such as fatigue, errors in properly operating and interpreting ship
sensors, indicators and alarms, and poor voyage planning. A recent report
assessing probabilities for groundings based on accident reports indicates
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inadequate communication and cooperation on the bridge is the most significant
contributing factor in a grounding accident [27]. In 2008 poor hydrographic
surveys were cited by the Helsinki Commission as a contributing factor to an
increase in groundings in the Baltic, particularly in the shallow waters around
Denmark [28]. These are just two of several factors that are of greater significance
in the Arctic environment for ships that are poorly prepared and ill-equipped in
terms of physical machinery, navigation equipment as well as crew training and
experience that contribute towards the increase in accidents.

5. Challenges of Arctic Navigation
There are many operational, logistical and technical challenges to ship navigation
in the Arctic. Those challenges having to do with expanding watchstander
environmental situational awareness center on navigation charts, aids to
navigation and sensors that provide direct insight into the environmental factors
relevant to transit. Another factor is the potential for terrorism, an occurrence from
which the Arctic is not immune. In the Arctic, infrastructure is minimal and
knowledge of the underwater environment is imprecise at best and wholly without
survey in many areas. The risks and consequences of grounding dramatically
increase due to potentially long rescue times and a lack of assets for salvage and
environmental remediation in the event of casualty. This risk extends to both
civilian and Government operations. Adm. Paul Zukunft, Commandant of the U.S.
Coast Guard, when speaking about icebreaker capacity recently stated that the
United States currently has no self-rescue capability in the higher latitudes [29].

5.1

Navigation Charts

According to the U.S. National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration
(NOAA) charting data in much of the Arctic is inadequate or nonexistent [30].
The U.S. Coast Pilot states that much of the Bering Sea area is “only partially
surveyed, and the charts must not be relied upon too closely, especially near shore.
The currents are much influenced by the winds and are difficult to predict; dead
reckoning is uncertain, and safety depends upon constant vigilance” [31]. The
overall status of charts and hydrographic survey for United States Arctic waters
may be described as:
“The Arctic is severely deficient in many of the capabilities that NOAA
extends to the rest of the Nation. The region currently has virtually no
geospatial infrastructure for accurate positioning and elevations; sparse tide,
current, and water-level prediction coverage; obsolete shoreline and
hydrographic data; poor nautical charts; insufficient weather and ice forecast
coverage; inadequate oil spill response capacity; and poor understanding of
baseline conditions for existing ecosystems. There are large gaps in the
information that NOAA does have, illustrated by empty white space on
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nautical charts of the region and limited capabilities for modeling spills in ice
conditions. Most Arctic waters that are charted were surveyed with obsolete
technology, some dating back to the 1800s, before the region was part of the
United States. Most of the shoreline along Alaska’s northern and western
coasts has not been mapped since 1960, if ever, and confidence in the nautical
charts of the region is extremely low” [32].
NOAA has expanded the deployment of survey ships to improve navigational
safety in the Arctic, conducting surveys of the ocean floor to measure water depths
and search for navigational dangers and increasing Arctic charting activities in
anticipation of growing vessel traffic in the region. Hydrographic projects for
Alaska in 2015 cover an area of 2,800 square nautical miles, plus the 12,000 linear
nautical miles for a potential Arctic shipping route from Unimak Island to the
Chukchi Sea [33]. The NOAA Arctic Charting Plan providing information about
existing, recently added, and proposed new ENC coverage in U.S. Arctic waters
was recently released for public comment [34].
Most of Canada’s Arctic waters have not been surveyed to modern standards
except for Lancaster Sound, Barrow Strait, the Beaufort Sea, Amundsen Gulf, and
the approaches to settlements and some mining sites. Spot soundings through the
ice or reconnaissance track soundings are the only survey data available in much
of the Arctic. In the Beaufort Sea, a route through the area with a large number of
pingos has been surveyed in greater detail [35]. It was reported the Canadian
Hydrographic Service says that 10% of the Canadian Arctic has been surveyed to
modern standards [36].
Russian Arctic survey coverage along the NSR, illustrated in Figure 2, appears
more comprehensive than the NWP. The Russian Federation’s Hydrographic
Service reported to the Arctic Council since 2011 the Northern Sea Route’s leaststudied areas are being surveyed over a 31,000 square km area of the sea floor.
Survey results have been digitized and developed into electronic navigation charts.
Sixty-eight marine electronic navigation charts were issued based on the survey
results. In 2012 two hundred charts were developed [37].
Overall, of a total of 7,018,392 linear nautical miles (LNM) in the Arctic across
the waters of Canada, Denmark (Greenland), Norway and the United States;
4,989,368 LNM (71.1%) of the depths remain unassessed by hydrographic survey
[38]. Navigation charts depicting these areas are often blank and/or contain
soundings that should not be relied upon. Of further concern are navigation charts
for the Arctic that have been created according to different datums used to define
the heights, depths and locations of hydrographic features. This requires extreme
diligence to ensure accurate positioning when transiting areas using a chart with a
datum different from that of the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) in
use, and when transiting areas from one chart to another where the charts were
compiled using different datums.
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Fig 2. Survey Coverage of the Arctic Based on the Systematic Sounding Data [39]

5.2

Electronic Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS)

ENC include a Category of Zone of Confidence (CATZOC) rating that indicates
the level to which the data meets minimum criteria in terms of position and depth
accuracy [40]. Except for ENC that contain the most recent modern surveys most
Arctic charts do not have an assigned CATZOC value. This condition has direct
implications on voyage planning and monitoring activities in terms of deriving
keel depth and beam clearance safety margins when planning route(s) of passage.
Safety contour and depth alarms required to be triggered by ECDIS would not be
available in areas exhibiting a lack of soundings. Where soundings do exist on
charts without an appropriate CATZOC rating, reliance upon them to set alarms
would be foolhardy as the soundings should be assumed to be unreliable. In
addition, incorrect setting of own-ship safety depth to a value greater than the
current setting may provide an ECDIS display that omits any obstructions and
shallows that may be present in the ENC.
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Aids to Navigation (AtoN)

The inability to place navigational aids and buoys in constantly changing ice
conditions produces increased risk in vessel navigation activity in the Arctic and
sub-Arctic regions. This has resulted in there being few, if any physical aids to
navigation existing along the coast and outside of heavily trafficked areas nearby
and within ports. Buoy placement and maintenance activity in sensitive ecological
areas is also problematic, and underdeveloped regions lack assets and
infrastructure needed to provide navigation services. The absence of physical aids
to navigation also eliminates the potential to use radar navigation to identify
physical aids during times of poor visibility.
This shortcoming may be alleviated somewhat in the near term through the use
of AIS-based AtoN at some locations in the Arctic. Deployment of this technology
is currently being accomplished across the rest of the United States to supplement
physical AtoN in areas where additional aids are beneficial to navigation. Their
use in the Arctic is limited to areas where infrastructure exists to install and
maintain these aids, and by the line of sight to their deployment locations due to
very-high frequency (VHF) radio transmission characteristics.

5.4

Communications

The ability to reliably communicate in the Arctic region will become much more
important over time as vessel activity increases. One factor that affects reliable
communications is the large distances involved that favor the use of satellite and
high frequency (HF) communications over shorter range VHF and ultra-high
frequency (UHF) communications that is generally limited to the line of site. The
negative influence of atmospheric effects on HF and satellite communications can
make these methods unreliable during magnetic storms initiated by solar flare
events. Heavy precipitation and antenna icing can also interfere with satellite
communications. VHF and UHF communications is useful for communications
between vessels, for tactical control and for emergency communications with
mariners operating in the local area. Further research in the Arctic is needed to
evaluate system coverage limitations and create improved signal modeling
techniques.
There is also a lack of reliable navigation safety information to help mariners
identify, assess, and mitigate risks the in Arctic region due to minimal Maritime
Safety Information infrastructure in the region. The U.S. Coast Guard currently
does not own any of its own electronic Maritime Safety Information (eMSI)
infrastructure in Alaska, and is examining the use of existing AIS infrastructure to
demonstrate the delivery of critical eMSI information to local mariners and
ultimately improve navigational safety [41]. Similar efforts are also underway
elsewhere including the European MonaLisa project that aims to integrate
environmental sensitivity data and dynamic route planning within Maritime
Spatial Plans, and the Accessibility for Shipping, Efficiency Advantages and
Sustainability (ACCSEAS) project for improving maritime access to the NSR by
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developing and implementing eNavigation regional services and to prototype
novel marine navigation and communication concepts.

5.5

Environmental Sensing

Several technologies such as GNSS, radar and sonar fulfill mandatory carriage
requirements on-board modern vessels worldwide, provide vessel positioning
information and offer navigation assistance by directly sensing the immediate
physical environment. However, each of these technologies exhibit specific
limitations as a result of their use in the Arctic. For example, special challenges to
GNSS exist at high latitudes due to low elevation with satellite inclination (55° for
GPS). Limited services like Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS) and
dynamics associated with the auroral region and polar cap also make it difficult to
predict ionospheric corrections and integrity [42].
The use of radar as a means to fix vessel position is also limited in the Arctic.
Absent the presence of short range AtoN, radar piloting that relies on these aids
while in inland, harbor and approach, and coastal navigation is not possible. Using
radar to determine bearing and distance to known objects and land features is
possible where islands are present at sea and mountains extend along the
shoreline. However, much of the Arctic landscape is regular and featureless,
sloping gradually from the shoreline with low and grassy inland terrain making the
detection of natural features difficult at best. Since much of the area is
uninhabited, there is also a lack of manmade objects from which bearings may be
taken.
Sonar technology may be used to identify bottom features, gradients and depth
contours useful to navigation. The echo sounder provides instantaneous depth
information directly below the keel that can reassure the mariner there is sufficient
water at the present time to avoid grounding. However, there is no assurance that
the depth immediately forward of the bow is sufficient for continued navigation.
Little navigational assistance is provided through the comparison of live echo
sounder readings against navigation charts containing no or few soundings.

5.6

Terrorism

The potential exists in the Arctic for deliberate vessel grounding as an act of
terrorism, with much greater effectiveness in terms of negative economic and
ecological impact than would be the case in most other parts of the world. This
can be caused by launching service denial and spoofing attacks on both GNSS as
well as AIS that are relied upon for vessel navigation. The ability to spoof these
services is well documented, taking advantage of inadequate security inherent in
their system architectures. In 2013 scientists from the University of Texas
successfully spoofed the GPS on a yacht, directing it on a parallel path hundreds
of meters off course while the chart display showed only a straight line [43]. Such
attacks could easily be accomplished to target vessels, mobile offshore drilling
units and other maritime assets using small boats as well as highly mobile
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unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs). Small platforms such as these that are
capable of supporting sensors and required technology can easily achieve such
attacks designed to mislead and misdirect vessels into believing their position is
other than their actual position.
At present there is little capability to reduce these threats in terms of detection
and establishing countermeasures against such operations. Much of today’s focus
targets terrorism using the Arctic as a means to traffic in arms, weapons of mass
destruction as well as for the transportation of terrorists [44]. In 2009 the United
States identified fundamental homeland security interests in preventing terrorist
attacks and mitigating those criminal or hostile acts that could increase the United
States vulnerability to terrorism in the Arctic region [45]. Although denial of
service and spoofing attacks have not yet been documented in the Arctic, acts of
eco-terrorism are on the increase. An incident occurred in April 2015 when
Greenpeace activists from their ship Esperanza boarded the Royal Dutch Shell oil
drilling ship Blue Marlin bound for Alaska, and previously in 2013 when the
group occupied a Russian oil rig resulting in the arrest and imprisonment of over
30 activists [46]. Subsequently Russia passed amendments in a federal law on the
protection of oil and gas objects and infrastructure that allow Russian oil
companies to establish their own protection units against hostile action and
terrorism [47]. The Canadian military has also routinely deployed a counterintelligence team in the Arctic to guard against possible spying, terrorism and
sabotage [48].

6. Enhanced Environmental Situational Awareness
The basis for an innovative means of vessel navigation in the world’s uncharted
frontier involves original research in the progression and integration of three
seemingly unrelated technologies: forward looking sonar, Virtual (non-AIS)
AtoN, and georeferencing. The approach described is eminently suitable for Arctic
service in terms of usefulness, ease of deployment and low cost for installation
and maintenance.

6.1

3-dimensional Forward Looking Sonar

This research is based upon the assertion that own ship sensors should be adequate
to detect soundings and bottom configuration both at its current position as well as
forward of the vessel in the path of transit sufficient to ensure safe navigation.
Such capability is especially appropriate where soundings and bottom
configuration are inaccurate or not available due to poor or lack of accurate
hydrographic survey. This is possible through the use of 3-dimensional Forward
Looking Sonar (3D-FLS), which is a variation of the multibeam echo sounder that
detects bottom features and objects within the water column forward of the bow.
Despite its usefulness and the availability of this technology in the commercial
marketplace for over two decades, it is rarely included within the ships’
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complement of navigation sensors. Historically, this is likely due to a lack of
suitable range, low vessel speed of use requirements and confusing 2-dimensional
displays. There is also no IMO carriage requirement for 3D-FLS at present.
The detection of bottom features, objects and soundings by determining range,
azimuth and elevation information uses methods that can generally be described as
variations on transmitting a steerable sonar signal ahead along the path of the
vessel or by transmitting a single ping from which snapshots of the environment
are obtained. Through this process a mosaic of the bottom topography and specific
targets is created as the vessel proceeds on its course. 3D-FLS systems have been
developed with different capabilities supporting both unmanned undersea vehicle
and vessel applications. Of those designed for use on vessels, most are intended
for pleasure and small fishing boats. There are systems with range and resolution
that make them suitable for use on larger vessels such as workboats, offshore
service vessels, merchant and passenger vessels. However, operational constraints
may create limitations on their usefulness. For example, effective range may be
limited by tradeoffs in transducer design to minimize water resistance and drag.
At present, 3D-FLS is capable of detecting and displaying the underwater
environment looking ahead as much as 1,000 meters forward of the bow at speeds
up to 25 knots. In shallower waters the range of 3D-FLS can extend from eight to
twenty times the depth ahead, depending on bottom and target conditions [49,50].
It is most effective when the bottom topography slopes upwards, and when targets
are large and consist of hard rock and/or coral that provide good acoustic
signatures.
The research focuses on the enhancement of 3D-FLS capability to survey the
sea bottom as well as to detect hazards attached to the bottom and floating in the
water column to aid in Arctic navigation, where soundings on charts rarely exist
and the vast majority of hazards to navigation have yet to be discovered. The
utility of this technology as a means to avoid such hazards has been explored in a
simulation of the M/V Costa Concordia disaster [51]. Its use as a means to
perform hydrographic survey has also been discussed in terms of International
Hydrographic Office (IHO) standards [52,53]. The potential exists to accomplish
complete survey coverage with 3D-FLS for the transit route with horizontal and
vertical accuracies within IHO standards using this approach. Such data can
supplement national hydrographic organizations’ efforts in the collection of
survey data in remote parts of the world and in areas lacking recent survey.

6.2

Virtual Aids to Navigation

Virtual AtoN based upon AIS technology are rapidly being deployed on a
worldwide basis as a supplement to physical AtoN. While this is a valuable
technology, the use of AIS-based AtoN is severely restricted in the Arctic due to
lack of existing infrastructure to provide power and communications for health
monitoring, access for maintenance and VHF radio range limitations. The research
focuses in the creation of (non-AIS) Virtual AtoN, defined by the International
Association of Lighthouse Authorities (IALA) as something that “does not
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physically exist but is a digital information object promulgated by an authorized
service provider that can be presented on navigational systems” [54]. Methods
used for the creation of Virtual AtoN have been described in a real-time,
shipboard implementation of this technology [55,56].
Virtual AtoN technology represents a major step beyond the capabilities of
existing AtoN, although critical limitations exist that are inherent in their design
and implementation. Qualifying as short range AtoN, Virtual AtoN appear neither
visually nor directly on radar. AIS-based virtual AtoN appear on an AIS radar
overlay and also on ENC/ECDIS displays. However, verification techniques to
ensure AIS and ENC/ECDIS positions coincide have yet to be developed. Virtual
AtoN may appear only on ENC/ECDIS displays. Such implementations can result
in a potential “single point of failure” scenario that may cause false conclusions
and possible system failures that may go undetected. A comprehensive Virtual
AtoN verification approach to help overcome this deficiency and ensure virtual
AtoN (AIS and non-AIS) are watching properly after deployment is possible using
georeferencing techniques.

6.3

Georeferencing

Georeferenced navigation using terrain features and manmade object recognition
has been in use for many years as a means of cruise missile and other unmanned
aerial vehicle (UAV) navigation across the landscape. This has been made
possible through highly detailed millimeter-resolution radar and laser-surveys of
the land areas from aircraft and satellites, whereas the ocean depths are presently
surveyed to a maximum resolution of about 5 kilometers [57].
This research utilizes a novel implementation of georeferencing based upon the
extraction of features from both multibeam sonar and 3D-FLS data represented in
the ENC, and correlation between vessel position indications and physical
environmental features to verify that Virtual (and physical and AIS) AtoN are
watching properly. Comparison between ENC soundings and echo sounder depths
along the path of transit can be performed even if precise positioning information
normally acquired using GNSS, AIS and other sources are unavailable due to a
variety of manmade and natural events. The techniques used to accomplish this
have been discussed based upon the results of a series of experiments conducted at
sea [53,58]. Environmental features are identified in terms of bottom depth
soundings for the ENC and echo sounder as well as the difference between these
two sources, differences in bottom slope and differences in the rate of change of
bottom slope resulting in new capabilities to automatically detect discrepancies in
either bottom conditions or GNSS positioning that may require additional caution.

7.

Grounding Avoidance Strategies

An overall strategy to reduce the potential for grounding in the Arctic must
originate during vessel preparation and outfitting for Arctic operations, continue
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through voyage planning, be implemented throughout the entire voyage to monitor
its progress, and result in products that preserve the information and knowledge
acquired during transit useful for crew debriefing. Such products should also
support the subsequent application of the information and knowledge gained to
benefit future mariners who transit the same areas. Strategies must be developed
in accordance with a Safety Management System that acknowledges the special
circumstances of Arctic navigation and includes provisioning appropriate for
correct vessel outfitting and crew training. Specific concepts that may be useful in
developing strategies to avoid groundings are illustrated using the incidents cited.
Applications and advantages that 3D-FLS and Virtual AtoN may provide in such
circumstances are also discussed.
Official reports commonly include accounts of groundings that have occurred
due to a seeming lack of environmental situational awareness regarding the
proximity of the keel of a vessel with the sea bottom. In several cases the
watchstander was not even aware that grounding had occurred even several
minutes after it happened. Descriptions of incidents extracted from the Nautical
Institute’s Mariners' Alerting and Reporting Scheme (MARS) include:
• Chart corrections while navigating contribute to grounding (Report 201528)
• ECDIS unassisted grounding (201505)
• Self-induced fatigue contributes to grounding (201451)
• Fog bound grounding under pilotage (201420)
• Vessel strikes island (201356)
• Unpublished draft restrictions lead to grounding (201335)
• Improper bridge procedures and ECDIS use caused grounding (201257)
• Grounding in channel (200657)
• Cross checking positions lead to grounding (200524)
• Near grounding due to permanent highlighting of charts (200109)
These are a few of many examples of groundings in non-Arctic areas; many of
which are highly travelled, well charted and represent the best of circumstances in
terms of information and sensor availability. The Arctic is generally less than
optimal in these terms. Groundings and their consequences can be considerably
more serious in the Arctic where harbors of refuge are few, search and rescue
facilities are scarce or non-existent, and salvage capabilities may take weeks or
months to arrive on-scene due to weather and sea conditions. Several detailed
accounts of groundings follow that will be used to illustrate grounding avoidance
strategies based upon the results of research accomplished to date.

7.1

M/V Clipper Adventurer

On 27 August 2010 the cruise chip Clipper Adventurer ran aground in Coronation
Gulf, Nunavut in the Northwest Passage on a shoal discovered in 2007, published
in Canadian Notices to Shipping but not officially charted until June 2012. The
Transportation Safety Board of Canada report concludes that the vessel ran
aground after the bridge team chose to navigate a route on an inadequately
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surveyed single line of soundings, as shown in Figure 3 [59]. This occurred in an
area where the depths of the waters were virtually unknown.

Fig 3. Navigation Chart and Bottom Topography: Clipper Adventurer Grounding [59]

Analysis: M/V Clipper Adventurer was proceeding on autopilot at a speed of 13.9
knots when the vessel ran aground on hard rock shelf [60]. Bottom depth directly
before the shelf, illustrated in Figure 3, exceeded 100 meters. Using 3D-FLS with
a 1,000 meter range, at a speed of 13.9 knots the vessel would have had
approximately 128 seconds or 2.1 minutes advance warning before the grounding
would have occurred based upon the following equation:

Advance Warning (sec) =

MDR (m) - SRR (sec) - APT (sec) - WRT (sec)

( )

m
Vs sec

(1)

where logical arguments may be made to establish values for each of these
parameters:
Speed of Vessel (Vs) = 13.9 knots
Screen Refresh Rate (SRR) = 2 sec
Maximum Detection Range (MDR) = 1,000 meters
Alarm Processing Time (APT) = 4 sec
Watchstander Response Time (WRT) = 5 sec
1 m/s = 1.9438 knots
The Marine Investigation Report identifies that 3D-FLS was indeed installed
on Clipper Adventurer, however it was not operational and in an unserviceable
condition. This unit had a maximum detection range of 500 meters and, if
operational and the vessel was operating at 6 knots, the report concluded the crew
would have had approximately 2 minutes advance warning of the shelf [61]. In
either case there may not have sufficient sea room to halt all forward motion of the
vessel. However a reduction in speed and course change may have altered the final
circumstances such that the grounding may have been avoided or the severity of
the grounding may have been lessened.
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Virtual AtoN placed to mark the perimeter of the shelf would have been visible
on ECDIS, providing warning adequate for the crew to take action to alter course
and speed to avert grounding.

7.2

M/V Exxon Valdez

On 24 March 1989 the U.S. Tankship Exxon Valdez loaded with 1,263,000 barrels
of crude oil ran aground on Bligh Reef while departing the traffic separation
scheme (TSS) to avoid ice. Approximately 258,000 barrels of oil spilled resulting
in damage to the vessel and cargo estimated at $25 million and a cost for
environmental cleanup in 1989 at $1.85 billion [62]. There was no indication in
the report to contradict that the area was well surveyed and accurately depicted on
nautical charts. The probable cause of the grounding was listed as failure to
properly maneuver the vessel because of fatigue and workload along with several
other factors.

X

Source: [63]

Source: NOAA Chart #16708.

(in fathoms)

Fig 4. Exxon Valdez - Glacial Ice Intrusion into Traffic Lanes; Bligh Reef Navigation Chart

Analysis: Exxon Valdez was proceeding at night on autopilot at a speed of 16
knots when the vessel ran onto Bligh Reef [63]. The depth of the hard bottom
before the reef, illustrated in Figure 4, averaged 30 fathoms sloping to 50 fathoms
before rising to 4 fathoms at the reef. Neither 3D-FLS nor ECDIS existed at the
time of this grounding. A vessel transiting this same course today using 3D-FLS
with a 1,000 meter range at a speed of 16 knots would have had several minutes
advance warning that they were in trouble before the grounding. First significant
indication (other than the depth was half what is should have been in the inbound
lane of the TSS) would have occurred around 1,000 meters out as the bow was
directed towards Reef Island, where a solid wall to the water’s edge directly in the
path of the vessel would have been displayed. The second and final indication
would have occurred after the turn away from Reef Island towards Bligh Reef,
where another solid wall to the water’s edge directly in the path of the vessel
would have been displayed. Conceivably, 3D-FLS might have been useful to
navigate the channel between Reef Island and Bligh Reef once they found
themselves in this situation.
Virtual AtoN placed to mark the perimeter of Bligh Reef, Reef Island and/or
the channel between the two would have been visible on ECDIS, providing
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warning adequate for the crew to take action to alter course and speed to avert
grounding.

7.3

M/V Rena

On 4 October 2011 the container ship Rena bound for the New Zealand port of
Tauranga ran aground on Astrolabe Reef (illustrated in Figure 5) at a speed of 17
knots. The master authorized the watchkeepers to deviate from the planned course
lines on the chart to shorten the distance and expedite their arrival. Instead of
passing two nautical miles north of Astrolabe Reef the second mate reduced the
distance to one nautical mile to save time. He then made a series of small course
adjustments towards Astrolabe Reef to make the shortcut. As a consequence Rena
made a ground track directly for Astrolabe Reef. About 200 tons of heavy fuel oil
were spilled in the accident, and a substantial number of cargo containers were
lost overboard [64].

Source: New Zealand Chart #541

Data from WASSP 160F multibeam system.
www.oceanDTM.com (used by permission)

Fig 5. Navigation Chart and Bottom Topography: Rena Grounding

Analysis: Rena was proceeding at night on autopilot at a speed of 17 knots when
the vessel ran onto Astrolabe Reef [65]. The depth of the bottom before the reef,
illustrated in Figure 5, averaged 80 fathoms rising to 4 fathoms at the reef. Were
Rena equipped with 3D-FLS with a 1,000 meter range at a speed of 17 knots the
vessel would have had approximately 1.7 minutes advance warning before the
grounding. The approaches to the reef would have been evident before then.
Although paper charts were being used, Virtual AtoN placed to mark the
perimeter of Astrolabe Reef would have been visible on ECDIS, providing
warning adequate for the crew to take action to alter course and speed to avert
grounding.

7.4

M/V Costa Concordia

On 13 January 2012 the passenger ship Costa Concordia with 4,229 persons on
board while in navigation in the Tyrrhenian Sea off the coast of Italy collided with
Scole Rocks adjacent to Isle de Giglio, as illustrated in Figure 6. The ship had

19

R. Glenn Wright and Michael Baldauf
recently departed the port of Civitavecchia and was enroute to Savona, Italy. The
hull was breached, thirty-two souls are dead or missing and the vessel was lost
[66]. Human error is cited as a primary cause for this accident [67]. Specifically, a
chart of inadequate scale was used to superficially plan and execute a maneuver at
night that was unsuitable in terms of distance from the coast and adjacent rocks
and outcrops as well as depth below the keel. This grounding became the most
costly maritime salvage event in history.

Source: MCIB [68]

Source: http://blog.maxsea.com/ (used by permission)

Fig 6. Navigation Chart and Bottom Topography: Costa Concordia Grounding

Analysis: Costa Concordia was proceeding at night at a speed of 16 knots when
the vessel ran onto Scole Rocks. The position marked 2000 on the chart to the left
lies approximately 1,100 meters from Scole Rocks with depth in excess of 100
meters with a mud bottom. The 100 meter bottom contour is approximately 500
meters further along the course, with upslope bottom rising to the 10 meter bottom
contour at the maximum range of the 3D-FLS off the starboard bow. The bottom
is also transitioning from mud to rock, with a resultant increase in acoustic
reflectivity of the bottom material. Clear indications of the approaches to Scole
Rocks would have appeared off the starboard bow on the 3D-FLS display. Even
with the switched off ECDIS alarms, such an indication potentially should have
initially alerted the Master to the existence of a problem since the appearance of
Scole Rocks would have been expected off the port bow based upon the passage
planning. Furthermore, the depth contour displayed on the 3D-FLS would clearly
indicate insufficient depth in an unexpected location. Approximately 1.8 minutes
advance warning could have provided of the pending grounding showing the
approaches to Scole Rocks culminating with a wall extending up to the water’s
edge. Up until 150 meters prior to grounding, an escape path to clear water would
have been evident off the starboard bow. Baldauf and Wright [69] provides a
concept for triggering anti-grounding warnings taking into account simulationbased prediction of the ship’s maneuvering behavior according to the prevailing
circumstances of the concrete situation.
Virtual AtoN placed to mark the approaches to Scole Rocks would have been
visible on ECDIS, providing warning adequate for the crew to take action to alter
course and speed to avert grounding.
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MSV Fennica

On 3 July 2015 the MSV Fennica, while enroute between Dutch Harbor Alaska
and the Shell Oil drilling field in the Chukchi Sea, was holed when it traveled near
a previously uncharted rocky shoal [70]. The nautical chart of the inadequately
surveyed area indicated several meters clearance to the bottom existed along the
route, and tides were favorable. However, a deeper route of transit was available
nearby that could have easily been used as an alternative to the shallower route
actually taken.

X

Source: NOAA Chart #16530 (Soundings in fathoms)

Fig 7. Navigation Chart: Location where MSV Fennica was Holed

Analysis: At the time of this writing the official investigation into the grounding
had just begun. The speed of the vessel at the time it was holed is unknown. The
depth of the bottom, illustrated in Figure 7, averaged 7-10 fathoms then around 15
fathoms until rising to 4 fathoms at the previously undetected shoal. Were MSV
Fennica equipped with 3D-FLS with a 1,000 meter range its useful range would
have been restricted due to the shallow waters of the area to between 8 to 20 times
the depth, or approximately 150 to 350 meters range. At a speed of 10 knots the
vessel would have had approximately 20 to 60 seconds advance warning before
the vessel was holed, possibly providing sufficient time to lessen the severity of
the incident. The approaches to the shoal would have been evident before then.
Virtual AtoN placed to mark the perimeter of shoal would have been visible on
ECDIS, providing warning adequate for the crew to take action to alter course and
speed to avert the incident.

7.6

M/V Petrozavodsk

On 11 May 2009 the 1,250 gt. refrigerated cargo ship Petrozavodsk ran aground in
heavy fog on the southern tip of Bjornoya (Bear Island) in the Arctic between
Norway and Spitzbergen. Satellite tracking shows the ship held a steady course
straight towards the shore and ran aground at a speed of 10 knots. The ship was
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declared a total loss. There were no injuries but up to 60 tons of fuel and other
pollutants were spilled into the sea in an area with major sea bird populations.
Many dead and injured seabirds were found along the coastline. The master and
mate were reported to have high blood alcohol levels resulting in the vessel
entering a protected area and running aground. Both were charged, convicted and
sent to prison in Tromso, Norway [71].
Analysis: This grounding is included to illustrate there is no fool-proof
technological solution to prevent any situation where the master and mate are
intent on criminally-negligent behavior that imperils the lives and safety of the
crew and vessel.

8. Safety Management System
The unique risks and limitations associated with navigation in the Arctic
necessitates a vessel safety management system that fulfills all appropriate
company policies, port state regulations and IMO carriage requirements; as well as
the COLREGS, the STCW convention, the Polar Code and other requirements that
apply to the voyage. However, this is still not enough. The results of eNavigation,
development of new carriage requirements and implementation of IMO initiatives
take years to achieve fruition. A risk-adverse strategy must be followed towards
equipping Arctic-bound vessels with 3D-FLS in a manner that will increase their
potential to successfully complete their voyage in this risk-prone environment.
The Arctic is a frontier that requires initiative, innovation and forethought to
anticipate circumstances and events that are not likely to occur at lower latitudes
and in areas more frequently traveled. This concept applies specifically to
technology that may assist mariners today in reducing risk to navigation, yet no
carriage requirements exist for their installation or use on vessels. One such
example of progress in this area is the use of an Inertial Navigation System (INS)
as a means to supplement GNSS positioning where atmospheric and other
phenomena may interfere with reception. Many vessels in the Arctic and
elsewhere are presently equipped with INS as a result of prudence and proper
planning despite the absence of any specific requirement to do so. In many parts
of the world eLORAN capabilities also exist and vessels are equipped with
receivers as a means to supplement GNSS positioning. 3D-FLS should be amongst
this equipment on the bridge. The adoption of truly Virtual AtoN and their
verification through the use of georeferencing techniques that would be immune to
interference and spoofing attacks would also be a logical extension of this
progress.

9. Conclusions
The technologies described provide new opportunities to increase maritime safety
in the poorly-charted frontiers of the Arctic, the benefits of which would be
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applicable worldwide. 3D-FLS technology is not yet sufficiently tested or
integrated on a widespread basis directly into existing navigation systems in its
present form. Merely adding yet another sensor and display system to an already
complex bridge environment without adequate engineering, planning and training
is likely to make matters worse rather than improving them, and may result in
increased risk to navigation similar to that which occurred upon the initial
introduction of radar that lead to the collision between the M/Vs Andrea Doria
and Stockholm [72]. Adequate training for watchstanders in the use of 3D-FLS by
manufacturers should be mandated in anticipation of future enhancements to the
STCW convention. Further, the Polar Code should be amended to stipulate the
requirement for a second echo sounder is fulfilled using 3D-FLS.
However, it is also abundantly clear that payback in terms of cost avoidance of
even one grounding requiring rescue or resulting in oil and/or chemical spillage in
the Arctic would far outweigh any investment necessary to equip vessels with this
equipment and technology. This will enable masters and crews alike to become
familiar with operating and using the described technology as well as enjoy the
benefits and enhanced safety provided by its capabilities.

Disclaimer
The opinions, conclusions and recommendations within this paper are solely those
of the authors and do not represent any official position or endorsement of the
United States Coast Guard, the National Oceanographic and Atmospheric
Administration or any Government or non-governmental organization or entity.
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ABSTRACT: Collisions and groundings are the two types of casualties in shipping that occur most often and cause serious
damage. At all times Officers ofthe Watch (OOW) must be aware ofthe risks of collision and grounding and comply with
rules and regulations as established, for example, in the Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea (COLREGs), Guidelines for Voyage Planning (International Maritime Organization (IMO) resolution
A.893(21» and the Procedures Manual ofa ship's Safety Management System (according to the International Safety
Management (ISM) Code). Maritime education and training supports compliance with the legal framework by providing
knowledge and skills and supporting application of best practice. This paper describes studies into the use of bridge alerts
and an innovative approach to trigger alarms using forward-looking sonar. The development of the concept and basic
functional and technological structure to support enhanced situational awareness will be explained and discussed from the
perspective ofthe grounding ofM/V Costa Concordia. Suggestions and recommendations for simulation-based test and
training scenarios are also presented.
1.0 NOMENCLATURE
Symbols, abbreviations and acronyms used within this paper are identified as follows:
ATON
Aids to Navigation
COLREGS International Regulations for Preventing
Collisions at Sea, 1972
eATON
Electronic Aid to Navigation
ECDIS
Electronic Chart Display and
Information System
ENC
Electronic Nautical Chart
FL-sonar Forward-looking sonar

HMI
HtoN
IMO
INS
M/V
OOW
STCW

Human Machine Interface
Hazard to Navigation
International Maritime Organization
Integrated Navigation Systems
Motor Vessel
Officer of the Watch
Standards of Training, Certification and
Watchkeeping

2.0 INTRODUCTION
An important aspect of basic and enhanced training in ship handling and navigation courses is the familiarization with and
handling of equipment including transferring knowledge and experience on the capabilities, functionalities and constraints
on their use. Bridge navigational equipment encompasses many and diverse systems to support safe and efficient navigation
and protection of the marine environment. The present situation is characterized by an increasing level of integration of
sensors, technical systems, displays and sophisticated decision support systems combined with complex alerts to ensure
sufficient situational awareness of the bridge team. However, despite the presence of such sophisticated systems accidents
in the form of groundings and collisions still happen. Regardless of the behaviour, the actions taken or not taken by the
bridge team, the grounding of Costa Concordia equipped with very modern integrated bridge navigational systems can be
seen as another prominent case where alerts implemented in most modern and highly sophisticated navigation systems
failed to raise the attention to take action to avoid an accident.
The COLREGs and the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers
(STCW) require an adequate watch be maintained.[1,2] However, there is presently no established means to maintain watch
below the waterline to directly detect the presence of hazards to navigation. A key assertion ofthe research presented in this
paper is that bridge watchstanders are generally provided only with indirect and/or secondary information from which
safety-critical decisions are routinely formulated. Although the tragic grounding of Costa Concordia or more recently the
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grounding ofMN Marco Polo in Norwegian fjords provide convenient and fresh examples to illustrate this assertion, the
problem has and continues to exist on a daily basis during virtually every vessel transit. For example, nautical charts and
even most modem ECDIS provide navigation information as a secondary reference created by survey at some time in the
past that was accurate at the time it was made but not necessarily reflecting actual conditions at the time of passage. Radar
indicates only those nearby targets from which the proximity to underwater hazards to navigation should be deduced. A
traditional echo sounder provides depth directly below the keel, but no indication of depth directly forward ofthe bow.
These and other methods such as GNSS merely infer positional relationships to geographic locations of interest and
concern, but none are capable of directly detecting the physical underwater hazard to navigation (HtoN) consisting of Scole
Rocks off Isle del Giglio, or any other such hazard prior to grounding. Additional to this, there are floating hazards to
navigation that cannot be charted such as drifting shipping containers, debris fields, whales, etc., having little or no presence
on radar or other navigation sensors.
Another assertion is that the technology needed to detect hazards to navigation in real time at and below the waterline
currently exists in the form ofFL-sonar and is available as commercial off-the-shelf equipment ready to be installed on
vessels at the next scheduled drydocking. This does not imply, however, that this technology is sufficiently tested, capable
of being integrated directly into existing navigation systems in its present form, or adequate training exists for its use.
Merely adding yet another sensor and display system to an already complex bridge environment without adequate
engineering, planning and training is likely to make matters worse rather than improving them, resulting in increased risks
to navigation. This is illustrated with the introduction of radar that lead to the radar-assisted collision between MNs
Stockholm and Andrea Doria. Lack of proper training in the operation, use and interpretation of radar equipment combined
with a lack of procedures for implementing corrective actions based upon radar indications created. a scenario where
established procedures for navigating in restricted visibility were not followed, resulting in the collision.[3]
The capabilities and limitations offorward-Iooking sonar technology are discussed in terms oftheir scope and capability to
detect hazards to navigation, along with its suitability in terms of vessel type, speed and installation requirements. Also
covered is the complexity of using FL-sonar for vessel navigation describing present capabilities as well as future
requirements in terms of standards for integrated navigation systems (INS) and bridge alerts. This includes the introduction
of electronic aids to navigation (eATONs) as a means to display hazards to navigation on electronic chart display and
information systems (ECDIS). Integral to this process is the use of simulation technologies to test, verify and validate
system processes, procedures and training requirements well in advance ofthe introduction of this technology to vessels by
the introduction of carriage requirements through the IMO.

3.0 FORWARD-LOOKING SONAR TECHNOLOGY
Active sonar, commonly referred to as an echo sounder by the IMO, is used by vessels in determining the depth between the
keel and the bottom.[4] A variation of the echo sounder is forward-looking sonar used to detect bottom features and objects
within the water column forward ofthe bow. Despite its usefulness and the availability ofthis technology in the commercial
marketplace it is rarely included within the ships' complement of navigation sensors.
1.1 SPECIFICATIONS AND CAPABILITIES
The methods used for detecting bottom features, objects and soundings by determining range, azimuth and elevation
information can generally be described as variations on transmitting a steerable sonar signal ahead along the path of the
vessel or transmitting a single ping from which snapshots ofthe environment are obtained.[5-8] A mosaic of the bottom
topography and specific targets is then created as the vessel progresses on its course.
The range ofFL-sonar can extend from eight to twenty times the depth ahead, depending on bottom and target conditions. It
is most effective when the bottom topography slopes upwards and when targets are large and consist of hard rock and/or
coral that provide good acoustic signatures. FL-sonar products are available that provide both 2-as well as 3-dimensional
representations which provide a more realistic portrayal ofthe course ahead.
FL-sonar systems have been developed with different capabilities supporting both autonomous underwater vehicle and
vessel applications. Ofthose designed for use on vessels, most are intended for pleasure and small fishing boats. There are
systems with range and resolution that make them suitable for use on larger vessels such as workboats, offshore service
vessels, merchant and passenger vessels. However, operational constraints may create limitations on their usefulness. For
example, effective range may be limited by tradeoffs in transducer design to minimize water resistance and drag. A
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summary and examples of several FL-sonar systems, presently available on the market and each utilizing a different type of
transducer, and their specifications are illustrated in Table 1.

Specifications
MaxirT\um D",t",c:~ion[)",pt~:
c:>p",ratirlgFrequel1cy:.
.
Maximum Detection Range (MDR):
Vertical Coverag.e:
Horzontal Field of View:
m.................................................................................................
Maximum
Tramsnit
Power:
...
.
............................

EchoPilot

:l()Om (328 ft)
200 kHz
200 m (656 ft)
900
600
.......................................................
not specified

Angular Accuracy:
Rolljpitch C()rT\pensation:
m~()!!!f>itc:~~c:c:lJE~c:y:m
Maximum Vessel Speed:
Screen Refresh Rate:
Advance Warning
A:"Calculationby author.

FarSounder

3D FLS [91

at MDR @ 10kts.:A

100 m (328 ft)
180 kHz
.
...
.............
800 m (2.500 ft)
1800
3600
............................
800W
ified
ecified
ecified
10 kts
seconds
139 sec. (2.3 min.)

50mJ169ft)
61 kHz

.........

.........

1000 1.111

1,000 m (3,200
600
600
..................................................
<1500 W,m.
.

..m1:60

mmm..

:1:200
0:50
25 kts
2 seconds

183 sec. (3.1 min.)

1.2 CONCEPTUAL APPROACH TO ESTIMATES OF ADVANCE WARNING AFFORDED BY FL-SONAR
As a very first basic step for establishing and further development of defmitive parameters for the issuance of warnings to
watchstanders using FL-sonar, certain guiding principles may be cited to achieve an estimate useful for broad guidance on
the subject. For example, a calculation ofthe relative time afforded a vessel to begin corrective action such as altering
course, reducing speed or otherwise reacting to an alarm generated by a FL-sonar would be based, at minimum, upon the
following factors:
MDR (m) - SRR (see) - APT(see) - WRT(see)
Advance Warning (see) =
m
(1)
Vs (see)
where logical arguments may be made to establish values for each ofthese parameters:
Speed of Vessel (Vs) =
Screen Refresh Rate (SRR) =
Maximum Detection Range (MDR) =
Alarm Processing Time (APT) =
Watchstander Response Time (WRT) =
1 m/s =

to knots
2 sec, or as noted
obtained from Table 1
4 sec
5 sec
1.9438 knots

Although some systems can perform at much higher speeds, a value of 10 knots was selected for the Speed of Vessel (Vs) to
provide a common basis for evaluating the reaction time to FL-sonar system alarms. A value of two seconds for Screen
Refresh Rate (SRR) on the display was assumed based upon system performance specifications. However, SRR for the
Furuno CH-270 system may be as high as eight seconds or more as this system provides general coverage that extends
beyond the area directly ahead ofthe bow. The value for Maximum Detection Range (MDR) is obtained from the
performance specifications of the individual FL-sonar units.
Alarm Processing Time (APT) is the speed at which FL-sonar data can be evaluated by signal processing and alarm
generation algorithms to determine whether a condition exists that breaches predetermined vessel-specific safety contours
and depths. This includes draft, course, Maneuvering capabilities, lateral clearance margins and other factors pertinent to
safety of navigation. As assumption is made that such criteria for FL-sonar are likely to be similar to those established by
IMO for ECDIS.[12] Integral to this factor are time delays to prevent normal operating conditions from causing false alerts
because ofnormaItransients that may exist in the FL-sonar data.[13] This can add an additional one to several seconds to
ensure target persistence, eliminating the generation of an alarm due to a single occurrence or short duration or transient
target. A value of four seconds was selected based upon FL-sonar refresh rates as well as estimates of processing times for
interface and communications systems handling software that may be required by INS.
Watchstander Response Time (WRT) is that needed for the OOW to acknowledge an alert and take appropriate corrective
action based upon the nature of the alarm. This must take into account time lags necessary to assess rates of change in
processes such as changing vessel course against targets' movements.[14] The time required for the OOW to confer with
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other bridge watchstanders and lookouts and to issue orders to the helmsman must also be factored into this calculation.
Add to this the effects of fatigue and various other human factor elements, one can easily see that this factor is the most
subjective and imprecise in the equation. A value of five seconds was chosen in part based upon the author's direct
observations of bridge practices used on several vessels under similar conditions using ECDIS and radar indications.
Using these criteria the EchoPilot 3D FL-sonar provided approximately Yz-minutewarning, the Furuno CH-270 provided
approximately 2Y4-minutewarning and the FarSounder 1000 provided approximately a 3-minute warning when considering
their maximum detection range. The speed of 10 knots may appear somewhat slow for most vessels while underway.
However, if a vessel is operating in unknown, poorly charted or known-hazardous waters it is prudent to increase safety
margins by proceeding at a slower than normal pace.
It should be noted that such advance warning calculations generally provide "best case" scenarios under ideal conditions,
and that actual conditions and response times must be expected to reduce these margins - significantly in some cases.
Actual conditions must also take into consideration both human and technological factors that can result in major deviations
from these response times. Technological factors can include water turbidity, poor acoustic reflection qualities of potential
HtoN and even growth on the hull that may reduce FL-sonar sensitivity. Human factors can range widely from distractions
on the bridge, unfamiliarity with the equipment and general lack of training, proficiency or currency in watchkeeping
procedures.
1.3 INSTALLATION
To achieve the most reliable and accurate performance FL-sonar transducer(s) must be located on an area ofthe hull that is
free of turbulence from obstructions located forward of the mounting position. Each transducer must be provided an
unobstructed view both horizontally towards the bow and vertically from the waterline to the bottom to achieve the best
accuracy and effectiveness.
The EchoPilot 3D Forward Looking Sonar uses two transducers mounted athwartships, one either side equidistant to the
keel- ideally on the rear third of the vessel The interior installation of these transducers as visualized from within the hull
is illustrated in Figure la.
The FarSounder 1000 Navigation Sonar uses one transducer mounted on the bow with a fairing tube inserted within an
existing or standard bulb, or as a separate installation. The exterior installation of this transducer as seen from ahead of the
bow is illustrated in Figure lb.

a. DualEchoPllot Transducers Mounted Athwartships
b. Single FarSounder Bow-Mounted Transducers
Figure 1: FL-Sonar Transducer Installations
The Furuno Searchlight Sonar, Model CH-270 (not pictured) uses a single transducer that can be lowered from and retracted
into the hull at speeds above 10 knots. This unit may be mounted anywhere on the vessel where an unobstructed view
horizontally through 3600 is available.
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4.0 GROUNDING OF COSTA CONCORDIA
On 13 January 2012 Costa Concordia with 4,229 persons on board (3,206 passengers and 1,023 crewmembers) whilst in
navigation in the Tyrrhenian Sea off the coast ofItaly collided with Scole Rocks adjacent to Isle de Giglio. The ship had
recently departed the port of Civitavecchia and was emoute to Savona, Italy. The hull was breached, thirty-two souls are
dead or missing and the vessel was lost.[15]
Human error is cited as a primary cause for this accident. Specifically, a chart of inadequate scale was used to superficially
plan and execute a manoeuvre at night that was unsuitable in terms of distance ITomthe coast and adjacent rocks and
outcrops as well as depth below the keel. Radar indications, had they been observed, would have clearly warned ofthe
vessel's unacceptably close proximity to the coast as well as the outcropped rock showing above the waterline. These are
just a few of the facts that came out of the official inquiry, and many mistakes in navigation were in evidence.
An attempt is made to depict information and alarms that would have been available to the bridge watch on Costa
Concordia were FL-sonar installed, operational and integrated into the INS. Mistakes in navigation planning can be made,
alarms deactivated, and watchstanders can be distracted and poorly communicate. However, perhaps the activation of an
alarm based upon direct detection of the presence ofan imminent HtoN would provide greater significance than an alarm
requiring inference ofHtoN based upon indirect methods and secondary data sources.
4.1 DETAILS OF NAVIGATION
A chronology of events leading to the grounding of Costa Concordia relevant to this discussion is as follows:
21:34:36
21:39:30
21:40:00
21:40:48
21:41:40
21:42:07
21:42:48
21 :43:08
21 :43:33
21:43:44

Master arrives on the bridge
Master orders helmsman to turn to 300°
...increase to 16 knots and turn to 310°
...turn to 325°
vessel is at position A in Figure 2
... turn to 330°
vessel is at position B in Figure 2
... turn to 335°
... turn to 340°
... turn to 350°

21:43:52vessel is at position C in Figure 2
21:44:11... starboard 10 (10 degrees to starboard)
21:44:15... starboard 20
21:44:20... hard to starboard

21:44:36...mid ship « 150metersScoleRock
21:44:43... port 10
21:44:45... port 20
21:45:55vessel is at position D in Figure 2
21:45:05... hard to port
21:45:07 CONTACT

From this chronology it appears that the Master, "vho had just come to the bridge minutes earlier at 21:34:36, exhibits
some sense of situational awareness at 21 :39:30 by his change of course to 300°" HO'\\o'"ever,
he seems to be completely
unaV\rareof the grave nature of the circumstances he has encountered at 21:40:00 (five minutes before the grounding)
when he ordered an increase in speed to 16 knots. Beginning 48 seconds later at 21 :40:48 the Master ordered the first of
twelve course changes over the next four minutes. Clearly at some point he had to become conscious of the gravity of
the situation, yet no attempt was ever made to stop the vessel, reduce speed or even execute a hard turn to starboard to
achieve a small yaw radius earlier in the incident chronology. Indeed, grolUld track information indicates the vessel was
accelerating in speed during these:final segments of the voyage.

4.2 INSIGHT AVAILABLE FROM FL-SONAR
Simulation ofthe circumstances encountered by Costa Concordia is attempted through extraction ofthe ground track using
the AIS data record, then overlaying FarSounder 1000 FL-sonar cone coverage onto the ground track to identifYkey events
that may have provided opportunities to enhance situational awareness. Four noteworthy positions in the transit just prior to
grounding identified as A, B, C and D are illustrated in Figure 2 and recorded into the above chronology.
1.4.1
Ground Track Position A (10°56'32" E, 42°20'41" N; Speed: 15.3 knots; Course 325°, approx.)
This position lies approximately 1,600 meters ITomScole Rocks with depth in"excessof 100 meters with a mud bottom.[16]
This location is outside the range ofFL-sonar to detect bottom information and is not likely to have provided any
information of significance to navigation.
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1.4.2
Segment A to B (Elapsed Time: 00:01:08, Rate of Yaw: llo/min)
During most of this segment the bottom depth would have remained in excess of 100 meters with a mud bottom. However,
just prior to arriving at Position B the maximum range of the FL-sonar would have crossed the 100 meter bottom depth
contour directly ahead and to port ofthe centreline and it is possible that early indications of an upslope bottom may have
been able to be detected. Note that during this segment the rate oftum is approximately 11 degrees per minute.
1.4.3
Ground Track Position B (10°56'15" E, 42°20'52" N; Speed 15.6 knots; Course 335°, approx.)
This position lies approximately 1,100 meters ITomScole Rocks with depth in excess of 100 meters with a mud bottom. The
100 meter bottom contour is approximately 500 meters further along the course, with upslope bottom rising to the 10 meter
bottom contour at the maximum range of the FL-sonar off the starboard bow. The bottom is also transitioning ITommud to
rock, with a resultant increase in acoustic reflectivity ofthe bottom material.
Clear indications of the approaches to Scole Rocks would have appeared on the starboard bow on the FL-sonar display.
This probably would have initially alerted the Master to the existence of a problem since the appearance of Scole Rocks
would have been expected off the port bow based upon his passage planning. [17] Furthermore, the depth contour
displayed on the FL-sonar would clearly indicate insufficient depth in an unexpected location.

... :orN

1,000 meters

S«mt 1 101)00
I'OOm

Summary of the track (extracted by the AIS data record)
Source: Marine Casualties Investigative Body, Cruise Ship Costa Concordia, Report on the safety technical
investigation, Pg. 61, Ministry ofInftastructures and Transports (Italy).
Figure 2: Ground Track of Costa Concordia, Annotated with Coverage for Forward-Looking Navigation Sonar
1.4.4
Segment B to C (Elapsed Time: 00:01:04, Rate of Yaw: 100/min)
During this segment bottom depth is steadily decreasing across the range ofthe FL-sonar ITomin excess of 100 meters to
the surface. The bottom consistency also changes ITommud to solid rock, resulting in a large acoustic reflection and
indications of strong targets.
The appearance of a solid wall leading up to the surface and continuously decreasing in distance would have loomed
prominently on the FL-sonar until it consumed two-thirds ofthe display ITomfar port to starboard of centre. Despite orders
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from the master to turn from 330° to 350° throughout the one minute segment duration, the rate of turn appears to have been
half that at 10 degrees per minute.
1.4.5
Ground Track Position C (10°56'01" E, 42°21 '05" N; Speed 16.0 knots; Course 340°?)
This position lies approximately 530 meters from Scole Rocks with depth of 95 meters just past the 100 meter contour with
a rock bottom. The bottom contour would reflect an upslope bottom rising to the surface around 500 meters ahead. Less
than one-third of the display off the starboard bow would show clear water. There would be very little room to manoeuvre
at this point.
1.4.6
Segment C to D (Elapsed Time: 00:01:03)
This is the terminal segment of the voyage. Bottom consistency is solid rock resulting in a large acoustic reflection and
indications of strong targets. The appearance of a solid wall leading up to the surface and continuously decreasing in
distance would have continued up to the point of impact.
1.4.7
Ground Track Position D (10°55'40" E, 42°21'21" N; Speed 15.3 knots; Course ???O)
This position lies approximately 30 meters from Scole Rocks with twelve seconds remaining before contact.
1.4.8
Hypothetic course of events - Applying FL-Sonar
Using a speed of 16 knots obtained from the chronology in paragraph 4.1 as the value for Speed of Vessel (Vs) in equation
(1), FL-sonar could have provided approximately 1.8 minutes advance warning to the Master of Costa Concordia of the
pending HtoN consisting of the approaches to Scole Rocks. The warning would have been issued when the vessel was just
past position B shown in Figure 2.
Had FL-sonar been installed and operational on the bridge as discrete navigational equipment without benefit of inclusion
within INS, visual indications would have shown an unmistakable wall directly in the path ofthe vessel. Existing alarms
available both integral and external to the equipment would have also been activated, further reinforcing the severity of the
situation. Consistently, at all noted positions on the final approach (Figure 2: positions A through D) the FL-sonar would
have indicated clear water was present off the starboard bow.
It is assumed that the 1.8 minutes prior warning would have provided sufficient advance notice to plan and execute evasive
manoeuvres that may have lessened the severity ofthe grounding or averted it entirely. Halting the forward momentum of
the vessel would not have been possible as this would require around 1,300 meters with the vessel moving at 16 knots, and
this distance was not available.[18] However, slowing the vessel combined with executing a hard turn to starboard upon
receiving the warning commencing approximately 800 meters prior to Scole Rocks would have significantly reduced the
damage incurred in the event of grounding such that the vessel may have remained afloat and lives may have been saved.
Indeed, and even hypotheticaL the accident may not have happened at all.
5.0

BRIDGE ALERTS AND ALARM GENERATION

The information available from the FL-sonar can be useful in alerting watchstanders as to potential HtoN present in the path
directly ahead of the bow. Visual indications seen on the FL-sonar display are one form of alerting mechanism. However,
this data may also be shared as part of an integrated approach using ECDIS as well as the Alert management, module C of
an INS according to latest IMO Performance Standards. This coincides with existing STCW training requirements and
could utilize existing alarm mechanisms with which watchstanders are already familiar.
Analysis of information available from FL-sonar can be used to trigger alerts with different levels of priority. In accordance
with the definitions provided by IMO performance standards the lowest level of such an alert is a caution to just raise
awareness ofthe bridge team to a certain unusual situation. In respect to the integrated use ofFL-sonar information this
could be a situation, where an obstacle is detected at a larger distance ahead, e.g. due to a cross track error.
Triggering warning, the second priority level of alert and requiring immediate attention by the bridge team, could be linked
to criteria within the usual Maneuvering range of the ship to avoid contact to any detected HtoN. The time frame is to be
configured as to allow the OOW to additionally check the FL-sonar display but also match with available ECDIS
information (e.g. to proof approaching a shallow waters area, a wreck or rock, island).
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Finally even an alarm could be triggered, characterizing conditions requiring immediate action e.g. the ship is approaching
the lower Maneuvering limit (e.g. an emergency, hard rudder action would be required) in order to avoid the contact with an
FL-sonar detected object/HtoN.
The capability to provide those warnings and alarms can be even independent of operator interpretation and be based upon
analysis of the information obtained from the FL-sonar. This appears to be available only from the FarSounder system.
Taking into account the characteristics ofthe sea area (e.g. approaching coastal waters, navigating in ice etc.) the operator
can configure parameters within the area being observed by setting alarm values by depth, minimum range, maximum
range, and field-of-view angle width as illustrated in Figure 3.[19] The alarm volume is shown in red. An additional setting
is the number of hits detected before triggering the alarm.

Figure 3: Forward-Looking Sonar Alarm Volume Setting
Watchstanders are provided both visual and audible notifications e.g. announced via the centralized CAM-HMI and
supported by presentation in FL-sonar target overlay in an ECDIS as suggested in the following figure, which takes into
consideration and applies requirements and standards similar to integration of information and radar overlays.
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Figure 4: FL-Sonar ENC Overlay
Fulfilling these requirements is accomplished through the fusion of data acquired directly through standard NMEA-OI83
interfaces with external navigation sensors that include the vessel's GNSS, heading sensor and echo sounder via the host
computer's COM ports.[20] A number of3rd party manufacturers have implemented their own FarSounder client
capabilities as part of their ECDIS/ENC software products.

6.0 SIMULATION PRIOR TO INTEGRATION
The use of simulation to accomplish testing, verification and validation to assimilate FL-sonar into the INS environment is a
vital factor towards ensuring systems are properly integrated and mariners are adequately trained prior to the introduction of
the technology into widespread use and as IMO carriage requirements.
Beside technical aspects, simulation trials are also to be designed and to be conducted to specifically address and study the
impact of new technologies on the human operators. Therefore simulation trials are also especially aiming at gathering
information about good practice to properly familiarize users with the handling of equipment to safely and reliably handle
such innovative systems during routine operations but also in case of safety-critical situations.
The following table provides an example for a simulation scenario firstly to be used for the purposes of researching the
effects of integrated FL-sonar on the situational awareness ofOOW. Secondly, the :fTameworkcan be further developed to
also make use in training exercises related to ice navigation too.
Simulation studies will be conducted to collect and analyse data in order to support that system requirements and
specifications are properly defmed at the level of the FL-sonar (component level) as well as the INS (system level). Human
Element related studies are to define optimal Human machine interface (HMI) and adapt alert management to end users'
needs and requirements.

On the other hand, properly implemented simulations can also serve as a means to mitigate future training lag times through
the parallel development and integration of training curricula with new system technology. Data available can be useful to
assist in marine casualty investigations especially in the cases of grounding, aIIision, collision and evasive maneuvers that
comprise some of the top marine casualty events. Indeed, the same hardware deployed on ships for navigation can be used
for training. The entire suite oftest criteria and test cases used in system verification, validation and test can comprise a
foundation for future comprehensive training tool and simulator scenario development. Involvement of training personnel in
the technology development process can also help to ensure navigation system fea¥e development is accomplished with
appropriate consideration given to ultimate end-user experience, requirements and needs.

I

I
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Draftsa1!Jple exercise scenario

Identifier
Training objective

EfQ~.eut;n~¥Jgatt9U$uPPort'~YJl\t.-~U~r
M~JtM~~ement and~2undingavoidatice
i.a. / e.g.
Use of integrated FL-sonar information for route monitoring and
grounding avoidance
Use of Integrated Navigation System for safe, efficient and
environmentally ftiendly shipping
Configuration of alert settings
. Route monitoring using all available meap.s

.
·

.

Simulator tool
Standard of competence

Navigational watch officer, Master, chief mate (management level)

- speed =18 Ids)'"

Configuration

Duration
Area

Long, > 45 min
r Coasti.irarea~~~-~-

Environment / Traffic

Moderate environmental conditions (low states) and traffic situation (low
density)

Event-descriptiol)

; '~Pass;~ger

..
.
·

vessel (i.a. equipped

system)is navigatingin a coastal
a numberof
coUJ;Se
c~ges,
~.
.

dem.~two
propellers, bow thrUster
llowing the planned route including \

CommuDicationwithcshore-based company control and VTS stations
Passage includeS several rudder/engine maneuver
Navigational wammgs about sunken container ship and drifting containers
in the concerned sea area

Change to'alternative route
.Enginebroblems
to be discussed with engineers
,
.. on under keel clearance power, speed and fuel
shallow water
tiot!:assessment jn respect to collision and grounding avoidance

.

Table 2: Draft framework for a suggested simulation scenario
7.0 CONCLUSIONS
Vessel groundings and collisions with HtoN can and do cause untold suffering, loss oflife and property, often resulting in
devastating environmental damage. Costs incurred as a result must include property and liabilities arising ftom the accident
itself as well as the cleanup. Such costs escalate as vessels increase in size and cargo capacity, especially for cargos that
include toxic chemicals. Larger passenger vessels with greater carrying capacity create even greater risk. The effects of such
accidents are amplified in areas that are remote where search and rescue and salvage efforts are problematic at best.
FL-sonar can provide a means to directly detect HtoN that are not present on navigation charts as well as supplement
existing methods to effect greater urgency to adverse circumstances and heighten situational awareness. The technical
capabilities exist to make a substantial difference now. The establishment of carriage requirements as well as fusion into
INS still needs to take place. The costs involved are minimal, especially in light ofthe consequences of not having FL-sonar
available for navigational use. The salvage cost of Costa Concordia amounts to over $2 billion US.[2l] This amount by
itself would cover the costs to purchase and install FL-sonar equipment on 75% of the world's merchant fleet greater than

.

25,000 gross tons.[22]
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